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ABSTRACT 
Privacy Audits and the Certified 
Public Accountant 
September 1978 
Ulric Joseph Gelinas, Jr., A.B., St. Michael's College 
M.B.A., University of Massachusetts 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Joseph L. Sardinas, Jr. 
Protecting the privacy of individuals about whom per¬ 
sonal information is maintained on computerized record¬ 
keeping systems has become a subject of great concern to a 
majority of people in the United States. There are no easy 
solutions to the problem of protecting privacy given the in¬ 
ternational implications of such solutions, the effect that 
computer technology can have on the success of any solution, 
and the adversary nature of the individual-record-keeper 
relationship. This research recommends that an audit of the 
privacy safeguards implemented by a record-keeping organiza¬ 
tion be conducted by the Certified Public Accountant. This 
research also suggests a methodology for such an audit. 
In July of 1977 The Privacy Protection Study Commis¬ 
sion issued its report. Personal Privacy in an Information 
Society. This report suggested the record-keeping practices 
which are necessary to protect the privacy of individuals in 
the United States. The Commission also suggested an imple¬ 
mentation plan which calls for a combination of: either 
Vll 
voluntary adoption of, or mandatory compliance with, the 
privacy practices; a permanent privacy commission to monitor 
the activities of record-keeping organizations and to serve 
as the nation's advocate on matters of privacy; and, the use 
of the courts as a last resort to obtain civil or criminal 
remedies for violations of privacy rights. This plan is 
found to be incomplete because it does not recognize: the 
impact that technology might have on the adoption of and 
compliance with privacy practices; the drive for interna¬ 
tional data accords; and, the needs of the public to receive 
verified reports of the privacy practices of record-keeping 
organizations. The results of an analysis of this implemen¬ 
tation plan, conducted in this research, is a recommendation 
that a privacy audit conducted by a Certified Public Account¬ 
ant (CPA) be an additional component of the Commission's 
plan. 
Support for this recommended audit is developed in 
three ways. First, the model is shown to be consistent 
with privacy implementation goals. These goals were taken 
from the Commission report and from assumptions made con¬ 
cerning international trans-border data flow, computer 
technology, and the information needs of the public. Se¬ 
cond, the audit by the CPA is supported by authoritative ac¬ 
counting and auditing literature. Third, as a practical mat¬ 
ter, the privacy audit is not unlike the present review of 
internal control conducted by the CPA. Although the purpose 
viii 
of the review of controls is different for financial and pri¬ 
vacy audits, the tools and techniques used by the auditor 
are similar. 
Having recommended and supported the audit of privacy 
safeguards by the CPA, this research suggests a model for 
the audit. Guidance in developing this model was obtained 
from the authoritative accounting and auditing literature. 
The first step in the model development is the selec¬ 
tion of a hierarchy of privacy objectives, standards, and 
practices. This hierarchy, which is similar in structure 
to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, is termed 
Generally Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPP). The standards 
portion of GAPP is used to suggest privacy implementation 
techniques as a guide to record-keeping organizations and is 
also used as a guide to the auditors. These standards are a 
very useful abstraction of the many privacy practices. 
The second step in the audit model development is the 
specification of privacy audit standards. The generally Ac¬ 
cepted Auditing Standards form the basis for these standards. 
The standards require that the organization devise a pri¬ 
vacy program and report annually on that program. The audit 
conducted is an audit of that report. The auditor is to de¬ 
termine the accuracy of management's representation and the 
effectiveness of the privacy program. 
The final step in the model development is a descrip¬ 
tion of the implications of existing auditing tools and 
IX 
techniques when employed in a privacy audit. A methodology 
for conducting the audit with these tools is suggested. 
The privacy implementation plan is found to be a vi¬ 
able solution to the problems of privacy implementation 
which were identified. The audit by the CPA is supported by 
authoritative literature, by being a function which can be 
performed by the CPA, and by the logical consistency of the 
model itself. This model selves both the public and record¬ 
keeping organizations. By allowing the organization to set 
its own privacy policy, recognition is given to the voluntary 
components of the privacy practices. The organization is 
therefore able to devise a privacy policy which is legal 
and also tailored to their situation. Being provided with 
verified information concerning the privacy practices of 
record-keeping organizations permits the public to use mar¬ 
ketplace pressures to force a compliance norm among record¬ 
keeping organizations. This information is the most impor¬ 
tant component of any privacy implementation plan as it pro¬ 
vides a basis for consumer choice and also provides a pre¬ 
emptive compliance monitoring device. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This research proposes a model for protecting indivi¬ 
duals' right to privacy which, if adopted as policy, would 
have a significant impact on the accounting profession, par¬ 
ticularly the Certified Public Accountant (CPA). Privacy 
discussions, which can encompass the fields of law, econo¬ 
mics, sociology and information systems, are being held for¬ 
mally and informally locally, nationally and internationally. 
Many persons and organizations are examining the problems of 
protecting privacy in today's world of computers and tele¬ 
communications. Solutions to these problems are complicated 
by the computer and telecommunications technology and are 
further complicated by an almost universal dependence on in¬ 
formation and also by an international interdependence which 
exists in many aspects of life. 
Privacy is very important to all concerned because 
great financial and psychological harm can be done to an in¬ 
dividual whose right to privacy has been violated. Nations 
are greatly concerned with this issue as they try to protect 
the right of their citizens to privacy. At the same time 
they are trying not to create data havens. Data havens exist 
in countries where privacy laws do not exist. These havens 
have the potential to dominate the international flow of data. 
1 
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Solutions to the privacy problem must balance the fol¬ 
lowing: first, an individual's right to privacy; second, 
business and government rights to maintain information with 
which to conduct their operations; third, a nation's desire 
to maintain autonomy; and fourth, a nation's desire to be in¬ 
volved in international trade. This research suggests solu¬ 
tions to the problem which directly involve the CPA. This 
chapter outlines the issue of individual privacy, presents an 
overview of the research project, including the scope and 
methodology, and also discusses the significance of the pri¬ 
vacy problem and the solutions to the problem as a justifica¬ 
tion for this project. 
The Privacy Problem 
An individual's independent right to privacy has not 
always existed. It is not specifically mentioned in the Con¬ 
stitution or the Bill of Rights. Certain privacy rights were 
originally derived from such common law rights as nuisance, 
trespass, protection of business confidences, trademarks and 
the relevance and necessity measures for the admissability 
of evidence. As a legal concept, an independent right to 
privacy was first prominently discussed in 1879 by Judge 
Thomas Cooley who said that privacy was a right "to be let 
along."'*' In 1890 Warren and Brandeis published an article 
"The Right of Privacywhich became a classic and the basis 
for a discussion of privacy which goes on to this day. 
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Various court decisions since the Warren and Brandeis 
article have defined privacy as a right which can be derived 
from various parts of the Constitution and the Bill of 
Rights, specifically amendments 1, 4, 5 and 9. Such rights 
as free speech, expression and belief, religious freedom 
and free conscience, protection against search without proper 
warrant and for unreasonable demands, protection from force 
to incriminate oneself and protection from cruel and unusual 
punishment, which have been part of the American civil- 
liberties tradition throughout our history, have been used 
to develop this individual right to privacy. 
Although privacy has been defined as a constitutional 
right by various court decisions, these rights had not been 
clearly enough defined given modern technology, especially 
computer technology. This gave rise to privacy laws start¬ 
ing, in the records-keeping area, with The Fair Credit Re¬ 
porting Act of 1970. 
Westin^ has described privacy as performing four func¬ 
tions for individuals in democratic societies. These are 
personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation and 
limited and protected communications. Others have described 
privacy as essential to physical, psychological, social and 
moral well-being.^ A person is continually engaged in making 
decisions on a trade-off between the desire for privacy and 
the desire to communicate with and disclose information to 
others. 
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Privacy has been defined in the literature already 
cited and in various other places. The following definitions 
for privacy and other related terms, taken from Hoffman, are 
those adopted for this research: 
1. Security. Data security is the protection of data 
against accidental or intentional destruction, disclosure 
or modification. Computer security refers to the techno¬ 
logical safeguards and managerial procedures which can be 
applied to computer hardware, programs and data to assure 
that organizational assets and individual privacy are 
protected 
2. Privacy. Privacy is a concept which applies to an indi¬ 
vidual. It is the right of an individual to decide what 
information s(he) wishes to share with others and also 
what information s(he) is willing to accept from others 
3. Confidentiality. Confidentiality is a concept which ap¬ 
plies to data. It is the status accorded to data which 
has been agreed upon between the person or organization 
furnishing the data and the organization receiving it and 
which describes the degree of protection to be provided 
4. Integrity. Data integrity exists when data does not dif¬ 
fer from its source documents and has not been accident¬ 
ally or maliciously altered, disclosed, or destroyed.5 
Security is the means used to provide for privacy, con¬ 
fidentiality, and data integrity. It should be noted that 
many discussions of privacy are really talking about all four 
items. There is also some confusion as to the difference be¬ 
tween secrecy and privacy. Fried notes the difference when 
he states: 
. . . privacy seems to be related to secrecy, to limiting 
the knowledge of others about oneself. ... It is not 
true, for instance, that the less that is known about us 
the more privacy we have. Privacy is not simply an ab¬ 
sence of information about us in the minds of others; ra¬ 
ther it is the control we have over information about 
ourselves.6 
The idea of privacy as a process of choice by an indi¬ 
vidual or of control by the individual has been incorporated 
into the various privacy laws. Legislated privacy as it ap¬ 
plies to record-keeping may include the following rights: 
to decide what personal information should be put into re¬ 
cords; to decide with whom this should be shared; to decide 
how this should be used; to be assured that the data is main¬ 
tained with confidentiality and integrity; and to know about 
and contest data used to make judgments affecting rights and 
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opportunities. Westin and Baker have noted that, with re¬ 
gards to record-keeping, that a person's right to privacy is 
closely connected to a person's right to due process of law. 
It is the force of these two rights which has been the source 
of the drive for the current privacy legislation. 
Internal Controls for Privacy Protection 
Providing for privacy safeguards is essentially a pro¬ 
cess of implementing internal control. Internal control 
seeks to ensure that the organizational elements, which are 
bound together by various management and operational relation 
ships, are in accordance with management policies. These 
controls include the following elements: management policies 
organization and assignment of tasks and responsibilities 
within the organizational structure; business plans and pro¬ 
jections used by management to guide the organization and 
evaluate achievement; operating policies and procedures; 
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manual transaction processing procedures; record-keeping, 
both computer-based information and record-keeping and those 
independent of data processing; and a feedback mechanism with 
which to monitor compliance with the controls. 
There are various manual and automated control techniques 
available to record-keeping organizations which can be used 
in a privacy protection program. There are administrative 
controls, physical security methods, and security and accur¬ 
acy controls built into the computer system which can be used 
O 
to enact a privacy protection program. Martin0 describes 
these controls as layers of protection with computer system 
controls overlaid with physical security which is then all 
overlaid with administrative controls. All of the levels of 
control are interdependent. 
There are various computer control techniques available 
to record-keeping concerns to assist them in complying with 
the requirements of the various privacy laws. For example, 
to assist in maintaining accuracy there are methods to check 
for errors as data are converted to machine-readable form, 
input to the computer, stored on a computer and finally as 
data are accessed for use. The use of telecommunications and 
remote terminals as well as internal data accessing methods 
allow the record-keeper to easily report record contents to 
the individual upon request. There are various authentica¬ 
tion, authorization, and logging methods to control access 
and use of information and to provide a record of the uses 
to which the information has been put. 
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Auditing and Internal Control Systems 
Once an internal control system is installed, its effec¬ 
tiveness is verified for management by an audit function. It 
may also be desirable to provide this audit by an independent 
function for those outside the organization who might be in¬ 
terested. The desirability of auditing internal controls in¬ 
stalled for privacy has been proposed by various authors. 
For example, Lobel has stated: 
A privacy protection program . . . should also have a de¬ 
tailed system security plan designed to: ... provide 
for the adequate testing and auditing of data accuracy 
and system operation to make certain that once imple¬ 
mented, controls are not circumvented.9 
Within an organization it is the responsibility of the inter¬ 
nal auditor to verify the effectiveness of internal control 
systems. This verification should include controls installed 
for the purpose of protecting privacy. 
Chapter III discusses the desirability of conducting 
an independent audit of privacy safeguards. It is also sug¬ 
gested that a logical candidate for such a task is the CPA. 
Suggesting that such an audit is desirable does not, however, 
necessarily mean that this audit task is acceptable to the 
accounting profession nor that there is support for it in the 
authoritative accounting and auditing literature. 
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A working panel on auditing of data base management sys¬ 
tems (DBMS), which was chaired by Donald L. Adams of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 
reported a mixed reaction to an audit of privacy safeguards 
by the CPA. For example: 
The dual growth of DBMS and public concern for individual 
privacy will create a flood of legislation. Someone will 
be given the job of determining whether or not specific 
data base applications comply with privacy regulations. 
Although they are not eager to accept this task, it seems 
likely that an auditor will be called on the conduct of 
such compliance reviews.10 
Also, in response to the question, "What should the auditor's 
role be in evaluating the impact of privacy considerations or 
legislation on the design of DBMS?", there were replies from 
the panel which suggested that the auditor would become in¬ 
volved. For example, 
The auditor should be knowledgeable about what reason¬ 
able privacy considerations are possible. He should un¬ 
derstand what privacy features management policy is di¬ 
recting to be implemented. Most important, he MUST know 
what features are actually being used and whether they 
are effective. . . . 
The external auditor will probably be the party respon¬ 
sible to management for insuring privacy legislation is 
enforced within the systems of an organization. 
The external auditor is responsible to parties external 
to the organization. The loss of assets which could re¬ 
sult from a legal suit over privacy may cause external 
parties to look to the external auditor for attestation 
as to the enforcement of privacy legislation within the 
organization. Interested parties such as government, so¬ 
cially conscious groups, stockholders, etc., and the or¬ 
ganizations themselves may look to the external auditor 
as an independent party who can attest to the enforcement 
of privacy legislation, because the integrity of data has 
continually been the essence of auditing. 
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There were those panel members who did not foresee involvement 
by the auditor. For example, 
No involvement. That is a legal not audit problem. It 
is up to Systems and Programming to insure legal involve¬ 
ment. Audit should only bring both parties together. . . 
Independent auditors should not be used to assist in mo¬ 
nitoring compliance with the myriad of federal, state and 
local law which governs our society. Although it is 
reasonable for independent auditors to particiate in some 
compliance, that participation should be limited to situa¬ 
tions which have a direct bearing on financial position 
or results of operations. Because it is not possible for 
auditors to be conversant in all areas of prevailing le¬ 
gislation concerning privacy, this area should not have 
the involvement of independent auditors.H 
This researcher recognizes that there are those in the ac¬ 
counting profession who do not deem it desirable for an au¬ 
ditor to undertake the task of a privacy audit. Arguments 
are presented to persuade those not inclined to undertake 
such a task. 
A review of the authoritative literature which has at¬ 
tempted to define theories of auditing and accounting reveals 
that there is some support for a CPA audit of privacy safe¬ 
guards. Two aspects are addressed in this review of the li¬ 
terature. First, is there authoritative support for a privacy 
audit as an engagement separate from the financial audit? Se¬ 
cond, is there support for a privacy audit as part of the fi¬ 
nancial audit? 
Clearly, there is support for the audit as a separate 
engagement. This would normally be referred to as a compli¬ 
ance review. The U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO), for 
10 
example, established standards to be used by auditors in 
conducting audits of government activities.^ The scope of 
these standards is wide enough to include a privacy audit as 
a separate engagement. The AICPA concurred with these stan¬ 
dards and suggested that auditors undertake such engage- 
13 
ments. 
Support for a review of privacy safeguards as a part of 
a financial audit does exist but it is not as clear and cer¬ 
tainly not as strong. The authoritative literature is briefly 
reviewed here to outline the relationship between the audit 
function and the review and evaluation of internal control. 
Mautz and Sharaf limited the scope of the CPA audit 
when they state: 
Auditing is concerned with the faithfulness with which 
reported financial data portray the realities of an en¬ 
terprise's operations and financial condition. 
Although they do advocate a review of the internal control 
system as one of their postulates of auditing, they restrict 
this review by limiting auditing to the financial condition 
of the company. 
The Committee to Prepare a Statement of Basic Account¬ 
ing Theory defined accounting as: 
. . . the process of identifying, measuring, and commu¬ 
nicating economic information to permit informed judg¬ 
ments and decisions by users of the information. 
In 1973 the Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts used the 
scope of accounting defined by the Accounting Theory Committee 
when it defined auditing as: 
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. . . a systematic process of objectively obtaining and 
evaluating evidence regarding assertions about economic 
actions and events to ascertain the degree of corres¬ 
pondence between those assertions and established cri¬ 
teria and communicating the results to interested 
users. 
The actual relationship of the CPA and the evaluation 
of internal controls as it exists today is defined in the se¬ 
cond Standard of Field Work of the Generally Accepted Audit¬ 
ing Standards which states: 
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the ex¬ 
isting internal control as a basis for reliance thereon 
and for the determination of the resultant extent of the 
tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted. 17 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 (SAS 1) goes on to dis¬ 
tinguish between accounting and administrative control. 
Administrative control includes, but is not limited to, 
the plan of organization and the procedures and records 
that are concerned with the decision process leading to 
management's authorization of transactions. . . . Ac¬ 
counting control comprises the plan of organization and 
the procedures and records that are concerned with the 
safeguarding of assets and the reliability of financial 
records. . . . 
Later in SAS 1 it is stated: 
. . . accounting control is within the scope of the study 
and evaluation of internal control contemplated by gen¬ 
erally accepted auditing standards, while administrative 
control is not.^° 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) recently issued SAS 20—Required Communication of Ma- 
19 
terial Weaknesses of Internal Accounting Control. This 
standard requires that auditors communicate to senior manage¬ 
ment and the board of directors or its audit committee ma¬ 
terial weaknesses in internal accounting control. It is not 
12 
required that this communication be made to the public and it 
is only incidental to the auditor's review of accounting con¬ 
trol performed while making an examination of financial state¬ 
ments . 
A major development on the subjeer of the relationship 
between the CPA and the verification of internal controls 
came in 1978 when the Commission on Auditors' Responsibili¬ 
ties (Cohen Commission) recommended an extension of the au¬ 
ditors' responsibilities in the evaluation of internal con¬ 
trols. This extension would require the auditor to expand 
the study and evaluation of the controls over the accounting 
system to form a conclusion on the functioning of the system 
20 
during the year. This recommendation takes the auditor 
further away from evaluating controls as a basis for their 
use in determining fairness of statements and closer to the 
analysis of controls regardless of the purpose for which they 
were established. A more detailed review of this authorita¬ 
tive literature is undertaken in chapter III. The conclusion 
is reached there that there is authoritative support for the 
privacy audit both as a separate engagement and as a part of 
the financial audit. 
Scope of the Research Projecu 
When discussing privacy, people are at various times 
talking about electronic surveillance such as wire-tapping. 
13 
psychological surveillance such as personality testing, mail 
opening, and record-keeping. This research deals with an in¬ 
dividual's right to privacy as it relates to individually 
identifiable personal information maintained, primarily in a 
computerized form, by record-keeping organizations. The re¬ 
quirements of the law, the safeguards which implement those 
requirements and the monitoring and enforcement of compliance 
are the subjects of interest. This research concentrates on 
computerized systems because the majority of personal records 
are stored in computerized form. The federal government, for 
example, reports that 74% of all personal records maintained 
by federal record-keeping agencies are in a partially or to- 
21 
tally computerized form. 
Legislation in the area of privacy is still evolving. 
As of mid-1978 there are several bills before the Congress 
which are currently pending action. Therefore, this research 
suggests a set of privacy standards and objectives, which do 
not vary with these laws, rather than attempting to deal with 
the detailed provisions of this legislation and laws already 
enacted. A few of the privacy safeguard implementation pro¬ 
cedures contained in this legislation will, however, be pre¬ 
sented as examples. Some of the implementation procedures are 
mandatory, some are optional, and most procedures vary between 
industries. It is also expected that these procedures will 
vary over time as the environment changes. It would serve no 
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purpose to present detailed procedures which lack consistency 
and permanence. 
This research will concentrate on federal privacy re¬ 
quirements only. Just as it serves no purpose to present all 
of the federal implementation procedures, it serves no pur¬ 
pose to present the many state privacy laws. Also, Federal 
privacy legislation precludes the states from enacting laws 
which are inconsistent with or less stringent than federal 
law. A report to the President on a national information 
policy concluded that national privacy legislation was more 
desirable than state laws because it avoided conflicting re¬ 
quirements in different jurisdictions. This inconsistency 
could significantly increase costs and impede interstate data 
22 
flow. Although this research will discuss only federal 
privacy procedures, any implementation of privacy safeguards 
should recognize that in certain jurisdictions there are 
privacy requirements which may be more restrictive than the 
federal requirements. 
Research Methodology 
There has been considerable discussion in the account¬ 
ing literature as to what constitutes appropriate methodology 
for research in accounting. There have been criticisms of 
a priori research as well as some of the global normative 
theories of accounting. Some of the criticisms are directed 
as the opinion-based nature of some of the theories and on 
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untested or untestable nature of the conclusions. Sterling, 
however, has concluded that: 
Since the research methods depend upon the questions and 
since I am unwilling to place restrictions on questions, 
it follows that I am unwilling to place restrictions on 
methods. ... To avoid this danger, I am unwilling to 
exclude any research method, and therefore, I must in¬ 
clude all research methods. 4 
Since this project is a prescription of what ought to 
be done as a solution to the privacy problem and how it 
ought to be done, it is essentially a normative theory of ac- 
counting. Ijiri describes the two steps involved in con¬ 
structing a normative theory as goal assumption and deduc¬ 
tion. Ijiri states: 
Since a normative model is goal oriented, the assumed 
goals must be clearly stated. . . . One must state the 
goals to be served by changing the existing accounting 
practices toward the normative direction. Then one must 
develop a model, deducing from the goals some of the 
properties that the model must have. ... A defense 
for a normative model is made by demonstrating that cer¬ 
tain benefits are derived if the reality is changed to 
fit the specifications of the model, where benefits are 
defined in relation to the assumed goals. A defense for 
a normative model may be made by logically showing the 
superiority of the state that can be created by using the 
model, . . . Since goals are concerned with improving 
reality, it must be feasible to apply a model in an em¬ 
pirical situation. Thus, the feasibility of a normative 
model becomes a vital part of its defense.26 
This model will assume goals and logically derive 
practices from the goals. It will be demonstrated that the 
conclusions are logically derived from the goals. The feasi¬ 
bility of these conclusions will be established. 
Within this overall normative framework this research 
will resort to other approaches to theory development. Choice 
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of goals will be guided by sociological and ethical consider¬ 
ations. The auditing practices which will be suggested will 
be pragmatic in nature, derived by a process of induction 
from the realities of the computerized record-keeping envi¬ 
ronment and tested by their consistency with this reality 
and the standards which they are intended to satisfy. Hen- 
driksen describes these approaches to accounting theory 
and advocates the combining of the various approaches in an 
eclectic approach to accounting theory development. He 
states: 
. . . practically all fully developed theories of ac¬ 
counting rely upon more than one basic approach to 
theory. Those that attempt to rely upon a single goal 
or approach are generally incomplete as a logical basis 
for the formulation of accounting procedures or their 
evaluation.2° 
This research must use an eclectic approach because there are 
several steps to the development of the privacy and auditing 
model which require different research methods. The re¬ 
search methodology to be employed at each stage of develop¬ 
ment of this model, a justification for each method, and the •* 
methods of demonstrating the consistency and feasibility of 
the conclusions are discussed in chapter II. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
The nature of this research project precludes conform¬ 
ing to what some would consider the norms of dissertation 
organization. There is no chapter dedicated to a review of 
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the literature since that will be done in each chapter as 
each aspect of the model is developed. Also, there is no 
chapter dedicated to results of the research project. At 
each step in the development process the logical consistency 
and feasibility of the arguments is discussed. 
Chapter II is a detailed discussion of the steps in 
the model development and the research methodology for each 
step. Chapter III presents the normative model for the pro¬ 
tection of individual privacy. The practical justification 
and the philosophical implications are presented. Chapter 
IV deduces a set of privacy safeguards from a set of privacy 
objectives which are consistent with the goals of the pri¬ 
vacy model. The privacy safeguard requirements or procedures 
are outlined and shown to be consistent with the standards. 
Chapter V suggests some of the ways that privacy safeguards 
can be implemented in an organization. It will not be pre¬ 
sented in such a way that it becomes a definitive model for 
implementation but to provide a framework for the audit mo¬ 
del. Chapter VI presents a model for conducting the audit 
including the auditing standards to be used. Concluding re¬ 
marks are presented in chapter VII. 
Significance of the Research 
The topic of the research is significant because pri¬ 
vacy is important to individuals and to society as a whole. 
The results of the project, the privacy and audit models. 
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are significant because of the potential contribution that 
they can make to society in solving the privacy problem. 
The importance of privacy and the contributions that compli¬ 
ance audits would make to the monitoring of the use of tech¬ 
nology and to an international agreement on privacy are pre¬ 
sented below. 
Importance of Privacy 
At the beginning of this chapter the development of 
privacy as a constitutional right was outlined. Little was 
said, however, about how important that right can be to an 
individual. As noted earlier, in 1973 a committee commis¬ 
sioned by the Secretary of the U. S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare reported: 
There is widespread belief that personal privacy is es¬ 
sential to our well-being—physically, psychologically, 
socially, and morally. Concern about the effects of com¬ 
puterized personal data systems centers on their threat 
to privacy.29 
People have expressed concern over violations of their rights 
to privacy. Westin and Baker^ report on a series of opinion 
studies conducted between 1970 and 1973. A conclusion that 
they reach is that there " is a solid minority sentiment that 
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people feel their privacy is being eroded in some respect."0 
In the studies reported, up to 84% of the people surveyed ex¬ 
pressed some concern about and strong interest in their right 
to privacy. Over a third of those polled in another survey 
thought that computers represented a real threat to people's 
privacy. A 1977-1978 Louis Harris poll, reported on in 
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Computerworld, shows that 54% of people now think that com¬ 
puter data banks pose a threat to personal privacy compared 
to 38% in 1973-1974. This poll also showed that 71% of the 
public thought that they surrendered their privacy by opening 
their first charge account, taking out a loan, buying some¬ 
thing on the installment plan or applying for credit. This 
is up from 48% in 1973-1974. 
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In a 1977 study of five major U. S. corporations, 
conducted by Purdue University's Information Privacy Re¬ 
search Center, up to 92% of the employees questioned ex¬ 
pressed a desire to be consulted concerning the use of their 
personnel records. Less than half of those questioned, how¬ 
ever, felt that they had any control over the use, content, 
or accuracy of their personnel records. A conclusion which 
can be reached from these studies is that people's privacy 
is important to them and they are concerned about an erosion 
of their rights to privacy. 
Privacy was deemed important by the people surveyed 
and should be important to most people because of what can 
happen as a result of having a right of privacy violated. 
In the context of record-keeping, violation of privacy can 
cause both financial and psychological harm. Misuse of per¬ 
sonal information can have a much greater impact on a person 
than actual direct financial losses brought about by pene¬ 
trating a data bank's security for purposes of committing 
fraud. Erroneous or improper use of information stored 
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about an individual can certainly cause direct financial loss 
when a person is denied a job, credit, insurance policy, or a 
preferred rate. But such abuses can also cause psychological 
harm as when a person is improperly accused of a crime, de¬ 
nied custody of a child or other harms which can be caused as 
a result of the financial losses. These losses, although not 
directly measurable, can cause greater damage than financial 
losses. 
As stated earlier, individuals are continually making 
decisions about the amount of privacy desired and the degree 
to which they want to communicate with others. People try 
to balance the information needs of organizations and the 
need for privacy. However, people have been gradually losing 
the ability to control this balance. Governments and private 
organizations have always maintained records on individuals 
with which to administer programs and compete in the business 
world. For a time there was little concern that the data 
would be misused, be inaccurate, or not kept confidential be¬ 
cause there was usually a first-hand contact between the per¬ 
son and the record-keeper. This contact would permit the 
establishment of expectations of confidentiality, accuracy, 
and use which if not met would allow the person to terminate 
the relationship or take action to see what expectations 
were met. 
Several things have happened which have changed this 
situation and which prevent individuals from knowing about 
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or controlling the use, accuracy or disclosure of records 
maintained about them. As society changed, contact with re- 
cordkeepers was no longer a normal situation. Local govern¬ 
ments became bigger, more complex, and less accessible. At 
the same time, the federal government took on a major role 
in recordkeeping to administer various tax, law enforcement, 
and social programs. Also, as society became more mobile 
and personal contact between business and customers became 
rare, there grew a need to have a method to check people's 
credit. This gave rise to credit bureaus and investigative 
agencies. All of these changes gave rise to massive files, 
many containing personal or sensitive information, which were 
not under the control of the person about whom the information 
was maintained. 
It was at this point that government stepped in, in 
the form of study commissions and then legislation to pro¬ 
tect the privacy rights of citizens. It is in this context 
that this research suggests compliance monitoring of privacy 
safeguards. 
Technology 
The potential for the abuse of the contents of personal 
files is significantly increased when these files are compu¬ 
terized. With the extensive use of computerized data banks, 
teleprocessing, and terminals, and the ability of the compu¬ 
ter to very quickly access, manipulate, correlate, and report 
data from its files, the protection of the rights of citizens 
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to privacy became an important issue. Files containing in¬ 
formation of a personal nature have always existed. As 
people have lost the ability to control these files and as 
abuse of them has become very easy with computerization, the 
need to assist individuals in protecting their privacy has 
become necessary. 
There is reason to believe that future techological 
advancements will cause the problem of privacy to become more 
acute. This conclusion is based on two independent yet com¬ 
plementary outgrowths of recent technological advances. 
First, today computer technology makes information gathering 
and storage in anticipation of needs more attractive than 
ever before. These same advances make accessing of compu¬ 
terized files easier. Second, this techology also makes 
compliance monitoring of computer systems more difficult. 
At the same time, however, modern technology does at times 
facilitate implementation of system controls. 
Data-base management systems (DBMS), for example, will 
be highly utilized in the future. These systems allow for 
easier storage, access and manipulation of computerized data. 
The massive amounts of data that can be maintained by a DBMS 
with the various access methods and storage structures make 
auditing of DBMS files very difficult. However, these sys¬ 
tems do have control features not present in other file 
storage techniques. 
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Computer networks, distributed processing systems, and 
micro-processors are all advances which give access to data 
files to more people (some novices) in such a way that secur¬ 
ity controls have become difficult to implement and monitor. 
This dispersion of the use and control of computer files 
becomes very critical when the files are of a sensitive na¬ 
ture . 
Also, technology may have created a situation in which 
it is financially desirable to permanently store data which 
would not normally be saved or collected at all. This could 
give rise to files, saved in anticipation of future needs, 
which could be used just because they are available. One 
author feels organizations will collect extra data about em- 
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ployees in anticipation of future government requirements. 
There are two aspects of computer technology which 
make this a very real possibility. First, it is much easier 
and cheaper to collect some data using direct sensing/ 
scanning devices than it is to go back and manually prepare 
these data for computer input. For example, the cost of 
preparing 1,000 characters of information for input is $.01 
if direct sensing is used and $.50 if a key-to-paper/card/ 
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tape/disk/processor is used. If an organization waits for 
a need to arise before preparing data for computer input, it 
will be paying more than it would if it had been captured 
originally. The organization also runs the risk that the 
data will not be available when it goes back to get it. 
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Much data is lost forever if not captured when the circum¬ 
stance which gave rise to the data occurs. 
Second, the cost of mass storage devices will continue 
to decline, making it cheaper to store data in anticipation 
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of future needs. Withington, for example, sees up to a 
200% decrease in the cost of storage per bit of information 
by 1985. This means that organizations, rather than running 
the risk of needing data which may not be available in the 
future, will anticipate their needs and capture and store 
data when originally available. There are really two cases 
here. One, if an organization is capturing certain data for 
processing and then discarding it; and two, if they have the 
opportunity to capture the data and are not doing so. In 
the first case the cost of converting 30,000,000 characters 
to machine readable form, using the figure of $.50 per 1,000 
characters is $15,000. That data can be thrown away after 
processing and re-captured later for another $15,000 or 
stored on one magnetic tape costing $20. In the second case 
the organization, based on an evaluation of future needs, may 
choose to expend the $15,020 as a protection against the risk 
of never being able to get the data back. Of course this is 
a simplified view since costs of storing and maintaining 
tapes are not included and the ability of the organization 
to estimate future needs is assumed, but it does identify an 
option which present technology does offer. 
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An application of some new technology which offers the 
ability to capture information previously not available and 
which is lost as soon as a transaction has ended unless cap¬ 
tured is electronic fund transfers (EFT). A recent article 
expresses the concern that some have regarding the proli¬ 
feration of EFT systems and their threat to privacy: 
What concerns consumers is that EFT, when used in lieu 
of cash, creates records of transactions where no record 
existed in the past. That EFT makes retrieval of data 
quicker and easier for both government agencies and for 
indepth market research.^ 
A bill recently submitted in the U. S. Senate has removed 
some of the restrictions on EFT systems and has paved the 
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way for further expansion of their use. The recently 
published report of the National Commission on Electronic 
Fund Transfers found that privacy safeguards were not adequate 
to deal with the threats to privacy that may arise with EFT. 
The report did not, however, recommend any legislation for 
protecting privacy.^ 
The question is, given these technological changes, 
can privacy be sufficiently protected with present and 
planned legislation? Two viewpoints were found. The pre¬ 
viously mentioned HEW study stated: 
The natural evolution of existing law will not protect 
personal privacy from the risks of computerized personal 
data systems.^0 
On the prospects of legislation being able to cope with the 
problem Rothman and Mosmann state: 
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The rate of change of technology is such that in another 
forty years, computer power can have increased by a fac¬ 
tor of 1,000. Technology, social attitudes, and econo¬ 
mic forces can change significantly in days, weeks, 
months, and certainly in a year. Our system changes po¬ 
litical office holders in periods of two, four, and six 
years. We create laws and commissions over periods of 
twenty to forty years. This disparity seems very great. 1 
It seems clear that modern computer technology threatens 
to erode a person's right to privacy. It also seems that le¬ 
gal processes take too long to mature to keep up with the rate 
of technological change. A monitoring of compliance with 
privacy safeguards seems in order. 
International Competition 
In 1977 and 1978 there have been many reports in the 
media expressing concern over the ability of some U. S. firms 
to compete internationally because of the disparity between 
U. S. privacy safeguard requirements and those that exist in 
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other nations. The U. S. firms that would be affected 
would be data base creators and suppliers, specialized com¬ 
munication carriers and multinationals. 
The laws enacted in Sweden and Germany, and proposed 
by international bodies such as the Council of Europe, the 
European Economic Community and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development vary quite a bit in their re¬ 
quirements making privacy agreements or treaties difficult. 
Most however do have three points in common. They establish 
a privacy board with licensing, regulation and enforcement 
provisions. They usually have an omnibus type approach with 
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privacy protection provisions being the same for all indus¬ 
tries. Finally, they all restrict the flow of information 
to countries which do not meet the levels of privacy protec¬ 
tion required in the originating country. 
The Privacy Protection Study Commission chose not to 
suggest a government privacy board with powers over the pri¬ 
vate sector because they felt that in a democratic society 
government intrusion into data flow must be kept to a mini¬ 
mum and that the first amendment sharply limits such govern¬ 
ment intrusion anyway. The Commission also felt that, in 
order to achieve fairness for both the recordkeeper and the 
individual, a varying combination of rights for individuals 
and responsibilities for organizations according to the par¬ 
ticular circumstances of each type of record-keeping rela¬ 
tionship should be designed. Thus, they suggest no omnibus 
legislation. 
There would seem, then, to be an impasse with other na¬ 
tions requiring procedures which in the United States are 
unconstitutional or at least undesirable. An article in 
the American Journal of International Law suggests a solu¬ 
tion, an international agreement.^ This agreement would 
have as one of its principles a minimum protection of rights 
which would be binding on any company receiving data from 
another country. This agreement would also require rules for 
verification of observance of the principles. The indepen¬ 
dent audit of the privacy safeguards which were suggested by 
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the Privacy Protection Study Commission or other minimum 
standards agreed upon would meet the intent of the interna¬ 
tional agreement suggested by this article. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented the privacy problem and its 
historical and legal development. It was shown that imple¬ 
menting privacy safeguards is a process of implementing in¬ 
ternal controls, controls which are audited to verify their 
effectiveness. Verification of internal controls is carried 
out by internal and independent auditors, although the CPA 
does not at this time verify privacy controls. The scope of 
this research project is limited to privacy as it relates to 
the computerized record-keeping and only as to privacy re¬ 
quirements at the federal level. The research methodology to 
be employed was briefly introduced. This will be the subject 
of the next chapter. The importance of this research was 
discussed in the previous section. Monitoring of privacy 
safeguards by an independent agency will be a significant 
assistance to individuals and to society as it wrestles with 
the problems of the advancing capabilities of automated in¬ 
formation technology and the devising of an international 
agreement on the protection of privacy. 
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CHAPTER I I 
METHODOLOGY 
In the previous chapter it was mentioned that the model 
to be developed in this research project will be a prescrip¬ 
tion of what ought to be done to protect the privacy of indi¬ 
viduals in the computerized record-keeping environment that 
exists today. When a model or theory prescribes what ought 
to be, it is a normative model. Hendriksen describes a nor¬ 
mative theory. 
Normative theories attempt to prescribe what accounting 
ought to do and how it ought to do it; that is, they at¬ 
tempt to explain what should be rather than what is. 
Normative accounting theory may be used to evaluate cur¬ 
rent practice or it may be used to develop new proce¬ 
dures. . . 
This model will develop new procedures which ought to be fol¬ 
lowed to effectively safeguard the right of individuals to 
privacy. These new procedures are changes to the current 
practice of accounting, as new roles are prescribed for ac¬ 
countants, both internal and independent auditors. It is, 
then, a normative theory of accounting. 
In the previous chapter it was mentioned that the de¬ 
velopment of a normative theory is a process of clearly stat¬ 
ing goals and logically deducing practices which the model 
must have to meet those goals. It was also stated that 
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a defense of a normative model requires demonstration of the 
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logical consistency and the feasibility of the practices. 
This chapter will present the methodology of the model and 
outline the defenses that will be used at each stage of the 
development process. First, however, the appropriateness of 
this research method in accounting and reasons for having an 
eclectic approach within this normative development will be 
discussed. 
Normative Models in Accounting 
It was stated in the previous chapter that some author¬ 
ities have criticized the normative research which has oc- 
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curred in accounting. Nelson, for example, has called this 
research "a priori research" which, he says, prescribes ac¬ 
counting practice by stating hypotheses without testing these 
hypotheses. He complains that the hypotheses have been too 
broad in scope and the models developed too grand to be use¬ 
ful or testable. He suggests that it is time to take smaller 
problems, to develop and test hypotheses and while doing 
this possibly make use of some tools outside of accounting or 
develop new ones. 
Caplan has stated that deductive global theories 
. . . have failed, in part at least, because they have 
neglected a fundamental aspect of scientific reasoning— 
they provide no evidence to support their logic except 
the opinions of their authors.^ 
These criticisms, which are based on a review of writings of 
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Chambers, Edwards and Bell, and Ijiri, seem to be represen¬ 
tative . 
There have been several authoritative answers to these 
criticisms. As was noted in the previous chapter, Sterling5 
is not willing to limit the methodology used in accounting. 
The methodology chosen depends on the problem to be solved or 
the question to be answered. A normative model is appro¬ 
priate to the privacy problem to be solved. 
Wells has written about the role of such models in the 
development of accounting theory. He states: 
. . . the works fulfill a critically important role; 
they are both a natural reaction to the recognition of 
anomalies and a vital step in the selection of a new 
disciplinary matrix.^ 
Wells is using terminology taken from Kuhn. A disciplinary 
matrix is composed of symbolic generalizations, beliefs in 
particular models, values, and examples which are concrete 
7 
problem solutions. What this means is that when an anomaly 
is recognized in a science, theory which proposes a new dis¬ 
ciplinary matrix is appropriate as a means of overthrowing 
outdated ideas and practices. A revolution occurs. Wells 
argues that accounting satisfies all of Kuhn's requirements 
to be considered a science and that the development of ac¬ 
counting theory should be judged in light of the revolution 
which Kuhn outlines. 
This research presents a situation in which the exist¬ 
ing roles of accounting and the practices of accountants do 
not adequately meet the problems posed by the environment. 
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Kuhn presents this specific situation as justification for 
fundamental changes in existing institutional or conceptual 
framework. A priori or normative research in accounting pro¬ 
poses new elements for the disciplinary matrix by proposing 
new ways of looking at parts of the world to solve problems 
that have been recognized. Caplan, who had criticized nor¬ 
mative research, states, "... their function would be to 
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identify problems and possible solutions." 
Some of the specific criticisms of this methodology 
can be answered. First, hypotheses of models operating in 
previously unplowed ground do not necessarily need to be 
tested. Kuhn points out that new ideas form the basis for 
discussion, testing, and identification of new schools of 
thought. One of these schools eventually dominates as a re¬ 
sult of the discussion. 
Second, this research does not intend to be a global 
solution to all accounting problems. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, this research limits itself to a small 
area. Finally, the goals of a normative model have to be 
based on opinion. Ijiri points out that: 
. . . the selection of a goal itself seems to be a mat¬ 
ter of personal value judgment. As such, the goal se¬ 
lected is not scientifically testable. 0 
It seems, then, that there is authority for using re¬ 
search techniques in accounting which are not favored by 
some for use in accounting. When a problem exists which 
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cannot be solved by more preferred research methods, those 
that will be of assistance should be used. 
The Eclectic Approach to the Model 
The overall approach to this model will be normative. 
The goals of the privacy protection model will be stated and 
the practices necessary to implement this model will be de¬ 
duced from the goals. There are reasons, however, for using 
other research methods within the overall framework. The 
evolutionary nature of accounting practice, the existence 
of a body of accounting and auditing theory, the close con¬ 
nection between accounting theory and practice, the exis¬ 
tence of computer system technology, and the existence of 
privacy laws, requires that this research do more than de¬ 
duce from the goals of the model. 
Ijiri points out the close relationship between ac¬ 
counting theory and practice and the problems that that re¬ 
lationship presents. He states: 
Since theory and policies are so intermingled in ac¬ 
counting, it is difficult to have one's theoretical 
argument understood purely on theoretical grounds. The 
argument is likely to be accepted or rejected not based 
on its theoretical strength or weaknesses, but rather 
on whether or not one likes its conclusions. 
He goes on to state that: 
Goal assumptions in normative models or goals advocated 
in policy discussions are often stated purely on the 
basis of one's conviction and preference, rather than 
on the basis of inductive study of the existing system. 
This may perhaps be the most crucial reason why so many 
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normative models or policy proposals are not implemented 
in the real world.12 
While the development of accounting theory may be a 
revolutionary process as described by Wells, accounting prac¬ 
tice is decidedly evolutionary as it looks to the existing 
theoretical and practical framework for guidance. The close 
relationship of theory and practice requires that any ac¬ 
counting theory look closely at the existing framework. 
Caws states: 
. . . But I might suggest that people sometimes do 
things not because they feel they ought but because those 
things follow from other things that are done. . . . Also, 
people sometimes feel that they ought to do what every¬ 
body else is doing, and that might in turn be the basis 
for an inductive normative explanation.-^ 
It may seem peculiar that after explaining that this model, 
being revolutionary in nature, need not abide by the exist¬ 
ing framework of accounting, that arguments are presented 
for being careful to observe this very framework during de¬ 
velopment. There are aspects of the model and the method¬ 
ology which cannot conform to the existing norms. However, 
the close relationship of the theory and the practice of ac¬ 
counting require that this development process be cognizant 
of the framework in which the model must exist. This model 
does not suggest change to the whole field of accounting, 
only a small part. There are parts of the model where induc¬ 
tion from the existing accounting framework will be required. 
Just as there is an existing accounting framework 
within which to operate, there is an existing privacy and 
39 
record keeping environment which must be considered. This 
model must, as with the accounting framework, deduce from 
the goals and induce from the existing environment to obtain 
a meaningful result. 
Hendriksen^ points out that there are several ap¬ 
proaches to developing accounting theory in addition to in¬ 
ductive and deductive normative models. Some of these ap¬ 
proaches will be used in this research in the setting of 
goals and in devising practices. The ethical approach looks 
at justice, truth and fairness. The sociological approach 
looks at the effect of accounting reports on all society not 
just users of accounting information. The pragmatic approach 
involves the development of ideas which are in agreement with 
the real world and find usefulness in realistic situations. 
These will all be used in the development of this model. 
The final point to be made in this section is the hier¬ 
archical, interdependent nature of the various aspects of 
this model. This is diagrammed in figure 1. First, there 
is the overall privacy model which specifies the relationship 
between record-keepers and their accountants and legal coun¬ 
sel, the courts, privacy policy commissions, and the indivi¬ 
dual. Second, there is the formulation of privacy standards 
which will be a framework for the implementation, reporting, 
and auditing of privacy safeguards. Third, there is a review 
of possible implementation procedures to establish a frame of 
reference for the audit of privacy safeguards. Finally, 
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there is the auditing model. The next section will discuss 
the methodology of each of these steps. 
Stages in the Model Development 
It is the purpose of this section to outline the me¬ 
thodology for each stage of the development of the model and 
to propose tests or defenses of the results of these stages. 
The model development considerations are outlined in figure 
2. First, however, a few general points about goal-setting 
and the testing of the resulting practices. 
As was noted earlier, the setting of goals is a matter 
of personal value, reflects the opinion of the researcher 
and is not empirically testable. As goals are selected in 
this research, the reasoning behind their selection will be 
explained. Where there are sources in the literature which 
have been of assistance in setting the goals, reference 
will be made. 
It was also noted earlier that defenses of a normative 
model involve showing logically the superiority of the me¬ 
thods chosen over alternative methods of achieving the goals. 
If a process of induction from observations of existing 
theory, practices, or the environment is used then it must 
be shown that the practices logically follow from the obser¬ 
vations . 
Finally, it was also noted earlier that feasibility 
is a test of the methods prescribed in a normative model. 
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In discussing normative accounting valuation models, for ex¬ 
ample, Ijiri notes that "it it important for us to question 
whether the model is capable of producing figures with a re¬ 
quired level of quality. He also notes: 
Here feasibility refers to both the practical problems 
in coming up with figures under the proposed alterna¬ 
tive and the problems of developing a system under the 
proposed alternative in such a way that the figures pro¬ 
duced satisfy a set of quality requirements.^ 
A test of the feasibility of the methods of this model will 
be made by showing that the methods chosen can be accom¬ 
plished in the environment that exists and can produce 
quality results. 
It might seem that in this model much is left to the 
opinions of this researcher and that the tests to be applied 
are not rigorous. In defense it could be argued that this 
is because of the nature of the problem to be solved. The 
area being covered is new and just now being explored. The 
methods to be prescribed are revolutionary. Exploratory re¬ 
search of this kind need not conform to the criteria of 
more well-defined, well-worked areas. On the subject of 
empirical versus logical tests, Hendriksen states: 
. . . in the view of some, theoretical hypotheses can be 
tested only through empirical research. Regardless of 
the validity of this statement, there is little ques¬ 
tion that empirical research can be a valuable aid in 
the formation and testing of accounting theories. In 
the opinion of the author, however, complete theories 
through the process of lo- 
44 
Privacy Model 
Goals for the overall model will be based on ethical, 
sociological, and pragmatic considerations. These terms are 
18 
used as defined by Hendriksen. A model will be devised 
which has practical use (pragmatic), serves the needs of as 
many of those concerned about privacy as possible (sociolo¬ 
gical) but which is fair to as many of these parties as pos¬ 
sible (ethical). The grounds for these goals will be found 
in the literature, the environment and where necessary from 
opinion. 
Practices will be deduced from these goals. They will 
be logically tested to see if they satisfy these goals bet¬ 
ter than other alternative methods. These methods will also 
be tested to see if they are reasonable and whether they can 
be accomplished. 
While these practices are being derived it will also 
be necessary to make observations from the literature and 
the environment to assist in deriving the practices and to 
test for the consistency of the derived practices with the 
observations. Observations for this purpose will be taken 
from the literature on accounting and auditing theory and 
practice. Also the "privacy environment" must be looked at. 
That is, the laws on privacy, the reports of various commis¬ 
sions on the subject of privacy, the needs and sentiments of 
individuals, groups, businesses and governments both na¬ 
tional and international and the function of courts and 
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commissions in privacy protection. And finally, the compu¬ 
terized record-keeping environment must be observed to deter¬ 
mine its relationship with the derived practices. These in¬ 
terrelationships are shown in figure 2. 
Privacy Standards 
A set of privacy protection standards will be sug¬ 
gested. There are two reasons for this presentation. 
First, the number of and variation in privacy requirements 
requires that standards be abstracted to simplify discus¬ 
sions of privacy implementation and privacy audits. Second, 
since it will be suggested that auditors conduct a privacy 
audit, it will be a positive aspect of this model to have 
privacy standards which are similar in structure to account¬ 
ing standards. A hierarchy of "Generally Accepted Privacy 
Principles" (GAPP) which are similar in structure to Gener¬ 
ally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) will be suggested. 
This will be a dual process as was the establishment of 
practices in the privacy model. A set of privacy standards 
will be deduced from privacy objectives and derived from and 
shown to be consistent with legislated privacy requirements. 
In defending these privacy standards it will be neces¬ 
sary to show that the structure and intent of the GAPP is 
similar to that of the GAAP. The internal consistency of the 
GAPP themselves will be shown as they are derived. It will 
also be necessary to show that the standards are the simplest 
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possible abstraction of the privacy requirements which serves 
the purposes intended. Feasibility of this framework will be 
tested by its usefulness in showing implementation plans and 
in devising the audit model. Finally, it will be necessary 
to show that the GAPP framework is logically consistent with 
the privacy model. 
Implementation 
The purpose of this part of the model is to provide a 
framework for the audit model. It will be necessary to de¬ 
velop an understanding of how the privacy requirements are 
implemented before an audit model can be devised. This sec¬ 
tion of the model development will, however, provide a test 
of the privacy standards. If the implementation procedures 
are consistent with privacy safeguard requirements and can 
be deduced from the privacy standards, then support is given 
to the GAPP framework. 
Audit Model 
There will be two major aspects to the audit model. 
The first is the audit function that the auditor will per¬ 
form and the second is the audit techniques to be employed. 
The development of the audit model will be pragmatic. The 
auditor will not be asked to perform a function for which 
auditors cannot be expected to be qualified nor for which 
the necessary tools do not exist. The primary goals, then. 
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will be practicality, feasibility, and consistency with the 
other aspects of the privacy model. 
The functional aspects of the audit model will involve 
defining the roles of the independent and internal auditors, 
the attestation statement that the auditor will make, the 
audit standards to be employed and the liability of the au¬ 
ditor. As with other aspects of this model, development will 
involve derivation from previously developed parts of the mo¬ 
del and from existing theory and practice. Defending the 
audit function will involve verifying consistency with the 
model and with observations from the literature. 
The audit techniques will be developed from the litera¬ 
ture on auditing and EDP auditing. They will be checked for 
their consistency with the audit function. There is a pos¬ 
sibility here for more rigorous tests of feasibility. Qua¬ 
lity requirements for the audit results will be specified. 
The potential outcome of the audit techniques may be testable 
against the quality levels established. 
Summary 
This chapter outlined the methodology to be used in de¬ 
veloping the privacy protection model. The methods are 
varied and can be considered eclectic. The overall model is 
essentially normative deductive with goals assumed and prac¬ 
tices deduced. The nature of the model itself and the envi¬ 
ronment from which it is derived and in which it will 
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operate requires the use of other methods in conjunction with 
the normative approach. Goals and practices are induced 
from observations from the literature and the environment. 
Goal assumptions are selected by this researcher's opinion 
guided by observation and ethical, sociological and pragma¬ 
tic consideration. 
A defense of this model is primarily through logical 
verification which is explained by Ijiri and supported by 
Hendriksen. This verification process is consistent with the 
research methodology employed. The logical consistency of 
the conclusions with observations and other aspects of the 
model make up most of the verification. The feasibility of 
the model is also tested by showing that the practices sug¬ 
gested can be accomplished and that they satisfy any quality 
requirements which might be specified. 
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CHAPTER III 
PRIVACY MODEL 
This chapter presents the overall normative model for 
the protection of individual privacy. The goals of the model 
are stated. These are the goals left unspecified in figure 
2. The practices are deduced from these goals. Concurrent 
with this deductive process observations are taken from the 
literature and the environment to assist in deriving and jus¬ 
tifying the practices. Defenses for the model are explained. 
These defenses are: first, the logical consistency of the 
derived practices with the goals; second, the consistency of 
the practices with the observations taken; and third, the 
feasibility of the practices. 
Goals of the Model 
The Privacy Act of 1974 created the Privacy Protection 
Study Commission'*’ which published its findings in July of 
2 
1977 after an extensive two year study of the issue of pri¬ 
vacy as it relates to record-keeping in this country. The 
findings of the Commission are a model for the protection of 
individual privacy. The Commission formulated the framework 
for a national privacy policy. Guided by a set of implemen¬ 
tation choices and principles and with knowledge of the 
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presence of competing societal values, the Commission pre¬ 
sents 166 specific recommendations to implement its privacy 
policy. These recommendations prescribe a combined use of 
voluntary compliance, statutory creation of rights, inter¬ 
ests, or responsibilities enforceable through either indi¬ 
vidual or government action, and an ongoing government mech¬ 
anism to investigate, study, and report on privacy protec¬ 
tion issues. 
The Commission's report is the starting point for this 
research for two reasons. First, although not adopted at 
this time, this report could eventually be the basis fo a 
national privacy policy. In an appearance before a U. S. 
House of Representatives subcommittee in May of 1978, a gov¬ 
ernment spokesman confirmed that President Carter's approach 
to privacy policy would follow the lead of the Privacy Pro- 
3 
tection Study Commission. Therefore, as a practical matter 
any privacy protection model proposed should use as a basis 
this very important and potentially influential report. Se¬ 
cond, the recommendations of the Commission are carefully and 
logically deduced from a set of principles or policy goals 
which have a firm foundation in the problem of privacy. This 
research must recognize the report of the Commission and use 
it as a basis for further theoretical development. This re¬ 
searcher does not, however, agree with the conclusions 
reached by the Commission. There is no objection taken to 
the specific privacy practices. These practices are taken 
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as preconditions for this research. Objection is taken to 
the implementation plan which consists of voluntary and sta¬ 
tutory compliance with those privacy practices, a non- 
regulatory privacy commission and the use of the courts as 
a last resort to remedy any violations of privacy. It is 
not sufficient theoretically, however, to simply disagree 
with this implementation plan. Objections to the conclu¬ 
sions must be based on objections to the implementation prin¬ 
ciples or goals of the Commission. The implementation is 
thought to be incomplete because the implementation goals 
are seen as incomplete. 
The three concurrent objectives of the Commission's 
privacy protection policy are: 
to create a proper balance between what an individual is 
expected to divulge to a record-keeping organization and 
what he seeks in return (to minimize intrusiveness); 
to open up record-keeping operations in ways that will 
minimize the extent to which recorded information about 
an individual is itself a source of unfairness in any 
decision about him made on the basis of it (to maximize 
fairness); and to create and define obligations with 
respect to the uses and disclosures that will be made 
of recorded information about an individual (to create ^ 
legitimate, enforceable expectations of confidentality). 
These objectives guided the Commission in the formulation of 
its recommendations for the procedures which must be observed 
by record-keeping organizations to protect the privacy of in¬ 
dividuals. These objectives are carefully derived from the 
privacy problem as it exists today. If implemented appro¬ 
priately these objectives would correct the important imbal¬ 
ances in the record-keeper-individual relationship. In 
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chapter IV it is shown that these objectives are not only re¬ 
lated well to the privacy problem but serve as a good basis 
for the deduction of privacy standards and practices. The 
part of the model being developed in this chapter, however, 
deals with implementation mechanisms such as courts, commis¬ 
sions, laws, and audits not with the practices of individual 
organizations. 
The Commission, in exploring ways to implement its po¬ 
licy recommendations, was guided by three principles which 
were: 
. . . (1) that incentives for systemic reform should be 
created; (2) that existing regulatory and enforcement 
mechanisms should be used insofar as possible; and 
(3) that unnecessary cost be avoided. 
These are the goals of the Commission's implementation po¬ 
licy. Since this researcher takes exception to the Commis¬ 
sion's implementation mechanism which consists of voluntary 
compliance, statutory enactment, a privacy commission, and 
the courts, exception must be taken to these goals. These 
goals are adequate as partial -'guidance for the formulation 
of a privacy implementation mechanism but are incomplete. 
The Commission has ignored or in any case not made explicit 
three other goals which must be included in any complete im¬ 
plementation plan. 
First, as was shown in chapter I, there is a signifi¬ 
cant movement in other countries, European countries in par¬ 
ticular, to formulate an international privacy policy. The 
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existence and persistence of these movements requires that 
a goal of any model for the protection of individual privacy 
be an attempt to satisfy the desires of that international 
movement. The Commission has ignored the position of this 
country in the international flow of data and has therefore 
deduced an incomplete implementation plan. In addition to 
the three goals of the Commission, the model proposed here 
adopts a fourth implementation goal, which is: 
4. That consideration be given to the movement for an inter¬ 
national privacy policy 
Second, it was also noted in chapter I that the rapid 
advances in computer and computer-related technology has 
created an environment in which it is often to the advantage 
of record-keeping organizations to violate the right of in¬ 
dividuals to privacy. Any privacy protection model must 
take technology into account if it is to be successful. The 
fifth goal of this proposed model, therefore, is: 
5. That the impact of technology on compliance be considered 
Third, the Commission suggests that record-keeping or¬ 
ganizations know that another organization is complying with 
privacy safeguard requirements before personal data is ac¬ 
cepted from or delivered to that organization. The Commis¬ 
sion suggests that a privacy commission be created to moni¬ 
tor privacy practices and participate in privacy policy de¬ 
bates. They suggest that the pressures of the market place 
will force organizations into compliance with privacy 
55 
safeguards. Finally they suggest that companies that do not 
comply can be brought to do so by the courts. The Commis¬ 
sion has not, however, provided any monitoring and reporting 
mechanism to serve as a source of information to those in¬ 
terested parties. 
Record-keeping organizations need to know what other 
organizations are doing with regard to privacy and how ef¬ 
fective those procedures are before they can make decisions 
regarding the transfer of personal data. A privacy commis¬ 
sion must be provided with reliable information regarding 
the privacy practices of record-keeping organizations if 
they are to participate intelligently in privacy policy de¬ 
bates. Individuals are expected to choose organizations with 
which to do business without being provided information re¬ 
garding the privacy practices of these organizations. All 
of this creates a situation in which the only information 
about an organization is provided in hindsight when an indi¬ 
vidual takes judicial action after a right to privacy has 
been violated. 
Since there are so many in the general public who re¬ 
quire information concerning the privacy procedures of 
record-keeping organizations, the following is adopted as 
the sixth and final goal of the model proposed here: 
6. That information be provided to the general public con¬ 
cerning the privacy procedures of record-keeping organi¬ 
zations 
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In summary, the following goals are adopted for this 
model for the protection of individual privacy: 
1. That incentives for systemic reform should be created 
2. That existing regulatory and enforcement mechanisms 
should be used insofar as possible 
3. That unnecessary cost be avoided 
4. That consideration be given to the movement for an inter¬ 
national privacy policy 
5. That the impact of technology on compliance be con¬ 
sidered 
6. That information be provided to the general public con¬ 
cerning privacy procedures of record-keeping organiza¬ 
tions 
Practical Justification for the Model 
As has been stated in chapter I, this model suggests 
an independent audit of privacy safeguard procedures by the 
CPA. This section shows how this suggestion complements the 
implementation mechanism suggested by the Privacy Protection 
Study Commission. It is also shown that this combined mech¬ 
anism is the best method of implementing privacy safeguards 
given the six implementation goals adopted above. 
Arguments for an Audit 
It was 3hown in chapter I the importance that indivi¬ 
duals attach to their right to privacy. It was also sug¬ 
gested that advances in computer-related record-keeping tech¬ 
nology may require a monitoring of compliance with privacy 
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safeguard requirements. These are two reasons for an audit 
of privacy procedures. Below are other reasons for an audit 
of privacy safeguards. 
Systems Audits Make Good Sense 
Any organization which maintains an information system 
has an obligation to the organization itself and, in the 
case of personal records, to those on whom information is 
maintained, to devise and implement systems controls and 
periodically review those controls to verify their utiliza¬ 
tion and effectiveness. For example, in testifying before 
a U. S. House of Representatives subcommittee Professor 
Joseph Weizenbaum noted that "any information system should 
be designed to be auditable in addition to being periodically 
6 
audited." On personal information systems Bigelow and Nycum 
note: 
It should be emphasized that not only must privacy pro¬ 
cedures be designed, but they must be followed . . . 
insist on audits on a regular basis to insure that the 
system has not been harmed.7 
A recent audit of The Social Security Administration's 
(SSA) central computer facility points up this need for au¬ 
dits of computerized record-keeping systems. Auditors from 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) successfully circum¬ 
vented the SSA's sophisticated security system and "removed 
38 reels of magnetic tape containing the names and addresses 
of 1.14 million Americans." The GAO report stated "that more 
effective controls and security procedures must be 
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established to protect both Social Security records and 
o 
property and the privacy of American people." Had no audit 
been conducted, the deficiencies in the controls may never 
have been discovered and may have allowed the privacy of in¬ 
dividuals to be violated. 
Not only is there a moral imperative that an organiza¬ 
tion monitor privacy safeguards in light of the importance 
of privacy to individuals but verifying that they are in 
compliance also makes good business sense. The Privacy 
Protection Study Commission devised a combination of volun¬ 
tary and mandatory privacy safeguard recommendation in the 
hope that it would create monetary incentives for private 
sector compliance. Providing an individual with the right 
to inspect the personal records which an organization has 
maintained will "give the company a powerful motive to re¬ 
cord only accurate, pertinent information about them and 
keep its records as timely and complete as possible." The 
Commission relays why this is true when they state: 
The Commission's recommendations should make it easy 
for an individual to assert his interest, thus making it 
attractive to organizations to comply voluntarily rather 
than incur the cost of enforcement through judicial or 
administrative action.10 
The conclusion reached is that it makes good sense both mo¬ 
rally and financially for a business to monitor its compli¬ 
ance with privacy safeguards. An audit provides businesses 
with an additional incentive for reform required by the first 
goal of this model. 
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Success of Audits 
There is little evidence of what effect the auditing of 
privacy safeguards has on an organization’s effectiveness in 
protection the privacy of personal records. However, in re¬ 
viewing the effectiveness of the Privacy Act of 1974, the 
Privacy Protection Study Commission did find that government 
agencies which audited their privacy procedures were the most 
successful in implementing the Act. They state: 
The Commission has found that those agencies that have 
established formal, structured approaches and mechanisms 
to implement the Privacy Act are the most successful in 
their implementation of the Act. They have provided the 
best training for their personnel, have issued detailed, 
consistent internal guidelines, and have devised proce¬ 
dures for auditing their own compliance with the Act ' 
£ emphasis addedj.-l-l 
There are no other reports of organizations auditing their 
privacy programs. There is, however, this one case where 
such a practice was successful. 
Audit as Complementary to Other Devices 
Privacy implementation mechanisms may include various 
regulatory, enforcement, and compliance monitoring mechanisms. 
National and international privacy boards or commissions have 
been suggested. The right to take recourse in the courts for 
privacy violations has been granted to individuals by privacy 
legislation. As mentioned above, there have been suggestions 
that compliance with privacy safeguards should be monitored 
by periodic audits. It is the purpose of this section to 
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present these suggestions and to show that the auditing of 
privacy safeguards is complementary to this combination of 
commissions and courts. 
Commissions 
Privacy boards or commissions have been proposed in 
12 
various forms with varying duties and powers. Some of the 
suggested functions of such boards are to receive complaints 
and bring them to the attention of bodies responsible for 
establishing public policy, to investigate, study, and re¬ 
port on privacy protection issues, to set the standards for 
surveillance, supervise practices under the rules, investi¬ 
gate compliance, and hear complaints about misconduct. 
13 
Others have suggested privacy agencies with more powers. 
For example, it has been suggested that a privacy commission 
be established and given licensing powers and investigatory 
powers to police the operations of computer-based data banks 
which would include the right to receive complaints, to sus¬ 
pend or revoke licenses and institute civil or criminal le¬ 
gal proceedings. Another has suggested that a privacy agency 
would provide standards for the establishment and maintenance 
of personal data banks and authorized to enforce compliance 
with these standards and to authorize access to data banks. 
Another suggests an information agency to which all record- 
keepers would be obligated to send information about what 
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they are doing, why they are doing it, and how the system and 
the data are going to be used. 
The Privacy Protection Study Commission believed that a 
commission was necessary to interpret law and policy and pro¬ 
vide a global, systemic view of the privacy issue. They saw 
this commission as complementary to the provision for re¬ 
course in the courts. ^ It was not their intention to have 
this commission be responsible for enforcement but to monitor 
compliance, be aware of changing privacy needs and problems 
and suggest policy and legislation to meet the changing envi¬ 
ronment . 
Courts 
Legislation enacted in the United States has given cer¬ 
tain rights to individuals."^ Should these rights be vio¬ 
lated by record-keeping organizations, individuals are left 
with the option of taking these organizations to court in 
either criminal or civil proceedings and receive monetary re¬ 
imbursement, penalties or orders to comply. 
Privacy Audits 
An audit of privacy programs instituted by record¬ 
keeping organizations could complement these two mechanisms, 
the commission and the courts. For the commission an audit 
report could give evidence of how effectively privacy is be¬ 
ing protected, what is being done and how it is being done. 
This information could be used by the privacy commission to 
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suggest policy or legislation or to suggest legal action in 
the courts if organizations consistently are not in compli¬ 
ance with existing regulations. 
As a remedy for providing recourse to those whose 
rights have been violated, the courts are necessary but in 
many ways need an auditing function to complement their 
power. Recourse in the courts is curative rather than pre¬ 
ventive. There are those who believe that, in the area of 
privacy, it is very important that as much as possible be 
done to prevent violation of rights to privacy leaving the 
courts as a last resort to recover monetary reimbursement 
16 
or satisfaction. In many violations of privacy the damage 
is done as soon as the right is violated, the injury is very 
difficult to translate into dollar rewards and there are very 
few people who would undertake a lawsuit solely for moral sa¬ 
tisfaction. For example, it does little good to know tnat 
you can bring a credit agency to court for inaccurate records 
while you are in a strange town unable to get a hotel room 
because your credit cards are not accepted. 
Another reason why the court mechanism needs to be sup¬ 
plemented is because few people are aware of their rights to 
recourse in the courts or to their other rights to see and 
correct their records. A report of the Office of Management 
and Budgets showed that very few exercised their rights under 
The Privacy Act of 1974. Tne conclusion was that few were 
17 aware of these rights. 
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In conclusion, a privacy audit complements the mechan¬ 
isms of a privacy commission responsible for systemic policy 
and monitoring and the courts which should be used as a last 
resort for recovering damages or forcing compliance. All of 
the above, however, could easily be accomplished with inter¬ 
nal audit functions. 
Arguments for an Independent Audit 
This section will make arguments for the conduct of a 
privacy audit by an agent independent of the organization be¬ 
ing audited. Independence is necessary to provide credibil¬ 
ity, to satisfy those outside the organization who are very 
interested in the design and effectiveness of privacy safe-- 
guards instituted by an organization. 
Confidentiality 
As was defined above, confidentiality describes the de¬ 
gree of protection to be offered data which is agreed upon 
between the person or organization furnishing the data and 
the person or organization receiving it. In the case of two 
organizations or persons which make a regular practice of 
exchanging personal data a knowledge of and confidence in 
the privacy procedures of the cooperating record-keeper could 
be established over time. This is not always the situation, 
however. People and organizations often need an independent 
evaluation of the privacy procedures used by a record-keeper 
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with whom they wish to do business. At both the national 
and international levels there is a need for an independent 
source of information concerning the privacy safeguards of 
record-keepers. 
National 
Both the Privacy Protection Study Commission and the 
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare's Advisory Com¬ 
mittee on Automated Personal Data Systems recommended that 
record-keepers know the level of confidentiality in effect 
in the organizations from whom they received information or 
18 
to whom they were sending information. The Privacy Protec¬ 
tion Commission recommended changes to The Fair Credit Re¬ 
porting Act (FCRA) which would require that credit grantors, 
depository institutions, insurance institutions and insurance 
support organizations exercise reasonable care in the selec¬ 
tion of support organizations so as to assure that such or¬ 
ganizations comply with certain privacy safeguard require¬ 
ments. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare' s-'Ad¬ 
visory Committee on broad privacy policy recommendations 
sought a requirement that record-keepers know and assure that 
privacy requirements would be observed by receiving organiza¬ 
tions. There is, then, evidence that privacy requirements in 
the future will have record-keepers know about and assure the 
effectiveness of privacy safeguards enacted by organizations 
with whom they share data. It is suggested one way to do 
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this is to have published reports of privacy audits conducted 
by independent auditors. 
International 
It was noted in chapter I that there is considerable 
international debate concerning the formulation of an inter¬ 
national privacy policy. The possibilities that an indepen¬ 
dent audit of privacy safeguards could allow the United 
States to participate in such an international agreement is 
a very compelling reason for conducting such an audit. 
Public service 
The report of an independent audit could also be a 
service to the general public. The public could use such 
reports to pick organizations with which it chooses to do 
business. These audits could also be a stimulus to busi¬ 
nesses to comply with privacy safeguards. 
The Privacy Protection Study Commission made compli¬ 
ance with many of its recommendations voluntary. They hoped 
that in the private sector the organizations would be moved 
to protect their customers' privacy interests. If their 
customers knew and understood the organization's record¬ 
keeping practices, the customers would use the competition 
of the market place as an ally in securing compliance with 
19 
privacy safeguards. The audit report would be the credible 
evidence that the customer would need to gain the knowledge 
with which to force this compliance. 
66 
Westin has suggested that "ethical and professional 
commandments will not always be sufficient to control the 
conduct of criminal elements, over-zealous government offi- 
20 
cials, profit-seekers, or insensitive researchers." This 
seems to be the case for some companies. Westin and Baker 
found that TRW-Credit Data, Inc. was not in compliance with 
the FCRA. The Federal Trade Commission found many violations 
21 
of the FCRA on the part of Equifax Services, Inc. It is 
suggested here that an independent compliance audit serves 
the purpose of not only providing credible information to 
those outside an organization but also forces those organi¬ 
zations not inclined to effect privacy safeguards to comply. 
Arguments for Audit by the Certified 
Public Accountant 
The argument is made here that the only independent au¬ 
dit function which satisfies the second and third goals of 
this model is the CPA. It is an established mechanism which 
has the expertise for such an audit and already does much of 
the work suggested for a privacy audit. The CPA is at this 
time required to review internal controls and given the en¬ 
actment of SAS 20 and given the recommendations of the Cohen 
Commission the auditor may be doing even more in this area in 
the future. To have another agency trained to perform such 
a function would be costly. To have another agency review 
the very same controls as were verified by the CPA would be 
an unnecessary and costly duplication of effort. These are 
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the same controls because in an information system controls 
are installed which are effective over both accounting and 
personal data. In fact some data are both personal and ac¬ 
counting in nature. 
At the Symposium on Data Banks and Society held in Oslo 
in 1972 Gunnar Arnholt made a few remarks which give support 
to the idea that the CPA is the one who should conduct these 
audits. He said 
There should be some body which is not dependent on the 
administration, but has a position similar to the exter¬ 
nal auditor, who can watch the use of data banks, see 
what kind of information is put into the bank, and 
react if the objectives of the banks are changed without 
responsible decisions having been made by the proper au¬ 
thorities . 
Arnholt is recommending here an agency with policy and moni¬ 
toring responsibilities similar to the commissions discussed 
above. In specifying how this commission should operate, 
Arnholt goes on to say: 
If a professional, permanently working body is set up, I 
think this should engage the competence not only of EDP 
systems and technical specialists, but also of technical 
specialists in what you might call information quality 
control, namely public and government auditors.22 
Arnholt is agreeing with part of the three part mechanism be¬ 
ing suggested here. He thinks that an independent commission 
responsible for privacy policy should review reports of inde¬ 
pendent auditors as a basis for its inquiries into what is 
being done by organizations to protect privacy. 
There is one other aspect of the CPA function which 
makes it the logical choice to conduct the privacy audit. 
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The CPA has an ongoing relationship with the client organiza¬ 
tion which allows the CPA to become familiar with the parti¬ 
cular privacy safeguards required in that organization's in¬ 
dustry and with the policies of that organization. Also, 
this ongoing relationship allows the auditor to become in¬ 
volved in the design of the system of control. This will be 
shown to be a significant advantage as the audit model is 
developed. 
Finally, another ongoing audit function which satisfies 
most of the requirements specified above is the internal au¬ 
ditor. A recent article suggested that the internal auditor 
can gain a certain amount of independence by reporting to 
the director of a firm's audit committee on certain aspects 
23 
of the firm's operations. Although discussing illegal 
acts, this article points out that the internal auditor is 
familiar with the firm's industry, familiar with the firm's 
policies and is involved on an ongoing basis. All of these 
are traits which make the internal audit function's report¬ 
ing to the audit committee a logical choice for the indepen¬ 
dent audit function needed for a privacy audit. This setup 
is not suitable because the internal auditor does not really 
gain independence by reporting to the audit committee. They 
are still part of one company with too many pressures and 
conflicts to be really independent. 
In a recent speech Harvey Kapnick, Chairman of Arthur 
Andersen & Co., discussed the failure of internal corporate 
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professionals, both lawyers and accountants, to maintain in¬ 
dependence in their professional duties. He stated: 
To be a professional while on a corporate payroll, how¬ 
ever, requires the same degree of independence in thought 
and action as that required of a professional retained 
from a professional firm. Unfortunately, not every indi¬ 
vidual is willing to accept such a responsibility.^ 
Kapnick concludes that since internal professionals failed to 
maintain professional independence in their corporate duties 
that they have lost the public's confidence in them. In¬ 
ternal privacy audit reports might lack the credibility they 
need to be effective. 
Conclusions 
This section has developed arguments for a privacy au¬ 
dit by the Certified Public Accountant. Audits are required 
because of the importance of the privacy problem in the con¬ 
text of society and its technology. The audit needs inde¬ 
pendence to give order to the relationships which exist be¬ 
tween information processing organizations at the national 
and international levels. The CPA satisfies all of these 
requirements better than any other audit function. It has 
been suggested that the combination of the courts, a privacy 
commission and the CPA privacy audit is the best way to pro¬ 
tect an individual's right of privacy. This plan is dia¬ 
grammed in figure 1. 
In developing the arguments for the audit, careful at¬ 
tention has been given to maintaining consistency with the 
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implementation goals. The combination of a privacy audit by 
the CPA, remedy in the courts and the formation of the pri¬ 
vacy commission is a mechanism which meets the requirements 
of the goals better than any other mechanism. The audit and 
the courts create incentives for reform using existing mech¬ 
anisms. The audit provides information to interested par¬ 
ties, both domestic and foreign, and creates an incentive 
for reform which recognizes the influence that technology 
can have on compliance by organizations. Although the cost 
of the audit raises the price of privacy protection monitor¬ 
ing above the price of the mechanisms suggested by the Pri¬ 
vacy Protection Study Commission, the cost is lessened when 
the required balance between the other goals is recognized. 
Finally, the privacy commission, provided with proper infor¬ 
mation, serves as an important feedback on the success of 
the mechanisms in an evolving environment. 
If parts of this argument are found to be lacking, it 
does not nullify the remainder of the research. The very 
least that will occur is that managements will want their 
privacy safeguards monitored by their own internal audit 
staffs. There are major parts of this research which could 
be used to guide the conduct of such an audit. 
In the next section this recommended function for the 
CPA is compared to the role of the CPA as defined by the ex¬ 
isting accounting and auditing literature. 
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Philosophical Implications of the Model 
A review of the literature which serves as the founda¬ 
tion for the present theory and practice of accounting and 
auditing reveals some disagreement concerning the role of 
these two disciplines. Until recently there was little 
theoretical grounds for the model proposed above. Below 
some of the literature is briefly presented showing where 
there is and is not theoretical support for the privacy au¬ 
dit. 
The Philosophy of Auditing 
In 1961 The Philosophy of Auditing, by Mautz and 
Sharaf, was published. This has been one authority on mat¬ 
ters relating to the theory and practice of auditing. They 
define the role of auditing as follows: 
Auditing is concerned with verification, the examina¬ 
tion of financial data for the purpose of judging the 
faithfulness with which they portray events and condi¬ 
tions . 25 
This definition limits the scope of auditing to verification 
of presentations which are financial in nature. They dis¬ 
tinguish between auditing and accounting by stating: 
Accounting includes the collection, classification, sum¬ 
marization, and communication of business events and 
conditions as they affect and represent a given enter¬ 
prise or other entity. . . . Auditing does none of these 
things. Auditing must consider business events and con¬ 
ditions too, but it does not have the task of measuring 
and communicating them. Its task is to review the 
measurements and communications of accounting for pro¬ 
priety. 26 
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Accounting and auditing, then, are two distinct disciplines. 
Accountants prepare reports of financial condition and opera¬ 
tions and auditors verify these reports. Mautz and Sharaf 
go on later, however, to say: 
All auditors are first accountants, or at least trained 
as accountants, because one cannot effectively verify 
accounting data unless he has some understanding of how 
they are gathered, summarized, classified, and pre¬ 
sented. 27 
The role of auditing, then, would seem to be closely tied to 
or even dependent on the practice of accounting. This pre¬ 
sentation of the function of accounting and auditing does not 
support a presentation by the enterprise of privacy safe¬ 
guards compliance nor a verification of that compliance by 
the auditor. 
It was mentioned above that privacy safeguards are in¬ 
ternal controls. Mautz and Sharaf emphasize the importance 
of internal controls to the auditor. Their fourth postulate 
of auditing is: 
The existence of a satisfactory system of internal con¬ 
trol eliminates the probability of irregularities.2^ 
They go on to say: 
There are so many events and relationships which can 
work to offset the most effective internal control mea¬ 
sures and which at the same time would be neither appar¬ 
ent to nor necessarily discoverable by the independent 
auditor that acceptance of responsibility for the review 
and evaluation of internal control is hazardous at best. 
Nevertheless, it remains an essential preliminary to the 
development of an intelligent audit program and an area 
in which the auditor can be of great service to his 
client.29 
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Although Mautz and Sharaf recommend a review and evaluation 
of internal control systems, they limit this review by making 
it a part of the audit of the financial presentations of 
the enterprise. The presentation of Mautz and Sharaf would 
not seem to support the privacy model proposed here. 
A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory 
In 1966 The American Accounting Association published 
the Report of the Committee to Prepare a Statement of Basic 
Accounting Theory, A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory 
(ASOBAT). This has been for some the basis of accounting 
practice and also has served as a basis for further theore¬ 
tical development in accounting. The Committee defined ac¬ 
counting as follows: 
. . . the process of identifying, measuring, and commu¬ 
nicating economic information to permit informed Judg¬ 
ments and decisions by users of the information.^0 
This definition of accounting differs from that used by 
Mautz and Sharaf by emphasizing the use of accounting infor¬ 
mation in decision-making but continued to tie accounting 
reports to financial or economic reality. The Committee did 
recognize, however, that the future scope of accounting in¬ 
formation need not be so constrained. They state: 
Most applications of accounting have dealt with economic 
resources . . . accounting need not be confined to such 
subject matter. 
The Committee also stated that: 
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The objectives of accounting are to provide information 
for the following purposes: 
• • • 
3. Maintaining and reporting on the custodianship of 
resources 
4. Facilitating social functions and controls22 
Taking these two statements together it could be assumed 
that the presentation of information concerning an organiza¬ 
tion's compliance with privacy requirements is justified on 
a theoretical basis since privacy compliance presentations 
would facilitate social controls and would be a report by 
the organization on their custodianship of personal records. 
The Committee later goes on to state criteria by which 
accounting information could be evaluated. They state: 
Four basic standards are recommended as providing cri¬ 
teria to be used in evaluating potential accounting in¬ 
formation: relevance, verifiability, freedom from bias, 
and quantifiability. Adherence to some or all of these 
standards may be partial. ^ 
Should an organization be asked to expand the information 
which it reports to the public, the information would need 
to meet these criteria. 
It was suggested above in this chapter that an integral 
part of the privacy model was an independent audit of the 
privacy safeguards by the CPA. It is suggested here that 
the organization present information concerning the activi¬ 
ties taken to comply with privacy safeguard requirements. 
The CPA would then attest to the accuracy of that presenta¬ 
tion and the effectiveness of the control system. An analy¬ 
sis is presented here of how well the information meets the 
criteria established by the Committee. 
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An organization’s presentation of information concern¬ 
ing the privacy controls installed would be relevant to the 
assumed needs of the potential users of such information. 
Individuals, the privacy commission, and domestic and fo¬ 
reign concerns are assumed to be interested in the privacy 
safeguards of record-keeping organizations. That certain 
controls have been installed is certainly verifiable. It 
will be shown in the audit model that the effectiveness of 
the system is also verifiable by the CPA. Unlike more tra¬ 
ditional accounting information, the needs of the potential 
users are similar with regard to the presentation of pri¬ 
vacy controls. The users need to know what is being done 
and how effective that process is. Bias in such a presenta¬ 
tion is held in check through the independent attestation. 
This, of course, is necessary since the interests of the 
organization and the users are not necessarily the same. 
The presentation of the privacy controls is not necessarily- 
quantifiable in all respects. Where it is not quantifiable, 
its measurability would not be implied. 
In summary it would seem that the accounting theory 
developed in ASOBAT lends itself to an expansion of the ac¬ 
counting information presented by an organization into a pre¬ 
sentation of the privacy control system. Such a presentation 
meets an objective of accounting information by serving cer¬ 
tain social goals and the information can be made to meet 
the criteria for accounting information established by the 
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Committee. Since the CPA attestation of this presentation 
is not yet supported. The literature which describes the 
role of the auditor is reviewed below. 
A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts 
In 1973 the American Accounting Association (AAA) pub¬ 
lished the Report of the Committee on Basic Auditing Con¬ 
cepts, A Statement of Basic Auditing Concepts which, like 
the other AAA monographs reviewed above, serves as a good 
framework for discussing the theoretical implications of 
extensions to the accounting and auditing functions. The 
Committee used The Philosophy of Auditing and ASOBAT as a 
basis for their conclusions. Taking the definition of ac¬ 
counting proposed in ASOBAT they updated Mautz and Sharaf's 
definition of auditing. They state: 
Auditing is a systematic process of objectively obtain¬ 
ing and evaluating evidence regarding assertions about 
economic actions and events to ascertain the degree of 
correspondence between those assertions and established 
criteria and communicating the results to interested 
users.34 
This definition would seem to close the door on non-economic 
extensions of the attest function which was opened by ASOBAT. 
The Committee would seem to be ignoring possible extension 
of accounting into non-economic reporting areas and defining 
a role for auditing which is restricted from expanding with 
the accounting function. The audit function as defined is 
limited to a review of economic representations in accounting 
information. 
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This Committee goes on to qualify their stand against 
the attestation by the CPA of non-economic data. They state: 
In the final analysis, any definition of the subject mat¬ 
ter to which the auditing process might be applied is ar¬ 
bitrary and artificial. It is mostly tradition which has 
led us to the 'economics' focus of auditing. In prac¬ 
tice, the auditor's competence and the existence of 
operational criteriadictate the boundaries of the sub¬ 
ject matter to be investigated by the audit process.35 
The Committee goes on to further specify criteria for subject 
matter of an audit function. It is stated that the Committee 
. . . believes that the subject matter of any extension 
of the audit function must possess the following attri¬ 
butes : 
1. The subject matter must be susceptible to the de¬ 
duction of evidential assertions. Such assertions 
must be both quantifiable and verifiable. 
2. An information system must be present to record the 
actions, events, or results thereof; preferably ade¬ 
quate internal controls will also be operating. 
3. Consensus must exist on the established criteria 
against which the information prepared from the sub¬ 
ject matter can be evaluated. 
While each of the attributes mentioned above is neces¬ 
sary, two further conditions needed are: auditor's com¬ 
petence and summarization of the findings in a report.3^ 
The proposed privacy audit meets and does not meet 
these criteria in the following ways. It is shown in chap- 
ters V and VI that an auditor can gather evidence and assert 
that an organization's representation of its privacy safe¬ 
guards is either reliable or not. As was discussed above, 
the organization's representation is verifiable and partially 
quantifiable. 
In chapter V the implementation of privacy safeguards 
is discussed. It is shown that much of what is done is in 
itself an internal control. It is also shown that a privacy 
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standard of accountability requires that an organization 
maintain a record of its actions with regard to privacy of 
individually identifiable personal records. 
Just as there are Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) as criteria for financial audits, chapter 
IV develops Generally Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPP) as 
criteria for privacy audits. These GAPP are based on pri¬ 
vacy laws and policies and thereby gain a level of consensus 
which exceeds the GAAP. 
The privacy audit does not have the last two attri¬ 
butes required by the Committee. Although auditors do con¬ 
duct reviews of internal control systems and do conduct com¬ 
pliance audits, they do not at this time possess much know¬ 
ledge of the privacy area. As the privacy model is further 
developed in the chapters below, attempts are made to cast 
the model in a framework which minimizes this problem. The 
auditor's competence regarding privacy audits, in the mean¬ 
time, remains questionable. 
Finally, the Committee requires that "report language 
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be developed and agreed upon by the profession" before any 
extension into new subject matter can occur. This project 
develops report language and presents it in chapter VI. 
Only time will tell if it becomes agreed upon by the profes¬ 
sion. 
In summary, the subject matter of a privacy audit 
meets most of the important criteria proposed by the 
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Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts for an extension of the 
audit function. A privacy audit does have operational cri¬ 
teria, assertions can be made by the auditor, privacy proce¬ 
dures are themselves a system of controls about which infor¬ 
mation is maintained and the auditor possesses competence in 
the general area of internal control review. The auditor 
does not, however, possess knowledge of privacy nor is there 
an accepted format for reporting on the results of a privacy 
audit. 
Statements on Auditing Standards 
A review of present auditing practice, as specified 
by the Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) issued by the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
is useful for determining discrepancies between the proposed 
privacy model and the present practices of CPAs. 
In chapter I it was stated that auditors are required 
to study and evaluate the system of internal control in an 
organization as a basis for reliance thereon and that only 
accounting control is to be evaluated. It was also noted 
in chapter I that SAS 20 now requires that auditors communi¬ 
cate to the senior management of the audited organization 
material weaknesses in the internal control system which are 
found in the review of the system performed incident to 
the audit of financial statements. The review, then, is not 
extensive enough to include privacy controls and the report 
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is not made to the public. Both are required for the pri¬ 
vacy model. This model is suggesting a fundamental change 
in the present audit practice. 
Extensions of Accounting and Auditing 
In the last few years there have been many authorita¬ 
tive recommendations for extending the scope of both ac¬ 
counting and auditing. It will be shown here that these 
authorities give significant support to the privacy model. 
Accounting extensions 
One of the objectives of financial statements speci¬ 
fied by the AICPA's Study Group on the Objectives of Finan¬ 
cial Statements deals with the issue of reporting on non¬ 
economic, socially-oriented activities. They state: 
An objective of financial statements is to report on 
those activities of the enterprise affecting society 
which can be determined and described or measured and 
which are important to the role of the enterprise in 
its social environment.^ 
This objective supports a report by an organization on the 
policies and procedures adopted to protect the privacy of in¬ 
dividuals. It was noted above how important privacy is to 
individuals and society as a whole and what an impact that 
the activities of record-keepers can have on society. The 
steps taken by organizations can be determined and described 
and in many cases can be measured. 
This conclusion of the Study Group is supported by 
other authorities. May has stated: 
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Accounting conventions should be well conceived in rela¬ 
tion to at least three things: first, the use of ac¬ 
counts; second, the social and economic concepts of the 
time and place; and, third, the modes of thought of the 
people.39 
This gives us the thought that accounting should change as 
social pressure dictates and as needs of users are identi¬ 
fied. The importance of privacy and the assumed needs of 
the public for information was noted above. 
Linowes said: 
The social responsibility of the accounting profession 
falls into three levels: 
1. The social responsibility of our profession to per¬ 
form well its traditional assignments for those it 
serves—its clients. 
2. The responsibility of every discipline to probe new 
frontiers and expand the parameters of its work, to 
help contribute to a better society. 
3. The social responsibility of any educated group of 
citizens to its nation and society.40 
This repeats the argument of May. Accounting must be ready 
and willing to perform services for society as they become 
known. This research is identifying a function to the pro¬ 
fession which is of great importance to society- It is 
hoped that accountants will react favorably. 
In conjunction with the Report of the Study Group on 
Objectives of Financial Statements a second volume of se¬ 
lected papers, used as the basis of the Group's study, was 
published. Two of these papers discuss the subject of ac¬ 
countability which is very useful to this research. 
Cyert and Ijiri stated: 
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Accountability is an example of a fundamental objec¬ 
tive . . . the recent emphasis on the quality of the en¬ 
vironment . . . has added the public to the list of 
parties to whom a firm is accountable. ... In any 
case, accountability requires the recording and reporting 
of the entities' activities and their consequences.41 
In the same collection of papers Rosenfeld states: 
A person who is accountable to another person for his 
behavior may be required to report his behavior or its 
results to the other person; ... as reports on account¬ 
ability, financial statements are directed to specific 
persons—those to whom the persons reported on are ac¬ 
countable. . . . The behavior for which those who con¬ 
trol or use resources are accountable also depends on 
law, contract or custom and also may change over time.42 
An organization is accountable to an individual for 
the proper safeguarding of personal records maintained on 
that individual. This accountability is established by law, 
and by government recommendation. This is not, perhaps, the 
type accountability relationship anticipated by these au¬ 
thors, but it is real and it is important in the world today. 
Ijiri in another place notes the role of accounting in 
facilitating accountability relationships. He states: 
Accounting is a system designed to facilitate the smooth 
functioning of accountability relationships among in¬ 
terested parties. . . . The role of the accountant is to 
assist the accountor in accounting for his activities 
and their consequences and, at the same time, provide in¬ 
formation to the accountee.43 
In summary, it has been noted that organizations are 
accountable to individuals on whom personal individually 
identifiable records are maintained. The organizations are 
responsible for maintaining the records in accordance with 
the GAPP developed in the next chapter and for making reports 
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on that accountability to the individual. There is signifi¬ 
cant authoritative support for the idea that an appropriate 
place for such a report is the annual statements of the or¬ 
ganization and that of the appropriate function to assist 
the organization in such a presentation is the accountant. 
This conclusion fits nicely into the privacy model 
developed above. Rosenfeld states: 
Financial statements designed as accountability reports 
are not meant to be simple historical recitations, 
mere curiosities. Their purpose is to permit those to 
whom an accounting is made to make informed decisions 
concerning the persons who are accountable. . . . Un¬ 
satisfactory behavior by those accountable can be met, 
for example, by terminating their control or use of re¬ 
sources . . . or by requiring restitution.44 
It was noted above that the Privacy Protection Study 
Commission advocated incentives for compliance with privacy 
safeguards. It was their belief that record-keepers could 
be driven to comply with the functioning of the market 
place. It was also noted that the Commission provided no 
mechanism for public reporting of the procedures of record¬ 
keeping organizations which would allow preemptive action by 
individuals. As noted by Rosenfeld, the accountability re¬ 
porting by an organization provides such a mechanism. 
Arguments have therefore been made for a report by 
record-keeping organizations of their privacy policies and 
procedures. An independent assessment of that presentation 
is also necessary. Rosenfeld states: 
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Financial statements may be prepared by those who are 
accountable or by others. Those who are accountable 
usually are most familiar with the information to be re¬ 
ported, but are not disinterested. Conservative report¬ 
ing standards and independent audits can help overcome 
this conflict. 
An independent audit by the CPA is required but not yet sup¬ 
ported. Authorities have recently lent support to such an 
audit. 
Auditing extensions 
In 1972 the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a 
booklet which contained standards to be used for audits of 
certain government activities. This booklet presented a 
definition of auditing which expanded the scope of the audit 
function. They state: 
These standards provide for a scope of audit that in¬ 
cludes not only financial and compliance auditing but 
also auditing for economy, efficiency, and achievement 
of desired results. . . . However, an audit that would 
include provision for the interests of all potential 
users of government audits would ordinarily include pro¬ 
vision for auditing all of the above elements of the 
accountability of the responsible officials. 
Definitions of the three elements of such an audit fol¬ 
low: 
1. Financial and Compliance—determines ... (c) whe- 
ther the entity has complied with applicable laws 
and regulations.46 
In response to these standards the AICPA published a 
booklet for CPAs. Some of their conclusions and recommenda¬ 
tions are as follows: 
However, in GAO's definition, an audit may also be con¬ 
cerned with . . . compliance with both financial and 
nonfinancial laws and regulations. . . . Independent 
public accountants should be encouraged to participate 
in audits of the types contemplated by the GAO. . . . 
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The members of this committee agree with the philosophy 
and objectives advocated by the GAO in its standards" and 
believe that the GAO's broadened definition of auditing 
is a logical and worthwhile continuation of the evolu¬ 
tion and growth of the auditing discipline.^7 
It can immediately be noted that the GAO standards and 
the comments of the AICPA are in reference to government au¬ 
dits. It should also be noted, however, that the AICPA 
agrees with the expanded scope of auditing and encourages 
CPA engagement in such audits. The AICPA also recognizes 
that the auditor will be involved in non-financial areas 
while performing these audits. Also, the GAO established 
these standards because they believed that it was essential 
that those to whom the government is accountable, the gen¬ 
eral public, should have reported to them the actions of 
government. There is no reason why this should not also 
hold true in the private sector. If CPAs can perform com¬ 
pliance audits in nonfinancial areas, they should be able to 
do it for any accountable organization. 
As was noted in chapter I, another recommendation for 
expansion of the scope of the audit function was made by the 
Cohen Commission. This recommendation 
. . . would require the auditor to expand his study of 
the controls over the accounting system to form a con¬ 
clusion on the functioning of the internal accounting 
control system.^8 
This review, being a review of the entire system, differs 
from the limited review required by SAS 1, which is a test 
sufficient to determine the degree of reliance to be placed 
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on the controls. The review suggested by the Cohen Commis¬ 
sion is, however, a review of accounting controls only. 
The Commission goes on, however, to discuss its position on 
that matter. They state: 
. . . the auditor should limit his report on whether he 
agrees with management's description of the company's 
internal control system to the accounting controls. . . . 
The Commission does not wish to preclude further develop¬ 
ment of standards for the evaluation of administrative 
controls and for reporting on them, but rather to sug¬ 
gest that there is a later step in the evolution of the 
audit formation.49 
The Commission does recommend one extension of the 
audit function into a non-financial area. They do so because 
of public expectations regarding the auditors' duties and 
responsibilities. They recommend an extension of the audit 
function into the monitoring and reporting of organiza¬ 
tions' compliance with laws and regulations. The Commission 
recommends a framework for achieving legal accountability 
c n 
which involves participation of the independent auditor. 
They believe that the auditor is not completely qualified to 
judge an organization's compliance with all laws but, given 
a proper framework, can be effective in offering a service 
to society which, they say, appears to want greater assurance 
on the compliance of corporations with laws and regulations. 
Although privacy safeguards are not always laws or regula¬ 
tions, some are only recommendations of commissions and some 
are still in legislative form, the framework proposed by the 
Commission corresponds very closely to that proposed in the 
privacy model above. 
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The Commission recommends a framework which combines 
actions of the organization and its legal counsel, the inter¬ 
nal auditor and the independent auditor. The organization 
should formulate a statement of policy on illegal acts which 
would be made public and included in the annual report. 
They should also adopt policies and procedures to provide 
for effective monitoring of compliance and state which pro¬ 
cedures can be audited. The organization should have their 
internal auditors participate in the design and implementa¬ 
tion of the programs for achieving and enforcing corporate 
policy statements in this area. 
The independent auditor should then provide users 
with assurance on whether a company is taking effective ac¬ 
tion on the policy. The Commission states: 
The auditor should review the company's code of conduct 
and the procedures adopted to monitor compliance with it. 
The auditor should determine whether there are material 
weaknesses in the related monitoring procedures, and in¬ 
dicate his conclusion on these matters in his report. 
Should the auditor require assistance during the inves¬ 
tigation the legal counsel of the organization would be con¬ 
sulted. The organization's legal counsel also becomes in¬ 
volved in devising the overall policy and the presentation 
in the annual report. 
The framework suggested by the Commission is essen¬ 
tially the same as that suggested for the privacy model. The 
record-keeping organization, assisted by legal counsel, for¬ 
mulates a privacy policy which conforms to various legal. 
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regulatory and voluntary privacy safeguards required for that 
company. The organization, with the assistance of the inter¬ 
nal audit staff, implements procedures to enact that policy. 
The organization with assistance of legal counsel and the 
internal auditors includes a description of the policy and 
procedures in the annual report. The CPA reviews this policy 
and the procedures to assure the readers of the report that 
the policy and procedures are in place and are effective and 
includes a report on these findings in the auditor’s report. 
The audit model is diagrammed in figure 3. 
Conclusions 
The discussion of the philosophical implications of 
the privacy model has revealed that the proposed privacy mo¬ 
del is not inconsistent with the recent authoritative ac¬ 
counting and auditing literature. There is also consider¬ 
able authoritative support for the model. The presentation 
by management of its policies and procedures is supported by 
ASOBAT which required that such reports meet social goa'ls 
and certain criteria which the information was shown to have 
met. Such a report was also shown to be supported by other 
authorities as a requirement of society in the present envi¬ 
ronment and as a means of facilitating the accountability of 
record-keeping organizations. The Cohen Commission suggested 
that companies report on their policies and procedures for 
complying with laws and regulations. 
Figure 3 Privacy Audit Model 
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The suggested extension of the audit function was sup¬ 
ported by the Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts which said 
that extensions of the audit function require auditors' com¬ 
petence and operational criteria. The privacy audit satis¬ 
fies those requirements. This extension of the auditing 
function was also supported by the GAO and the AICPA for 
government audits and by the Cohen Commission for all audits. 
Summary 
This chapter has developed the privacy model. It be¬ 
gan with a description of the goals of the model. Three of 
these goals are taken from the Privacy Protection Study Com¬ 
mission and three were adopted for this model. The practices 
required to implement those goals were deduced from and shown 
to be consistent with those goals. 
It is noted here that the practices are assumed to 
meet the model's goals. For example, it is assumed that the 
audited privacy report will satisfy the needs of interna¬ 
tional concerns. However, privacy is responsible for only a 
portion of the impasse on the issue of- transborder data flow. 
The international data flow problem is also complicated by 
the issues of nationalism, the protection of national indus¬ 
tries and interests. The privacy model developed here does 
not address these other aspects of the international data 
flow oroblem. 
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It is also assumed that the public will be served by 
the audited privacy report. However, there is a danger that 
the public will not interpret this report correctly. The 
public may perceive the auditor's attestation as a certifi¬ 
cation that privacy is protected by the organization. This 
would not necessarily be true since the auditor is to merely 
state that the organization is doing what the organization 
had said it was doing with regard to privacy. This possi¬ 
bility of public misunderstanding was voiced by some members 
of the Auditing Standards Executive Committee when they dis¬ 
sented on the issuance of SAS 20. They objected to any 
public communication of the material weaknesses in internal 
control. The dissenting members believed that such communi- 
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cation could easily be misunderstood by the public. 
This chapter also contained a review of the accounting 
and auditing literature. It was noted that this model is in 
many ways supported by the authoritative literature. It is 
noted here, however, that showing that the model is consis¬ 
tent with the assumed implementation goals and showing that 
it is not inconsistent with the authoritative literature may 
not make up sufficient support for the model. The account¬ 
ing profession would not necessarily be convinced by such 
arguments. If the profession is not convinced by such ar¬ 
guments and does not develop an interest in conducting pri¬ 
vacy audits, this may not be a significant model. 
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The accounting profession, being pragmatic in nature, 
would probably be more convinced by practical arguments con¬ 
cerning this model. If the auditor can be shown to be qua¬ 
lified for this task and if there is substantial overlap 
with existing audit tasks, the auditor might be convinced. 
This researcher believes that there is substantial overlap 
and that the auditor is qualified for this task. This will 
become more apparent in the remaining chapters of this re¬ 
search. 
In conclusion, this researcher believes that this mo¬ 
del is consistent with the assumed environment, is supported 
by authoritative accounting literature, and finally will be 
perceived by the auditing profession to be a desirable task 
to undertake. These three aspects together are convincing 
arguments for this model. 
93 
Footnotes 
^The Privacy Act of 19 74, 5 U.S.C. sec. 552a 5. 
2 
Personal Privacy in an Information Society, The Re¬ 
port of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, by David F. 
Linowes, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1977). 
3 
Edith Holmes, "Carter Chided for Dragging Feet on 
Privacy," Computerworld, May 29, 1978, p. 5. 
^Linowes, pp. 14-15. 
^Ibid., p. 30. 
^Edith Holmes, "NCIC Audit, Expansion Pending," Compu¬ 
terworld, October 17, 1977, p. 1. 
7 
Robert P. Bigelow and Susan H. Nycum, Your Computer 
and the Law (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1975), p. 141. 
Q 
Edith Holmes, "GAO Auditors Demonstrate SSA Data Too 
Easy to Steal," Computerworld, March 13, 1978, pp. 1, 6. 
9 
Linowes, p. 28. 
■^Ibid. , p. 30. 
■^Ibid., pp. 522-523. 
12 
See Linowes, pp. 17, 33; Westin, p. 376. 
1 3 
See Milton R. Wessell, Freedom's Edge: The Computer 
Threat to Society (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 61-62; Bigelow and Nycum, 
p. 149; Data Banks and Society: Proceedings of the First In¬ 
ternational Oslo Sympsoium on Data Banks and Society (Oslo, 
Norway: Scandanavian University Books, 1974), p. 54. 
^Linowes, pp. 35-37. 
15 
See The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C., Sec. 
602 (1970); Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 
20 U.S.C., Sec. 1232 g(g); The Privacy Act of 1974, U.S.C." 
sec. 552a. 
94 
16 
See Data Banks and Society, p. 149; Linowes, pp. 11, 
67, 70-71, 340; Ware, p. 37. 
17 
Federal Personal Data Systems Subject to the Pri¬ 
vacy Act of 1974: Second Annual Report of the President, 
p. 3. 
18 
See Linowes, pp. 75, 191, 197, 292-293; Ware, po. 
55, 86, 98. 
19 
Linowes, p. 497. 
90 
uWestm, p. 384. 
21 
Westin and Baker, p. 138; Nancy French, "Equifax 
Tactics Unfair to Subjects, FTC Rules," Computerworld, 
December 26, 1977/January 2, 1978, p. 1. 
22 
Data Banks and Society, pp. 26, 95. 
2 3 
Victor F. DeMarco, "How Internal Auditors Can Help 
CPAs Stamp Out Illegal Acts," The Internal Auditor 35 (Feb¬ 
ruary 1978):60-65. 
24"Corporate Internal Professionals Also have Public 
Responsibilities," report of a speech by Harvey Kapnick, 
Executive News Briefs (Arthur Andersen & Co.), October 1977, 
p. 1. 
25 
Mautz and Sharaf, p. 15. 
2^Ibid. , p. 14 . 
27Ibid., p. 159. 
28Ibid., p. 47. 
29 
Ibid., p. 145. 
30 
Zlatkovich, p. 1. 
8^Ibid., p. 6. 
32 . 
Ibid., p. 4. 
33 
Ibid., p. 7. 
^^Silvoso, p. 2. 
35 
Ibid., p. 5. 
95 
36Ibid., p. 14. 
3^Ibid., p. 14. 
38 
Objectives of Financial Statements, Report of the 
Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements, by- 
Robert M. Trueblood, Chairman (New York: American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, 1973), p. 55. 
39 
George 0. May, Financial Accounting (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1943), p~ T~. 
40 
"Social Responsibility of the Profession," report of 
a speech by David F. Linowes, The Journal of Accountancy 131 
(January 1971):66. 
41 
Richard M. Cyert and Yuji Ijin, "A Framework for 
Developing the Objectives of Financial Statements," in Ob¬ 
jectives of Financial Statements, vol. 2, Selected Papers 
eds. Joe J. Cramer, Jr. and George H. Sorter (New York:- 
American Institute, of Certified Public Accountants, 1974), 
pp. 30-31. 
^2Paul Rosenfeld, "Stewardship," in Cramer and Sorter, 
pp. 125-127. 
^2ljiri, Accounting Measurement, p. ix. 
44 
Rosenfeld, p. 128. 
^3Ibid., p. 129. 
4 6 
U.S. General Accounting Office, Standards for Audit, 
^^Auditing Standards Established by the GAO, pp. 10-12. 
^3Cohen, p. 60. 
49 
Ibid., p. 62. 
3^Ibid., pp. 45-49. 
3^Ibid., p. 47. 
52 
Kelley, p. 120. 
p. 2. 
CHAPTER I V 
PRIVACY STANDARDS 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline privacy 
safeguards as a hierarchy of objectives, standards and pro¬ 
cedures. The presentation lends itself to the implementation 
of privacy safeguards and provides a framework for the audit¬ 
ing of these safeguards. This relationship was shown in 
figure 1. 
Framework 
This presentation of privacy safeguards is modeled af¬ 
ter the hierarchy of accounting objectives, standards and 
procedures sometimes collectively referred to as Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). This is done because 
this framework is familiar to the accountant and because 
privacy safeguards lend themselves to such a presentation. 
This framework is also useful to the organization in imple¬ 
menting privacy safeguards. It could be argued that a pri¬ 
vacy audit is a compliance audit, because it certainly is a 
test of the compliance with privacy laws, and should not be 
confused with, nor made similar to, nor conducted with a fi¬ 
nancial audit. It is argued here that a privacy audit should 
be conducted as part of a financial audit. Proctor has 
stated: 
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The compliance audit should be an integral part of fi¬ 
nancial and operational or performance audits and should 
not generally be conducted as a separate examination. 
Basically, this is due to the nature of compliance au¬ 
dits since most aspects of these examinations overlap 
with financial and performance auditing.1 
This concept reduces cost by eliminating duplication of ef¬ 
fort. 
The information system within an organization contains 
both accounting and personal data. Some accounting data is, 
in fact, also personal data. Accounts receivable files, for 
example, contain some information which is personal in na¬ 
ture. If privacy and financial audits are conducted sepa¬ 
rately there would be duplication of some tests of the infor¬ 
mation system. The review of the internal control system 
and the tests of file accuracy are examples. A privacy au¬ 
dit is a test of an information system to determine compli¬ 
ance with privacy safeguards and if it is to be conducted 
as a part of a financial audit it should be modeled after 
financial audits which determine whether financial statements 
are prepared in accordance with accounting requirements 
called Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. It is ne¬ 
cessary, then, that privacy safeguards be outlined as a 
hierarchy of objectives, standards and procedures as are the 
GAAP. 
The auditor, while conducting a review of an organiza¬ 
tion's financial statements, is guided by a set of Generally 
Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). Therefore, if the CPA 
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is to conduct a privacy audit it is not only necessary that 
a framework such as GAAP be developed but also that privacy 
audit standards be developed. In chapter VI modification 
of the GAAS are suggested to assist the auditor in design¬ 
ing and conducting a privacy audit. 
Accounting Objectives/ Standards and Procedures 
GAAP have been defined as a hierarchy of various le¬ 
vels, levels with various descriptions and definitions. 
These levels have been called postulates, objectives, prin¬ 
ciples, rules, procedures, basic concepts and purposes. All 
authors have agreed that there is a hierarchy, that it usu¬ 
ally has three levels, that the higher the level the more 
permanent the concept and that the lower levels are logically 
derived from those above. 
In 1958 the American Institute of Certified Public Ac¬ 
countants' special committee on research programs proposed 
four levels, postulates, principles, rules or guides and 
research. They stated the following: 
Postulates are few in number and are the basic assump¬ 
tions on which principles rest. They necessarily derive 
from the economic and political environment and from the 
modes of thought and customs of all segments of the busi¬ 
ness community. ... A fairly broad set of coordinated 
accounting principles should be formulated on the basis 
of the postulates. . . . Rules or other guides for the 
application of accounting principles in specific situa¬ 
tions, then, should be developed in relation to the 
postulates and principles. . . .2 
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Moonitz in his search for postulates of accounting adopts 
. 3 
this hierarchy. Leonard Spacek in his comments contained in 
the Moonitz monograph contends that purposes and objectives 
4 
should be specified, then postulates and principles. 
Moonitz in another monograph tells us something about 
the relative permanence of the upper levels of the hierarchy 
when he states: 
The complexities of modem business make it necessary to 
formulate more specific rules, beyond the principles 
themselves. . . . But changes in the detailed rules do 
not necessarily affect the broad principles and basic 
postulates, all of which are comprehended in the term 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
In 1965 Grady published an inventory of GAAP. In out¬ 
lining his presentation he agreed with the hierarchy speci¬ 
fied earlier by the committee on research programs but chose 
to use the term basic concept rather than postulates.^ He 
goes on further to explain what principles are not rules 
which cannot vary. Grady summarizes the principles of fi¬ 
nancial accounting by stating that accounting principles 
must follow from the purposes of accounting, and that: 
Such principles are necessarily stated in terms of ob¬ 
jectives and major criteria, and the complexities fac¬ 
ing modern business make more definitive rules, such as 
the APB Opinions, necessary to implement the principles 
in relation to the pertinent circumstances of the time. 
In a changing world it naturally follows that detailed 
rules not only may but should be changed to meet changes 
in conditions or in the mode of thought of the busi¬ 
ness community, and that such changes do not necessarily 
affect the broader principles and concepts, all of which 
are comprehended in the term, generally accepted account¬ 
ing principles. 
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In 1973 the American Insittute of Certified Public Ac¬ 
countants issued its report of the study group on the objec¬ 
tives of financial statements. That report outlines the 
hierarchical framework in which the study group was operat¬ 
ing when it was stated: 
To serve users' needs, the accounting process should con¬ 
sist of an interrelated and compatible system of objec¬ 
tives, standards or principles, and practices or proce¬ 
dures. Objectives should identify the goals and pur¬ 
poses of accounting. Standards should follow logically 
from objectives, and should provide guidelines for the 
formulation of accounting practices compatible with the 
desired goals. All three levels of the system should 
be linked rationally to the needs of users.9 
In summary, it has been shown that Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles are a hierarchy of objectives, stan¬ 
dards and procedures. Objectives are relatively permanent 
in nature and are broad definitions of the problem at hand. 
Standards derive from objectives and are rather broad 
guidelines of how the objectives are to be carried out. 
This is the framework to be used in presenting privacy safe¬ 
guards as a set of Generally Accepted Privacy Principles 
(GAPP). 
Privacy Objectives, Standards and Procedures 
Objectives 
There are several opinions of what the objectives of a 
privacy policy should be. One of the early statements on 
the issue, as reported in the preceding chapter, was Cooley 
who called "the right of privacy" "the right to one's 
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person" which is "a right of complete immunity: to be let 
alone."2 3 * * * * * * 10 This is certainly a broad objective but it is not 
sufficient to suggest standards for its implementation, par¬ 
ticularly in today's record-keeping environment. 
Westin feels that the overriding issue on privacy is 
the obtaining of a balance between the right of privacy and 
the need for disclosure or surveillance.11 This is fine as 
far as it goes but still presents problems of operationaliz¬ 
ing as did Cooley's objective. Miller also feels that the 
central privacy problem is a need for balance but he sees 
12 
privacy and efficiency as the conflicting interests. 
13 
Westin and Baker suggest a privacy policy which has 
these three points: 
1. Place limits on the amount and types of data collected 
and the uses of that data, for decision making 
2. Provide greater rights of access by individuals to re¬ 
cords maintained about them 
3. Fashion new rules for data sharing and confidentiality 
These points would suffice as the objectives of a privacy 
policy except that point number two outlines a procedure for 
accomplishing a more broad objective. 
The report of the Secretary of Health, Education and 
14 
Welfare's Advisory Committee on Automatic Data Systems 
suggested a code of fair information practice which had 
these five points: 
1. Define fair information practice as adherence to speci¬ 
fied safeguard requirements 
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2. Prohibit violation of any safeguard requirements as an 
unfair information practice 
3. Provide that an unfair information practice be subject 
to both civil and criminal penalties 
4. Provide for injunctions to prevent violation of any 
safeguard requirement 
5. Give individuals the right to bring suit for unfair in¬ 
formation practices to recover actual, liquidated, and 
punitive damages, in individual or class actions. 
Provide for recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees and 
other costs of litigation incurred by individuals who 
bring successful suits 
This code is a method for providing a legal structure for 
unmentioned privacy issues and is not suitable as a privacy 
objective. This report also sets forth five fair informa¬ 
tion principles which are considered to be standards and 
will be discussed below. 
The report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission 
concluded that an effective privacy protection policy must 
15 
have three concurrent objectives: 
1. to create a proper balance between what an individual is 
expected to divulge to a record-keeping organization and 
what he seeks in return (to minimize intrusiveness) 
2. to open up record-keeping operations in ways that will 
minimize the extent to which recorded information about 
an individual is itself a source of unfairness in any 
decision about him made on the basis of it (to maximize 
fairness) 
3. to create and define obligations with respect to the 
uses and disclosures that will be made of recorded in¬ 
formation about an individual (to create legitimate, en¬ 
forceable expectations of confidentiality) 
These objectives are suitable as the broad privacy objec¬ 
tives necessary as a foundation of the Generally Accepted 
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Privacy Principles hierarchy. They lead to privacy stan¬ 
dards without being specific in themselves. They are 
founded in the history of the privacy issue discussed in the 
preceding chapter. That is, they address the rights of an 
individual to be let alone, to participate in decisions made 
regarding personal records which are maintained by others, 
decisions regarding collection, use and accuracy. This will 
serve as the foundation from which privacy standards are de¬ 
rived. 
Standards 
No source could be found which proposed privacy safe¬ 
guards and called them standards, since that terminology 
is original to this research. However, there are several 
sources which suggest privacy safeguard classes which will 
satisfy as standards. A number of these will be presented 
here to gain a concensus of what these standards are. It is 
useful to restate that standards must derive from the objec¬ 
tives, be relatively broad and permanent in nature and sug¬ 
gest specific implementation procedures. 
Westin and Baker present a section in their report on 
the implications for public policy which they derive from 
16 
their three point privacy policy mentioned above. This 
policy includes the following points: 
1. A person should have access to a personal record main¬ 
tained by others. This should include rights to know 
that the records exists, to inspect the record, and to 
challenge its accuracy, completeness, and propriety 
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2. Rules should be established for confidentiality and 
data-sharing 
3. Limit unnecessary data collection 
4. Record-keeping organizations should provide security 
measures for their information system 
5. Establish a privacy agency to manage certain bodies of 
sensitive data 
With the exception of the establishment of a privacy agency, 
these points meet the criteria established for standards 
and, as will be shown below, are similar in many ways to 
other suggested standards. 
The Health, Education and Welfare study mentioned above 
contains certain fundamental principles of fair information 
17 
practice which has five points: 
1. There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems 
whose very existence is secret 
2. There must be a way for an individual to find out what 
information about him is in a record and how it is 
used 
3. There must be ways for an individual to prevent informa¬ 
tion about him obtained for one purpose from being used 
or made available for other purposes without his consent 
4. There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend 
a record of identifiable information about him 
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or dis¬ 
seminating records of identifiable personal data must 
assure the reliability of the data for their intended 
use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent mis¬ 
use of the data. 
Again, these points satisfy the criteria established for 
standards. Although arranged differently, this list is es¬ 
sentially the same as that proposed by Westin and Baker 
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above. The Privacy Protection Study Commission accepted 
this list, added a few points, rearranged others and pre¬ 
sented their own principles of fair information practice as 
follows: 
1. Openness—There shall be no personal-data record¬ 
keeping system whose very existence is secret 
2. Individual Access—Individuals shall have the right to 
see and copy individually identifiable information 
stored about them 
3. Individual Participation—The right to correct or amend 
information maintained about an individual 
4. Collection Limitation—Limits on the types and manner 
of collection of information 
5. Use Limitation—Limits on internal use 
6. Disclosure Limitation—Limits on external disclosure 
7. Information Management—Organization shall bear an af¬ 
firmative responsibility for establishing reasonable and 
proper information management policies and practices 
which assure that its collection, maintenance, use, and 
dissemination of information about an individual is 
necessary and lawful and the information itself is cur¬ 
rent and accurate 
8. Accountability—An organization is accountable for its 
personal-data record-keeping policies, practices, and 
systems 
These principles of fair information practice are taken here 
as the privacy standards being sought. These standards are 
consistent with the three primary objectives. Standard 4, 
collection limitation, derives from objective 1, minimizing 
intrusiveness. Standards 1, 2 and 3; openness, individual 
access, and individual participation, derive from objective 
2, maximize fairness. Standards 5, 6, 7, and 8; use 
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limitation, disclosure limitation, information management, 
and accountability, derive from objective 3, create legiti¬ 
mate, enforceable expectations of confidentiality. These 
standards are relatively broad and as will be shown below, 
they suggest specific implementation procedures. 
Procedures 
Specific implementation procedures are contained in 
various laws passed by the Congress and in the recommenda¬ 
tions of the Privacy Protection Study Commission. Examples 
of procedures specified in The FCRA, The Privacy Act of 
1974 and the Privacy Commission Report will be presented 
here. Table 1 contains a list of the sources of privacy 
procedures. Hoffman suggests several ways of staying 
abreast of privacy legislation. Also the Privacy Journal 
publishes an annual compilation of privacy laws. The pur¬ 
pose of this presentation will be to show a few examples of 
implementation procedures and also to show how they are con¬ 
sistent with the privacy standards. 
In 1970 Congress passed The FCRA. This was the first 
major recognition of the rights of citizens to privacy of 
records kept by others. Congress recognized "a need to en¬ 
sure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave 
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect 
for the consumer's right to privacy." The law's purpose was 
to require that these agencies perform their duties with 
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TABLE 1 
Sources of Federal Privacy Procedures 
Freedom of Information Act (U.S. Code, vol. 5, SEC. 552, 
1966) 
Truth-in-Lending Act (U.S. Code, vol. 15, sec. 1601, 1968) 
Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board (Code of Federal 
Regulations, vol. 12, sec. 226, 1968) 
Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 
(U.S. Code, vol. 3T, sec. 1051-1122, 1970) 
Fair Credit Reporting Act (U.S. Code, vol. 15, sec. 602, 
1970) 
Law on Federal Justice Information Systems (U.S. Code, vol. 
42, sec. 3771, 1973) 
Privacy Act of 1974 (U.S. Code, vol. 5, sec. 552a, 1974) 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (U.S. 
Code, vol. 20, sec. 1232q, 1974) 
Fair Credit Billing Act (U.S. Code, vol. 15, sec. 1601, 
1974) 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 (U.S. Code, vol. 26, secs, 408, 6103, 
1976) 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (U.S. Code, vol. 15, sec. 1691, 
1976) 
Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission (Personal 
Protection in an Information Society, by David F. 
Linowes, Chairman^ Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1977) 
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regard to information "in a manner which is fair and equit¬ 
able to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, 
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such infor- 
21 
mation. ..." The major requirements of the law with 
regard to consumer reporting agencies, with parenthetical 
reference to privacy standards, are as follows: consumer 
reports can only be issued in response to court order, when 
instructed by the consumer, or to persons expected to use it 
in legitimate business such as credit granting, employment 
or insurance (disclosure limitations); consumer reports can¬ 
not contain obsolete information (information management); 
consumer reports should be prepared with procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy (information management); consu¬ 
mers shall upon request be notified of nature, substance, 
and sources of information and recipients of consumer re¬ 
ports (individual access, disclosure limitation, account¬ 
ability, collection limitation, openness); disputed informa¬ 
tion should be reinvestigated, and if the dispute cannot be 
resolved, a consumer statement is amended to the record and 
any past or future recipients are notified of the disputed 
information (individual participation); consumers must be 
notified if a report is used for an employment decision or 
if a report is the cause of an adverse credit decision (use 
limitation, disclosure limitation, openness). Finally, in 
addition to providing for various civil and criminal penal¬ 
ties, this act requires that the provisions be enforced by 
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various federal agencies (accountability). These agencies 
are given "procedural, investigative, and enforcement 
powers, . . ."^2 jn 1977 the Report of the Privacy Protec¬ 
tion Study Commission recommended that consumers be informed 
of the actual contents of records maintained about them ra- 
23 
ther than just the substance of such records. 
The Privacy Act of 1974, the most important privacy 
legislation to date, adopts the eight privacy standards as 
policy for federal agencies. The main provisions of the law 
are: agencies are required to provide notice of the exis¬ 
tence or proposed existence of data banks and also the gene¬ 
ral contents and likely subjects of such files (openness); 
provide access to files and correction or amending proce¬ 
dures (individual access, individual participation); re¬ 
quest permission for and provide history of non-routine dis¬ 
closures (use limitation, disclosure limitation); agencies 
must establish appropriate administrative, technical, and 
physical safeguards to insure the security and confidential¬ 
ity of sensitive records (information management); criminal 
and civil penalties are provided (accountability). 
The most extensive and comprehensive work in the area 
of privacy was that of the Privacy Protection Study Commis¬ 
sion which was created by the Privacy Act of 1974. The Com¬ 
mission published its findings in July of 1977 in a book 
titled Personal Privacy in an Information Society. As stated 
above, the Commission formulated three objectives of an 
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effective privacy protection policy. These objectives are 
minimization of intrusiveness, maximization of fairness and 
legitimizing expectations of confidentiality. In proposing 
methods for implementing this policy the Commission was 
guided by three principles: that incentives for systemic 
reform should be created; that existing regulatory and en¬ 
forcement mechanisms should be used insofar as possible; 
that unnecessary cost be avoided. In keeping with these 
principles the Commission's recommendations include a combin 
ation of voluntary compliance with the policy; statutory 
creation of rights, interests, or responsibilities enforce¬ 
able through either individual or governmental action; and 
establishment of ongoing governmental mechanisms to investi¬ 
gate, study, and report on privacy protection issues. 
The Commission makes 166 specific legislative recommen 
dations as well as some suggestions for voluntary compliance 
with the privacy policy outlined in the report. With very 
few exceptions the only mechanism suggested for enforcing 
compliance with the policy is remedy through the courts. 
The Commission feels that if the rights of individuals are 
established so as to create a balance between them and the 
power of the record-keepers, then any violations can be 
remedied in the courts. The Commission feels that this will 
create an incentive for organizations to comply with the 
policy. 
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The Commission also recommended the creation of an in¬ 
dependent entity within the federal government charged with 
the responsibility to: monitor and evaluate the implementa¬ 
tion of any statutes and regulations enacted pursuant to 
this study and participate in proceedings or processes whose 
action affects privacy; continue to research, study and in¬ 
vestigate areas of privacy concern and to be a mechanism 
whereby information collection and use could be questioned; 
to issue interpretive rules that must be followed by Federal 
agencies in implementing The Privacy Act of 1974; provide ad 
vice regarding the privacy implications of proposed federal 
or state statutes or regulations. It is important to note 
that the only enforcement authority given the board is in 
connection with the implementation by federal agencies of 
the Privacy Act itself. 
A very important part of the Commission's report is a 
review of the effectiveness of the Privacy Act of 1974 and 
its recommendations concerning the adoption of the Privacy 
Act in the private sector. The Commission does not feel 
that the Privacy Act should be adopted because: economic in 
centives are more effective in the private sector than in 
government; there is a high degree of uniformity in govern¬ 
ment not present in private institutions; government inter¬ 
vention could not be kept at a minimum in administering the 
Privacy Act in many diverse private concerns; some require¬ 
ments of the Privacy Act would be improper or even illegal 
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if applied in the private sector; and the Privacy Act is not 
working very well in the Federal government. 
The Commission's recommendations vary according to the 
particular circumstances of each type of record-keeping re¬ 
lationship. Implementation by different industries would be 
similar in that the recommendations follow from the primary 
objectives and standards but vary with the particulars of the 
individual's typical relationship with that industry and with 
an eye to balancing the competing interests of the individual 
and record-keeper. 
Some examples of the recommendations of the Commission 
are presented here. For the insurance and insurance-support 
industries it was recommended that The FCRA be amended to: 
prevent false or misleading representations in the collection 
of information on individuals (collection limitation); re¬ 
quire reasonable care in selection of support organizations 
so as to assure that the Commission's recommendations are 
followed by that source (disclosure limitation, information 
management); and require that individuals be notified of ex¬ 
istence of records and contents of that record (openness, 
individual participation).^ 
In the employment records area, the commission recom¬ 
mended amendment to The FCRA to limit information collected 
about employees (collection limitation), and to specify uses 
and disclosure of information collected (use limitation, 
25 
disclosure limitation). 
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In the medical-care relationship, the Commission re¬ 
commends that The Social Security Act be amended to require 
that medical-care providers comply with certain recommenda¬ 
tions as a condition of participation in the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs. The recommendations specified involved 
access to records (individual access), correction of records 
(individual participation), and availability of records to 
authorized recipients (use limitation, disclosure limita- 
. . ,26 
tion). 
The Commission's report contains many more recommenda¬ 
tions in the areas mentioned above as well as in the areas 
of consumer credit, banking, mailing lists and investigative 
reporting agencies. In mid-1978 these were still recommenda¬ 
tions. However several bills were pending before Congress 
to implement various parts of the Commission's report. 
Summary 
This chapter has suggested a set of Generally Accepted 
Privacy Principles (GAPP) which is a hierarchy of objectives, 
standards, and procedures. The GAPP are summarized in fi¬ 
gure 4. The objectives and standards are taken from the 
Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission. Using 
these objectives and standards in the way suggested in this 
chapter is, however, original in this research. The proce¬ 
dures in this hierarchy are the specific privacy practices. 
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These are found in various laws and in the Privacy Commis¬ 
sion Report. 
The GAPP framework is developed for both the auditor 
and for the record-keeping organization. The GAPP framework 
will assist the auditor in the privacy audit in much the 
same way that the GAAP framework is of assistance in the fi¬ 
nancial audit. It is emphasized here that the GAPP frame¬ 
work is different from the GAAP framework in that the GAPP 
is a classification scheme for the privacy practices some 
of which are optional. The accounting practices in the GAAP 
framework are for the most part not optional. 
The GAPP framework's classification feature is useful 
for this research because the presentation of suggested 
techniques for implementing privacy, discussed in the next 
chapter, can make reference to the standards rather than the 
actual practices. This approach broadens the scope of the 
presentation and relieves it of the difficulties of discuss¬ 
ing the many specific procedures. The audit model, discussed 
in chapter VI, also makes reference to the standards rather 
than the procedures. 
This framework also simplifies privacy implementation. 
Implementation by an organization would require reference to 
the specific requirements or optional practices for that in¬ 
dustry and for that organization. However, being able to 
classify the many privacy procedures into just eight stan¬ 
dards will facilitate this implementation. The organization 
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can view the specific procedures in light of the objectives 
and the standards and more easily make decisions on the ex¬ 
tent of implementation by knowing the intent of the speci¬ 
fic procedures. The framework also assists in choosing spe¬ 
cific implementation techniques, given the presentation in 
chapter V. 
This framework will also assist the auditor as it 
will facilitate the auditor's learning process. The frame¬ 
work, which classifies the many privacy procedures, sim¬ 
plifies the many privacy requirements and makes it easier 
for the auditor to identify what practices are being imple¬ 
mented, the intent of the practices and the techniques which 
can be used to implement those practices. The audit model 
in chapter VI is also presented with this framework in mind 
which allows the auditor to choose audit techniques based 
on the standard being tested. 
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CHAPTER V 
IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY STANDARDS 
This chapter presents procedures which are or can be 
used to implement privacy safeguards in a record-keeping 
organization. These procedures, a combination of policies, 
and manual and automated controls, are presented not to give 
an implementation plan but rather to establish a framework 
for the privacy audit model. Where this presentation lacks 
detail, references to privacy methods will be made. 
This presentation does not discuss the specific pri¬ 
vacy safeguards suggested by laws and studies but instead 
uses the privacy standards adopted in the preceding chapter. 
Since these standards do not vary between industries and are 
relatively constant over time, the implementation procedures 
and the audit model based on those procedures will have suf¬ 
ficient scope and permanence to be useful. 
This presentation proceeds as follows: first, the 
eight privacy standards and the types of procedures neces¬ 
sary for their implementation are discussed; second, each of 
the standards and some of the manual and automatic controls 
which could be used to implement them are discussed; finally, 
some thoughts on the subjectivity of privacy procedures will 
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be presented. Ideas for the general outline of this presen¬ 
tation were found in Hoffman and Linowes.'*’ 
Implication of the Standards 
Table 2 presents an outline of the procedures neces¬ 
sary to implement the standards. Each is discussed in more 
detail in the following sections. 
Openness 
The Privacy Act of 1974 required an annual publication 
2 
of system notices in The Federal Register. This was in¬ 
tended to give information on the existence of a data-bank, 
a description of likely candidates for inclusion in the bank 
and the routine internal and external uses. No mechanism 
such as the Federal Register exists in the private sector. 
Until such time as one does, organizations could publish sys¬ 
tem notices in such a way that they would be likely to 
reach the type of individual included in the bank. The open¬ 
ness standard also requires that each individual be notified 
of the existence of the system, if there is a record on the 
individual in that system. The notice could be given as an 
individual contributes data; authorizes collection of that 
data from third parties; when the record is set up; period¬ 
ically as the organization has correspondence with the indi¬ 
vidual; or when the individual, responding to public notice, 
questions an organization concerning existence of a record. 
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TABLE 2 
Implementing the Standards 
1. Openness: . Public notice of existence 
Notice to individuals 
2. Individual Access: Copy of record provided with notice 
Copy of record provided upon request 
3. Individual Participation: Mechanisms for individuals to 
challenge record contents 
Amendments included in or 
linked to the record 
4. Collection Limitation: Policy of limited data collection 
Notify individuals and third 
parties at time of data collec¬ 
tion 
5. Use Limitation: Mechanisms to limit internal use of in¬ 
formation 
6. Disclosure Limitation: Mechanisms to limit external use 
of information 
Procedure for verifying uses by 
receiving entities 
7. Information Management: Designate an individual as 
privacy monitor 
Provide mechanisms to propagate 
corrections 
Establish security system 
8. Accountability: Maintain log of record uses and sources 
Audit of privacy safeguards 
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Individual Access 
This standard requires that an organization provide to 
the individual a copy of a record maintained about the in¬ 
dividual. This copy should be complete, containing any 
amendments or variations in duplicate records, and be in a 
form readily understood by the individual. This copy might 
be included with the notice to the individual concerning the 
existence of the record or provided upon the request of the 
individual. 
Individual Participation 
After an individual has reviewed a copy of the record 
provided by the organization, there may be objections to the 
contents of the record on the grounds that it is not accu¬ 
rate, timely, complete or relevant. The organization must 
have a mechanism for the individual to register these com¬ 
plaints and for the organization to re-evaluate the contents 
of the record after a complaint has been lodged. Should the 
organization agree with the individual, the record would 
be corrected. Should there be disagreement, the organiza¬ 
tion should make the individual's rebuttal part of the 
record or link it to the record so that any future access 
to the record would capture the amendment as well as the 
record. 
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Collection Limitation 
An organization should periodically review its data 
collection practices to insure that a minimum of informa¬ 
tion is collected for a given use and, as far as possible, 
that it is collected from the individual. The results of 
each review would become organization policy until a subse¬ 
quent review. Practices would then be implemented to carry 
out this policy. The organization should also notify indi¬ 
viduals and third parties, at the time that data is col¬ 
lected, of the uses of the information, the scope, tech¬ 
niques and sources used to get additional information about 
the individual and the effects of not providing the informa¬ 
tion requested. This notice would give the individual a ba¬ 
sis for deciding whether or not to provide the information 
requested or whether to participate at all in the record¬ 
keeping relationship. 
Use Limitation 
An organization must install mechanisms to insure that 
uses of personal information are consistent with the uses 
specified in the notices given to individuals under the 
openness and collection limitation standards. These mech¬ 
anisms would limit uses of information by restricting data 
to certain applications and persons or functions within the 
organization. 
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Disclosure Limitation 
As with the use limitation standard an organization 
must install mechanisms to insure that external disclosures 
are consistent with notices given to individuals. In addi¬ 
tion an organization must take action to verify the uses to 
which the information is put by organizations receiving per¬ 
sonal data. An organization can insure that internal uses 
are consistent with an individual's expectations and that 
other organizations which receive data are known to the in¬ 
dividual. It is the organization's responsibility to verify 
that the uses to which the data are put by receiving organi¬ 
zations remains consistent with the individual's expecta¬ 
tions . 
Information Management 
This standard establishes that there are proper ap¬ 
proaches to the management of information and that the 
record-keeping organization should take affirmative steps to 
assure that their information management practices conform 
to a reasonable set of norms. Some of the practices sug¬ 
gested by this standard have been incorporated into the 
other standards. Establishing policies on limited data col¬ 
lection, for example, is a good information management 
practice. The information management standard, however, 
suggests that there are other more general steps that an or¬ 
ganization should take in regards to the management of its 
information system. 
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First, an individual within the organization should be 
appointed as privacy monitor with responsibility to issue 
instructions, guidelines and standards, and make such de¬ 
terminations as necessary to implement privacy safeguards. 
This person would be responsible for training the organiza¬ 
tion's personnel in privacy procedures, for reviewing 
record-keeping practices or computer system design for 
reasonableness. This person would also be responsible for 
participation in privacy policy-making and for enforcing com¬ 
pliance with safeguards within the organization. This person 
would serve as a central focus within the organization to 
keep abreast of current privacy procedures and to provide as¬ 
sistance to organization personnel on privacy matters. 
Second, the organization should provide procedures for 
notifying any sources or prior recipients of personal infor¬ 
mation whenever a correction to that information is made. 
Third, the organization should establish reasonable 
administrative, technical and physical safeguards to assure 
the integrity, confidentiality, and security of its indivi¬ 
dually identifiable records. 
Accountability 
To verify that the organization is complying with its 
privacy policy, an audit of the privacy system is required. 
The audit would involve a review and testing of the proce¬ 
dures noted under the other seven standards. In order to 
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assist in verifying that the use and disclosure of informa¬ 
tion is consistent with policies and with the notices given 
and also as an aid in propagating record corrections, a 
logging of sources and uses of personal records would also 
be required. 
Techniques for Implementing Privacy Procedures 
This section reviews the techniques for implementing 
the privacy procedures. As mentioned earlier, this presen¬ 
tation is not intended to be an implementation plan nor an 
exhaustive review of the literature available. It is in¬ 
tended to present suggested ways to implement the procedures 
and provide a framework for auditing the privacy system. As 
with the previous section, this presentation proceeds by 
presenting techniques for each privacy standard. Table 3 
presents an outline of the techniques presented in the fol¬ 
lowing sections. 
Openness 
As mentioned above, there is presently no mechanism 
that record-keeping organizations in the private sector can 
use to notify the general public as to the existence of that 
organization's personal record-keeping systems. Until such 
time as there is an index of private sector data banks, or¬ 
ganizations can make public announcements. For example, no¬ 
tices concerning personnel records can be made in company 
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TABLE 3 
Privacy Techniques 
1. Openness: Pre-printed forms 
Automatic notice 
File inquiry 
2. Individual Access: Conversion of record to understand¬ 
able form 
Linkage to amendments and duplicates 
3. Individual Participation: Mechanisms for file update 
Data fields for amendments or 
linkage to amendments 
4. Collection Limitation: Controls on data types 
Controls on data sources 
5. Use Limitation: Authentication and authorization proce¬ 
dures 
Other software controls on applications 
of data 
6. Disclosure Limitation: Authentication and authorization 
procedures 
Other software controls on appli¬ 
cation of data 
Automatic verification of confi¬ 
dentiality of receiver of re¬ 
cord 
7. Information Management: Privacy monitor as database ad¬ 
ministrator 
Software procedures for automa¬ 
tically propagating record 
corrections 
Security system 
8. Accountability: Data fields to record sources and uses 
of information 
Transaction logs of data use 
Privacy audit 
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bulletins, in pay envelopes or on company bulletin boards. 
Notices concerning personal records maintained on indivi¬ 
duals outside the organization could be made as advertise¬ 
ments in the media. All such notices would include a de¬ 
scription of likely candidates for inclusion in the data 
bank and the type and uses of information maintained. The 
organization could continue to use these techniques even af¬ 
ter the data bank index is established. 
By having notices pre-printed on forms used by an or¬ 
ganization, people could be notified of the existence of a 
data bank, its use, and other information deemed desirable. 
Forms used to collect data could contain such a notice as 
well as a description of third parties who might be used as 
sources to complement the data being collected. Periodic 
correspondence such as monthly statements might have such a 
pre-printed notice which also describes procedures for view¬ 
ing and copying the individual record and also procedures 
for correcting or amending the record, if the record is 
deemed by the individual to be in error. 
The actual record could also be printed on periodic 
correspondence with the individual. Each person in an or¬ 
ganization could, for example, be provided annually with a 
copy of their personnel record. Credit card companies 
could send annually a copy to each customer of the record 
maintained about that individual. Use of this procedure 
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would, of course, depend on size and sensitivity of the re¬ 
cord. 
If an organization is to respond to requests by indi¬ 
viduals concerning the existence of a record, possibly in 
response to the public notice, an organization must provide 
a method of querying their files to make such a determina¬ 
tion. There would need to be a function within the organiza 
tion which would make such file inquiries either on-line 
with terminals at their desks or overnight on a batch basis. 
The answers to such queries could be a simple yes or no or 
might include a copy of the record if the organization felt 
that most requests concerning existence of a record were 
coupled with or immediately followed by a request for an 
actual copy of the record. 
The openness standard would be implemented by an or¬ 
ganization knowing the specific procedures for disclosure re 
quired or suggested, keeping in mind the objectives of pri¬ 
vacy. The purpose of the openness procedures is to notify 
likely candidates of the existence of a record, its uses, 
additional sources of information not provided by the indi¬ 
vidual and procedures for seeing, copying and correcting or 
amending the record in order to relay to the individual ex¬ 
pectations concerning confidentiality and to maximize the 
fairness of the record-keeping relationship. This also al¬ 
lows the user to participate in the decision concerning 
amount of data collected and its uses. 
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Individual Access 
Quite often the computer printout of records, for use 
by people familiar with the system and its records, are ra¬ 
ther cryptic and difficult for an untrained observer to re¬ 
cognize or use. Organizations should make provisions for 
readable printouts of personal records for an individual 
whether these print-outs are for a specific request or are 
produced automatically with systems notices or periodic 
correspondence. This might require conversion tables to 
match internal codes with a phrase or word which describes 
their meaning. This may also require special headings and 
other explanations of the meaning of the data being printed. 
The organization may want to have a variable on the query 
input to allow shortened, coded print-outs for internal use 
and expanded, translated, formatted print-outs for external 
use. In any case special software and tables would be re¬ 
quired. 
Print-outs of records, whether for internal or exter¬ 
nal use, must include the entire record. That is, all amend¬ 
ments to the records must be included any time a record is 
accessed. This must be done to maximize the fairness to the 
individual. Decisions should not be made on incomplete re¬ 
cords. If the amendment is part of the record, no problem 
exists. If the amendment is stored internally but not part 
of the record, the inquiry routine should include a search 
for and print-out of that amendment. If the amendment is 
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stored externally, the print-out should signify the existence 
of an external amendment, which would then be manually at¬ 
tached to the record print-out. 
If the organization has duplicate copies of records, 
any print-out of the record should include a note concerning 
the existence and location of the duplicates. In this way 
inconsistencies can be corrected prior to any use or disclo¬ 
sure of the record. 
The individual access standard should be implemented 
knowing the specific procedures required or suggested. For 
example, some data, such as medical records, are exempt from 
certain disclosures and would not be included in most print¬ 
outs to the individual. The primary objective of this 
standard is to maximize the fairness with which record keep¬ 
ing operations are practiced and to provide the individual 
with sufficient information with which to participate in 
the record-keeping relationship. Implementation should 
keep these objectives in mind. 
Individual Participation 
One purpose of giving an individual access is to pro¬ 
vide the individual with the means by which to participate 
in the record-keeping relationship by asking for corrections 
to erroneous data contained in the record. After reinves¬ 
tigating the data on which the individual takes exception, 
the organization must either correct the errors or, if they 
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disagree, attach an amendment to the record noting this dis¬ 
agreement. The organization, therefore, would need to have 
a means of updating the file. Making corrections to files 
is a common occurrence. It would be an unusual computer 
system which did not allow such corrections to be made 
easily. 
Providing for amendments to records is not quite as 
common and deserves more consideration. There are three 
cases to consider. First, if the record is of fixed length 
and cannot provide for amendments to be included in the re¬ 
cord itself or if there is no room for the amendment to be 
included anywhere else on the computer system, then an ex¬ 
ternal manual file of amendments must be maintained and the 
record altered to signify the existence of such an amendment. 
This alteration would only need be a single digit code which 
would be understood to mean that an amendment exists. 
The second case is a fixed length record not providing 
room for an amendment to be included in a record but where 
there is room to store the amendment in another place on the 
system. A field in the record would serve as a pointer to 
the place where the amendment is stored. This would create 
a link between the record and its amendment to be used 
whenever necessary. The third case is a variable length re¬ 
cord which provides space for the amendment as a part of 
the record. This situation presents no problem in implemen¬ 
tation . 
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The purpose of this standard is to provide for correc¬ 
tion of, or amendment to, records upon request of the indivi¬ 
dual about whom the record is maintained. It should be im¬ 
plemented with the specific procedures in mind and in 
light of the objective of maximizing fairness to the indivi¬ 
dual. The use of inaccurate records is not fair to the per¬ 
son about whom the record is maintained. 
Collection Limitation 
As mentioned above, the organization must establish 
policies concerning the types of information to be collected 
and the means by which the information is collected. These 
policies are, as always, derived from the specific proce¬ 
dures keeping in mind the objective of minimizing intrusive¬ 
ness by limiting the amounts and types of data and the ob¬ 
jective of fairness which requires that data should be col¬ 
lected as much as possible from the individual and then as 
a last resort from reliable third parties, all of whom know 
what other sources are or could be used. Once the policies 
are established, the organization should provide controls 
which prevent unauthorized data or data from unauthorized 
sources from being entered into the record. 
The design of forms used to collect data could be used 
as a method to restrict data types. Pre-printed notices 
on the forms could be used to inform the individual or third 
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parties of other data and sources which might be used to 
complement the data being collected thereon. 
Controls on the types and sources of data which the 
computer would accept as input might also be advisable. Re¬ 
striction of data type, if the record was of fixed format, 
would not be difficult. The design of the record would 
preclude unauthorized data types. As to the restriction on 
sources of information, the system could be so designed that 
a source indicator is required with the input. The computer 
would reject any data, which by scanning a source/data 
authorization table, was found to come from unauthorized 
sources. This procedure depends somewhat on the honesty of 
the persons preparing the data for input who would be re¬ 
sponsible for assigning the source code. Particular atten¬ 
tion would be paid to this area in any audit. A comparison 
of source documents with the data could uncover such dis¬ 
honesty. This problem is discussed further in chapter VI. 
The problem of controlling data types becomes more 
complex when records are not fixed-format type. Many modern 
internal computer storage structures do not by nature have a 
3 
fixed format or size. When such storage structures are 
accessed by means of a data base management system (DBMS), 
there is a method of restricting the types of data which can 
4 
be stored. Date, in describing an architecture for a data¬ 
base system, shows how the Data Model (DM) as defined by the 
Data Model Definition (DMD) can restrict the types of data 
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available to the user for access or update. This effectively 
restricts the types of data stored. 
Use Limitation 
The purpose of this objective is to limit the persons 
or functions within an organization who can use certain data 
and to restrict the applications for which data can be 
used. There are two problems here. Restricting access is 
5 
one and restricting application is the other. Hoffman de¬ 
scribes the solution to these problems as authentication and 
authorization. 
Authentication verifies that a person or object is 
who they claim to be. Software authentication methods such 
as the use of passwords require that the user know some 
privileged information and transmit this to the computer. 
There are physical authentication methods which require that 
users have in their possession some object such as a key or 
magnetic card or possess some physical characteristic such 
as their voice or fingerprints.-* These methods are used to 
restrict access to the computer system itself by limiting 
those who get near the computer or one of its remote termi¬ 
nals and by limiting those whom the computer will allow ac¬ 
cess to all or selected parts of the system. 
Once a person or object has been authenticated as le¬ 
gitimate and given access to the computer facility or termi¬ 
nal and access to the system, an authorization check is made 
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on each request to determine if the requester can be given 
g 
the data item requested. Hoffman describes authorization 
techniques which can be designed to key on the user, the 
terminal, the operation requested, the datum itself, the 
7 
value of the datum or other miscellaneous criteria. Date 
describes the general principles whereby a database system 
can restrict the use of the stored data through the data 
submodel definition (DSMD) of the data submodel (DSM). 
Since the DSM is the only part of the DM to which a user has 
access, the DSMD can become a means of restricting authori- 
8 
zation. Graham describes the principles by which an ope¬ 
rating system can restrict access to authorized processes. 
As with all of the standards, there are many varia¬ 
tions in the procedures required or suggested for a record¬ 
keeping organization. The permitted uses of data within an 
organization vary with the type of data and type of organiza¬ 
tion. An organization would implement these specific proce¬ 
dures keeping in mind the objective of creating and enforc¬ 
ing an expectation of confidentiality for the individual to 
maximize the fairness of the uses of the data. This is done 
by limiting the uses of the personal data. 
Disclosure Limitation 
Just as there are limits on the uses of data within an 
organization, there are specified limits on the disclosure 
of data outside the record-keeping organization. There are 
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limits on the types of organizations which are authorized to 
receive data and also on the uses to which those organiza¬ 
tions can put the data. 
The techniques for implementing this standard are simi¬ 
lar to those for the preceding standard, use limitation. A 
system of authentication and authorization can be used to 
restrict the transfer of data to authorized organizations. 
Providing data only to authorized organizations presents no 
particular problems. The list of authorized organizations 
would simply be included in the authentication/authorization 
criteria list described below. 
What does present a problem is determining which or¬ 
ganizations are complying with certain privacy safeguards. 
It is essential to determine which organizations will provide 
the level of confidentiality expected and will restrict their 
use of the data provided accordingly. Receiving organiza¬ 
tions cannot be included on an organization's authorization 
list until it can be shown that they comply. It is sug¬ 
gested here that organizations review the reports of the in¬ 
dependent privacy audits, suggested in chapter III, and 
periodically update their authorization lists based on the 
results of that review. Only if an organization has been 
found to be in compliance with certain privacy safeguards 
can they be included on an authorization list for disclosure 
of personal data. Records would automatically be sent to 
authorized requesting organizations until such time as it 
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is determined that they are not in compliance and are re¬ 
moved from the list. This procedure requires no manual in¬ 
tervention as requests are made and only periodic update of 
authorization lists. 
Implementation of this procedure would require a re¬ 
view of the required and suggested procedures to make a de¬ 
termination of the types of organizations which are permitted 
disclosure of personal records and a review of compliance 
with privacy safeguards by those authorized organizations. 
In assembling the external disclosure authorization list an 
organization should be guided by the objectives of this 
standard. The purpose of the disclosure limitation standard 
is to restrict the external uses to which personal records 
are put to enforce the individual's expectations of confi¬ 
dentiality. This process is an attempt to maximize for the 
individual the fairness of the uses of individually identi¬ 
fiable data. 
Information Management 
In the report of the Privacy Protection Study Commis¬ 
sion it was -recommended that a person in each federal agency 
be designated as privacy monitor to oversee implementation 
9 
of the Privacy Act. It is suggested here that such a moni¬ 
tor be appointed in all organizations, public or private, 
which implement privacy safeguards. The responsibilities of 
this monitor involve reviewing privacy procedures established 
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for the organization, assisting in setting organization pri¬ 
vacy policy, and overseeing the implementation of informa¬ 
tion management controls to implement that policy. The re¬ 
sponsibilities of this monitor are essentially the same as 
those given to a function proposed for data processing ac¬ 
tivities, the Database Administrator (DBA). 
The role of the DBA has been described in various 
sources.1^ The DBA is seen as the manager of the data re¬ 
source within an organization. The DBA function may be one 
or more people. The DBA is responsible for, among other 
things, deciding the information content of the database, 
writing the DSMD for each user or user group, and defining 
authorization and authentication procedures. The privacy 
monitor is essentially a DBA responsible for implementing 
controls on the collection, storage and use of data and for 
the overall quality of the data. It is suggested here that 
the DBA perform the duties as the manager of the data re¬ 
source for the users and for the organization's management 
with additional guidance from the above suggested GAPP. 
This function should not relieve others in an organization 
of responsibility for protecting the privacy of individually 
identifiable information. Rather, it should be a function 
responsible for reviewing privacy procedures and changes in 
them to become a focus of privacy implementation in an or¬ 
ganization, a function which assists in policy formulation, 
implementation of policy, problem solving, and policy en¬ 
forcement. 
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Another aspect of information management is propaga¬ 
tion of corrections. In general, it is a good information 
management practice to notify the users of information of 
any errors which have existed in that information. If an 
organization finds that it has had errors in its data base, 
those who have had occasion to use that data as well as 
those who were the sources of that data should be notified 
to prevent decisions from being made on the basis of erro¬ 
neous data. This is also important in the privacy area be¬ 
cause decisions made concerning an individual, if based on 
erroneous data, are unfair to an individual. This would 
violate the privacy objective of maximizing fairness to the 
individual. There are many privacy procedures concerning 
the propagation of corrections. An organization implement¬ 
ing this portion of the information management standard is 
left with some subjective judgments concerning the extent 
to which propagation is required. If an organization for 
any reason makes a correction to a personal record, they 
should notify those who have obtained a copy of that record 
and those who were the source of the erroneous data of that 
correction if it is likely that there would be no other way 
for them to know of the error and if it likely that a deci¬ 
sion could be made about an individual on the basis of the 
erroneous data. 
To implement this part of the information management 
standard an organization would have to modify its computer 
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system to provide for automatic propagation of error correc¬ 
tions. The system would be designed to recognize correc¬ 
tions of personal records, to scan the log of data sources 
and uses (to be discussed below) and to send notices to 
these functions. This notice would contain sufficient infor¬ 
mation for the function receiving the notice to identify the 
record and the correction being made. It might be difficult 
to have the system recognize an error correction and to dis¬ 
tinguish it from a routine update. This would mean that the 
person responsible for input of the error correction might 
notify the system that propagation was required. The system 
could then automatically make the required notices. 
The third aspect of information management is system 
security. If an organization is to bear an affirmative re¬ 
sponsibility for establishing information management poli¬ 
cies and practices to assure that information that it main¬ 
tains about individuals is current and accurate, then it 
must have a system of security controls. Security is gene¬ 
rally considered to be a set of technological, physical, and 
administrative controls which are installed by an organiza¬ 
tion to protect both data and the equipment which processes 
the data. The purpose of the security measures is to pro¬ 
tect the data from accidental or intentional destruction, un¬ 
authorized disclosure or unauthorized modification. There 
is a considerable overlap of privacy and security controls. 
For example, the techniques of authentication and 
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authorization are both security and privacy measures. The 
two concepts are interdependent. A secure system is not 
necessarily a private system. 
Perfectly accurate data may not be authorized by pri¬ 
vacy procedures for collection or use. Adequately controlled 
access may be access to functions not authorized for such 
use by privacy procedures. Also, to properly protect pri¬ 
vacy a system must be secure. All of the privacy safeguards 
discussed above will not be effective unless the computer 
system is in a secure environment. Procedures to keep per¬ 
sonal records accurate will not be effective if the computer 
system is open to intentional or accidental modifications of 
data. 
Security systems range from nothing or possibly a lock 
on the computer room door to very elaborate control proce¬ 
dures which may include cryptographic coding of data as a 
precaution against unauthorized use of data. There are li¬ 
terally hundreds of sources on the subject of computer se¬ 
curity. Martin and Hoffman have been referenced above. 
Wooldridge is considered a good source on security and 
Browne contains a recent bibliography of security litera¬ 
ture . H 
The essential elements of a security system can be sum¬ 
marized as follows: it should protect the physical environ¬ 
ment against sabotage, fire and other natural disasters, 
and unauthorized entry; it should provide administrative 
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controls to prevent fraud, theft or unauthorized access or 
use by providing personnel policies such as separation of 
duties, and by installing authentication and authorization 
routines; systems for backup and recovery are necessary to 
reestablish operations after disasters; and the security sys¬ 
tem should provide methods for preventing or detecting and 
correcting errors and for purging dated information. 
Security measures will vary among organizations be¬ 
cause their implementation must include consideration of 
cost versus benefits derived, the environment of the computer 
facility and the sensitivity of the files. Whatever security 
system an organization chooses, the measures should be chosen 
with the information management standard in mind. Since it 
is generally accepted that a perfectly secure system is un¬ 
attainable, security systems should, for the purposes of 
privacy, be designed to maximize fairness to the individual 
on whom data are maintained by reaching a reasonable level 
of confidentiality. 
Accountability 
Implementation of this standard requires a system of 
logging data sources and uses. The logs should contain suf¬ 
ficient information to determine the sources and uses of 
personal data to aid in the propagation of errors which is 
required by the information management standard. When a 
correction to a data field is made, the log would be used to 
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send notification of the correction to the sources of the 
data and the past users of that data. The logs created for 
this purpose could consist of data fields in the record it¬ 
self or might be contained in the system transac tion log de¬ 
scribed below. This log of uses of data might also be main¬ 
tained to notify the individual, upon request, of the past 
uses of the personal records maintained on that individual. 
There are requirements in certain record-keeping relation¬ 
ships for notifying an individual of such past uses. 
Another form of logging, transaction logs, are main¬ 
tained as a method for increasing the security in the com¬ 
puter center as well as a means of providing for the audit- 
ability of the system. This log can be a record of all at¬ 
tempted or actual access to data or programs. A log might 
contain all requests made by a user, the time, the data items 
or program involved, the terminal or other access method used, 
the job or program submitting and whether or not the request 
was granted. The log could also be designed to capture the 
external sources and uses of personal data. Typical trans¬ 
action logs may be produced for accounting, for security or 
might be produced for privacy. These logs could be pro¬ 
duced separately or as one combined log. Regardless of how 
a privacy log is produced and regardless of what information 
is contained, there should be sufficient information to make 
determinations concerning:^ 
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1. the authorization profiles associated with any protected 
resources 
2. accountability for and any changes made to authorization 
profiles 
3. all accesses that were made to any protected resources 
4. all access denials made 
The privacy log would be used to: 
1. notify individuals of uses of personal records (unless 
such information is contained in the record itself) 
2. allow propagation of record corrections (unless sources 
and uses is contained in the record itself) 
3. allows auditors to determine sources and uses of per¬ 
sonal data 
The final aspect of the accountability standard is the 
privacy audit. As a minimum, an organization should provide 
for an internal audit of the effectivenss of its privacy 
safeguards. It is in the best interest of any record-keeping 
organization to have such an audit performed just as audits 
of security systems are performed. Arguments were presented 
in chapter III for an independent audit of the privacy safe¬ 
guards . 
Conclusions 
The implementation of privacy procedures is partly a 
subjective undertaking. There are aspects of the standards 
which give some latitude to the organization in the imple¬ 
mentation of privacy safeguards. For example, an organiza¬ 
tion could choose not to implement privacy safeguards on 
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some personal records because they are determined not be be 
individually identifiable. The Privacy Protection Study Com¬ 
mission reports some Privacy Act exemptions claimed by fe¬ 
deral agencies because their personal, sensitive records 
could not be retrieved by use of any personal identifica- 
13 
tion. Hoffman, however, shows that records containing 
personal information can be retrieved without reference to 
14 
any identifier associated with that person. 
An organization makes subjective decisions on the ex¬ 
tent to which errors are propagated. It is expected that 
sources and users of information who can reasonably be ex¬ 
pected to use the faulty information should be notified. 
Also, an organization is expected to implement a security 
system to protect any personal records. Since no security 
system is perfect, the organization is left to decide what 
amount of security is necessary. 
In implementing privacy procedures an organization 
might be guided by the objectives of privacy. The organiza- 
0 
tion should attempt to minimize intrusiveness, provide le¬ 
gitimate expectations of confidentiality and, in particular, 
should attempt to maximize fairness to the individuals on 
whom information is maintained. In many cases this will 
require the use of judgment on the part of the organization. 
An organization might also consider the sensitivity of the 
data in determining the level of security required or in 
making other decisions regarding the privacy implementation 
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plan. A paper presented by Jon Bing at The First Interna¬ 
tional Open Symposium on Data Banks and Society outlines a 
method of rating the sensitivity of a data bank.^ He 
classifies personal information and assigns a sensitivity 
grading for each class. An organization might thereby be 
assisted in making some of the subjective decisions necessary 
in implementing privacy procedures. 
Summary 
This chapter has outlined the general implications of 
the eight privacy standards. A description of the proce¬ 
dures an organization might use to implement the standards 
was presented and was summarized in table 2. A brief survey 
of the techniques which might be used to implement the 
standards was presented and was summarized in table 3. The 
final section attempted to outline some of the considerations 
which a firm might make in implementing the standards. The 
purpose of this chapter was to present a general framework 
for implementation, not to present a definitive implementa¬ 
tion plan. 
This presentation also serves as a framework for the 
audit model. This presentation has suggested the techniques 
which could be used to implement privacy. Chapter VI pre¬ 
sents the actual controls applicable to each technique and 
then suggests the audit tools which could be used to test 
the controls. 
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CHAPTER VI 
AUDIT MODEL 
This chapter presents the model for the audit by the 
CPA of the privacy safeguards of an organization. Since 
this audit model is a step in the hierarchical development 
of the overall privacy model, goals of this audit model are 
presented. These practices are logically deduced from the 
goals. It is shown that these practices are consistent with 
the overall privacy model. The three major sections in this 
chapter present the development of the goals, the outline 
for the audit function and the audit techniques. 
Audit Model Goals 
As was indicated in chapter III, The Committee on Basic 
Auditing Concepts specified boundaries for potential audit 
subject matter. These concepts follow carefully from the 
writing of Mautz and Sharaf and were used as the basis for 
some of the findings of the Cohen Commission. It seems 
reasonable that the audit goals developed here remain consis¬ 
tent with the approach of the Committee on Basic Auditing 
Concepts. 
The Committee specified the boundaries of audit subject 
matter as follows: 
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In practice the auditor's competence and the existence of 
operational criteria dictate the boundaires of the sub¬ 
ject matter to be investigated by the audit practice.^ 
The design of the CPA's function for a privacy audit and the 
audit practices suggested here should attempt to meet these 
requirements. This keeps the audit practices consistent 
with auditing theory and also provides a practical framework 
for the formulation of the practices. Therefore, the first 
two goals of the audit model are: 
1. That the auditor's assumed competence be maximized and 
that limitations on the auditor's ability be minimized 
2. That wherever possible oeprational criteria be estab¬ 
lished 
The first goal requires that the auditor's tasks while con¬ 
ducting a privacy audit be designed to be similar to those 
tasks already being performed in a financial audit. This 
goal also requires that assistance be given to the auditor 
in those areas of the audit where the auditor's knowledge is 
not adequate. For example, since the auditor cannot be as¬ 
sumed knowledgeable in the area of privacy law, legal assis¬ 
tance may be necessary. The second goal requires the formu¬ 
lation of privacy audit standards which guide the auditor in 
determining the degree of correspondence between that which 
is audited and the established criteria. 
The Committee on Basic Auditing Concepts also specified 
attributes of audit subject matter as follows: 
1. The subject matter must be susceptible to the deduc¬ 
tion of evidential assertions. Such assertions must 
be both quantifiable and verifiable 
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2. An information system must be present to record the 
actions, events, or results thereof; preferably ade¬ 
quate internal controls will also be operating 
3. Consensus must exist on the established criteria 
against which the information prepared from the sub¬ 
ject matter be evaluated 
While each of the attributes mentioned above is neces¬ 
sary, two further conditions needed are; auditor's com¬ 
petence and summarization of the findings in a report. 
Therefore, the following additional goals are adopted; 
3. That quantifiable, verifiable evidential assertions be 
facilitated 
4. That provisions be made for the recording of information 
and installation of controls for use by the auditor 
5. That a suggested report for summarization of audit find¬ 
ings be formulated 
The third goal requires that any assertion that the auditor 
is required to make be verifiable and/or quantifiable through 
the gathering of evidence. The fourth goal requires that re¬ 
sponsibility be established for the controlled recording of 
information from which the auditor can gather evidence for 
making assertions. The fifth goal requires that the audit 
model allows standardization among audit engagements. 
It is also necessary to modify the second goal to 
specify that the established criteria be generally accepted. 
The second goal, therefore, is; 
2. That wherever possible generally accepted operational 
criteria be established 
An implied goal of the audit model is that it be con¬ 
sistent with the overall privacy model. It is necessary, for 
example, to use the privacy standards developed in chapter 
IV. It is also necessary that the auditor's report satisfy 
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the needs of the assumed users, the courts, the privacy com¬ 
mission, national and international concerns, and the gen¬ 
eral public. 
In summary, these goals are established to give a prac¬ 
tical and theoretical basis for formulation of audit prac¬ 
tices. This assists in generating practices which are con¬ 
sistent with audit practice and theory. The goals and the 
audit model are developed within the framework of the pri¬ 
vacy model. The goals and practices of the privacy model as 
well as the audit goals developed above serve as the basis 
for the audit function and techniques. 
Audit Function 
In this section the framework for the privacy audit is 
developed. The roles and responsibilities of the CPA, the 
internal auditor, the organization and the organization's 
legal counsel are discussed. The standards with which the 
CPA will conduct the privacy audit are developed. Finally, 
as part of the standards a suggested statement for use by 
the auditor as a report of findings is presented. 
Roles and Responsibilities 
In chapter III it was stated that the Cohen Commission 
had formulated a framework for auditor participation to help 
organizations achieve legal accountability. This general 
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framework is used to develop the roles and responsibilities 
of those concerned with the privacy audit. 
Organization responsibilities 
Since it is the record-keeping organization which is 
accountable for its record-keeping practices, the first re¬ 
sponsibilities should fall on the organization. It is the 
organization that should adopt a privacy policy, establish 
responsibilities for enactment of the policy and take action 
to report on this policy to those to whom the organization 
is accountable. 
The establishment of a privacy policy was first men¬ 
tioned in chapter V. This policy would be established in 
cooperation with legal counsel. This counsel is required to 
assist the organization in interpreting privacy laws and 
privacy commission recommendations. The counsel must deter¬ 
mine which of these requirements are applicable given the 
organization's industry type and the characteristics of the 
individually identifiable personal records which the organi¬ 
zation maintains. The policy should be specific as to the 
practices which are required and the responsibilities of the 
functions which will implement the policy. The responsibi¬ 
lities of the legal counsel, the internal auditors, the data 
base administrator (DBA) and the CPA should be clearly de¬ 
fined. All of these functions should participate with manage¬ 
ment and legal counsel in formulation of the policy. In this 
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way all functions will have input to and be aware of the in¬ 
dependent responsibilities. Suggestions for minimum infor¬ 
mation to be included in the policy statement are given in 
table 4. 
Once the policy is formulated, action must be taken to 
implement the policy. As was mentioned in chapter V, the 
DBA should be the focal point for implementing privacy 
policy. As manager of the data resource within the organiza¬ 
tion the DBA would enact procedures to limit data collection 
and use, to protect data integrity, provide for security, 
and to facilitate the accessing and correcting of records 
for the individuals about whom the records are maintained. 
The internal auditor would be responsible for assisting 
the DBA in implementing privacy policy and for periodically 
auditing the privacy safeguards for effectiveness. The in¬ 
ternal auditor should recommend audit controls during the 
privacy policy implementation phase. The internal auditor 
would require that privacy safeguards are auditable and that 
records are maintained on the functioning of the privacy con¬ 
trols. The internal auditor should also periodically audit 
the privacy controls to insure that they are auditable, that 
privacy protection is effective and to provide the ground¬ 
work for the CPA privacy audit. 
Finally, the organization should summarize its privacy 
policy, its procedures and the effectiveness of the system, 
in the annual report. The responsibilities of all parties 
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TABLE 4 
Minimum Information for Organization 
Privacy Policy Statements 
The organization's policy statement should contain the fol¬ 
lowing minimum information: 
1. The personal record systems maintained by the organiza¬ 
tion—for example, personnel records, credit records, 
etc. 
2. The laws or other requirements which are applicable to 
those systems—for example, the personnel records should 
meet the voluntary requirements of chapter 6 of The Re¬ 
port of the Privacy Protection Study Commission 
3. An interpretation, for each record system, of what should 
be done to protect privacy—this would be a list of the 
actions which must be taken to implement each of the 
eight privacy standards for each record system 
4. A description of the responsibilities of the DBA and 
the internal auditor for implementing the privacy po¬ 
licy—for example, the DBA is responsible for implement¬ 
ing the privacy policy. The internal auditor is respon¬ 
sible for suggesting controls and monitoring techniques 
to the DBA to provide for auditability 
5. A description of the responsibilities of legal counsel, 
the DBA and the internal auditor for preparing a report 
on the privacy protection system—for example, counsel 
is responsible for stating which record systems are 
covered by which laws. Legal counsel is responsible for 
identifying all required privacy practices. Counsel is 
also responsible for identifying any optional procedures. 
(The organization may choose to implement all, some, or 
none of these optional features.) The DBA is respon¬ 
sible for reporting what procedures are implemented to 
protect the privacy of those systems. The internal au¬ 
ditor reports on what controls exist and what monitoring 
of the system has been accomplished 
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Table 4 
(continued) 
6. A description of the responsibilities of the internal au¬ 
ditor and the CPA for monitoring the effectiveness of 
the system—for example, the internal auditor is respon¬ 
sible for periodic monitoring of the effectiveness of the 
system. The CPA is not responsible for implementing the 
policy or the controls nor for judging which laws and 
which record systems are applicable. The CPA is respon¬ 
sible for reviewing the statements made by management to 
verify that a policy does exist, to verify that it has 
been implemented, and to test the procedures used to im¬ 
plement that policy. The CPA will report on this review 
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should be described to inform readers where the responsibili¬ 
ties of the organizationleave off and those of the CPA begin. 
Suggestions for the minimum information to be included in the 
organization's privacy report are given in table 5. 
In summary, the organization is responsible for devis¬ 
ing a privacy policy, for implementing that policy, for mo¬ 
nitoring the effectivensss of the implementation and report¬ 
ing on the actions taken. Within the organization the legal 
counsel, the DBA and the internal auditor are responsible 
for various tasks in formulating, implementing, reviewing and 
reporting on the privacy policy. 
CPA Responsibilities 
The CPA is not responsible for designing the organiza¬ 
tion's privacy protection procedures. The CPA may, however, 
perform this function on a separate engagement. The CPA is 
responsible for reviewing the statement made by the organiza¬ 
tion and reporting on that review. The auditor would review 
the organization's privacy policy and implementation proce¬ 
dures and determine that the policy is actually implemented. 
The auditor would test these procedures to determine their 
effectiveness. Finally, the auditor would report on this re¬ 
view and on the results of the tests performed. The audit¬ 
or's responsibilities will be further defined in sections be¬ 
low on privacy audit standards. 
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TABLE 5 
Minimum Information in Organization Privacy Report 
The organization's privacy report should contain the follow¬ 
ing minimum information: 
1. A description of the privacy policy and procedures 
adopted by the organization—for example, the mandatory 
procedures for the personnel records which are . . . 
have been adopted as well as these optional procedures 
2. Delineation of responsibilities in formulating the pri¬ 
vacy policy—for example, the organization in cooperation 
with legal counsel, etc. 
3. Delineation of responsibilities for implementation of the 
privacy procedures—for example, the organization and its 
staff with suggestions from the CPA, etc. 
4. Delineation of responsibilities for review of the privacy 
procedures—for example, the privacy controls are subject 
to periodic review of the internal audit staff and are 
reviewed and reported on by the CPA 
5. Description of CPA responsibility sufficient to fix lia¬ 
bilities—for example, the privacy policy, the choice of 
procedures and effectiveness of the controls are the re¬ 
sponsibility of the organization. The CPA is responsible 
for a review of the effectiveness of the system as repre¬ 
sented in the privacy policy statement and in this re¬ 
port. The CPA is also responsible for reporting the 
findings of the review 
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Legal Counsel Responsibilities 
Although the role and responsibilities of the organiza¬ 
tion's legal counsel has already been discussed, it is ela¬ 
borated on further here because of the key position that this 
function occupies in the privacy monitoring process. It is 
the legal counsel which will minimize the limitations of the 
auditor in matters of law and reduce the potential liability 
of the auditor for statements made regarding the review of 
the privacy procedures. 
The legal counsel in assisting in the formulation of 
privacy policy relieves the auditor of responsibility for 
determining what safeguards are appropriate for each record 
system. By participating in the writing of the organiza¬ 
tion's statement on the privacy safeguards, the legal coun¬ 
sel relieves the auditor of the responsibility for reporting 
what actions have been taken. The auditor would be respon¬ 
sible only for exercising due care in detecting weaknesses 
in the implementation procedures. 
The concept of relying on the organization and its le¬ 
gal counsel has been advocated before. The AICPA in provid¬ 
ing guidelines for CPA participation in government audits 
stated: 
Legal and regulatory reviews in other than the financial 
audit areas may require extensive data gathering and can 
be time consuming and expensive. A substantial part of 
the work required to identify applicable laws and regu¬ 
lations should be done by the organization requesting the 
evaluation, thus limiting the practitioner's involvement 
to the exercise of professional judgment in gathering and 
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testing the related data. . . . Legal assistance may be 
required or advisable.4 
Similar wording is used by the AICPA in another report.^ 
Audit Standards 
This section suggests the substance of audit standards 
for use by the auditor in conducting privacy audits. The 
privacy audit implications of the present standards and any 
required additional standards are presented. This presenta¬ 
tion begins with a review of the generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS) and the implications of a privacy audit on 
these standards. The classification of general standards, 
standards of field work and standards of reporting used by 
the AICPA is utilized here. 
As a guide to determining where the present standards 
need to be extended or where additional standards are neces¬ 
sary Mautz and Sharaf have suggested characterisitcs of au¬ 
diting standards. They state: 
Standards should provide guides: 
(1) for the evaluation of professional performance by 
practicing public accountants 
(2) to indicate accepted requirements of practice to 
those outside the profession who have occasion to 
judge or evaluate the work of practicing account¬ 
ants 
(3) to suggest the extent and nature of education ex¬ 
pected of those preparing for entry into the profes¬ 
sion. ^ 
The auditing standards for privacy audits should provide 
guidance on the duties, responsibilities, liabilities and 
expertise required of the CPA. 
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General Standards 
7 
The first general standard is: 
The examination is to be performed by a person or per¬ 
sons having adequate training and proficiency as an au¬ 
ditor. 
The model of the privacy audit minimizes the knowledge re¬ 
quired of the auditor in non-accounting matters. The au¬ 
ditor will not require knowledge of law, for example, be¬ 
cause of the reliance on the assurance of the organization's 
legal counsel. The organization's counsel will, therefore, 
be responsible for knowledge of the law and for determining 
the applicability of various privacy laws to the organiza¬ 
tion. The auditor would, however, be responsible for know¬ 
ledge of the implications of privacy implementation. 
The auditor will still be required to have knowledge 
of computer systems suggested by the following statement con¬ 
tained in SAS 3: 
Situations involving the more complex EDP applications 
ordinarily will require that the auditor apply special¬ 
ized expertise in EDP in the performance of the necessary 
audit procedures. 
The auditor will not require any additional training in this 
area beyond that already required. 
The second general standard is: 
In all matters relating to the assignment, an indepen¬ 
dence in mental attitude is to be maintained by the au¬ 
ditor or auditors. 
Situations will arise in which an accounting firm will be 
asked to assist an organization in implementing its privacy 
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policy and then be required to audit the effectiveness of 
the privacy procedures. Mautz and Sharaf note that this si¬ 
tuation creates an inevitable loss of independence. They 
state 
. . . public recognition and acceptance of the auditor's 
status is significant to the successful accomplishment 
of his purpose. It recognizes also that within the 
broad range of public accounting services, important 
differences exist between auditing and other services. 
These differences are such that performance of these 
services by the same individual is incompatible with the 
idea of independence.^ 
It would therefore seem necessary to require, as a minimum, 
that performance of audit engagements and design engagements 
be accomplished by different people. The optimum arrange¬ 
ment in terms of public confidence would be to have these 
engagements performed by different firms. 
The third general standard is: 
Due professional care is to be exercised in the perform¬ 
ance of the examination and preparation of the report. 
This standard attempts to assign the degree of responsibility 
which the auditor is assumed to take in performance of pro¬ 
fessional duties. It is not meant to require that an auditor 
discover all irregularities but that the auditor will be 
alert to the possibility of irregularities and discover 
those which the exercise of due professional care and good 
judgment would lead one to discover. 
In the performance of privacy audits this standard is 
not as important as it is in the performance of a standard 
audit. In a financial audit this standard requires that the 
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auditor be alert to the possibility of all manner of irregu¬ 
larities and fraud. For a privacy audit this standard re¬ 
quires the discovery of irregularities in the implementation 
and effectiveness of specific privacy controls. 
Mautz and Sharaf summarize their concept of due audit 
care which, although directed at all irregularities, is use¬ 
ful here as an explanation of the responsibility that an au¬ 
ditor takes on in performance of a privacy audit. Mautz and 
Sharaf state: 
Independent auditors should accept responsibility for 
the discovery and disclosure of those irregularities 
which the exercise of due audit care by a prudent prac¬ 
titioner would normally uncover. A prudent practitioner 
is assumed to have a knowledge of the philosophy and 
practice of auditing, to have the degree of training, 
experience, and skill common to the average independent 
auditor, to have the ability to recognize indications 
of irregularities, and to keep abreast of developments 
in the perpetration and detection of irregularities. 
Due audit care requires the auditor to acquaint himself 
with the company under examination, its method of 
operation and any significant practices peculiar to it 
or the industry of which it is a part, to review the me¬ 
thod of internal control operating in the company 
under examination by inquiry and such other methods as 
are desirable, to obtain any knowledge readily available 
which is pertinent to the accounting and financial prob¬ 
lems of the company under examination, to be responsive 
to unusual events and unfamiliar circumstances, to per¬ 
sist until he has eliminated from his own mind any 
reasonable doubts he may have about the existence of ma¬ 
terial irregularities, and to exercise caution in in¬ 
structing his assistants and reviewing their work.-*-® 
The auditor would, therefore, accept responsibility for the 
discovery and disclosure of those areas in which an organiza¬ 
tion's privacy policy was not implemented and those areas 
where implementation was not effective which the exercise of 
due audit care by a prudent practitioner would normally 
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uncover. A prudent practitioner would be as defined by 
Mautz and Sharaf except, as was noted earlier, that they 
would be required to be knowledgeable of the implications of 
the generally accepted privacy principles. 
A fourth general standard is suggested here. A state¬ 
ment of the scope of the privacy audit is required to define 
the responsibilities and functions of the auditor while con¬ 
ducting a privacy audit. The generally accepted auditing 
standards do not include a standard on the scope of the au¬ 
dit work since it is assumed that all audits are audits of 
financial statements. Because it was necessary to establish 
the work required in government audits, the GAO included a 
scope of the audit work as its first general standard.^ 
A general standard on the scope of a privacy audit 
would contain the following information: 
1. The objective of a privacy audit—express an opinion as 
to the accuracy of the organization's representation 
with regard to privacy protection 
The responsibilities of the auditor and of the organiza¬ 
tion—it is the responsibility of the organization to 
determine what must be done to protect privacy, to as¬ 
sure the auditor that the organization's privacy policy 
includes all mandatory privacy practices, to enact con¬ 
trols to carry out its privacy policy, and to make a 
statement concerning its actions. It is the responsi¬ 
bility of the auditor to review the privacy statement, 
determine if said controls have been implemented to en¬ 
act the privacy policy, and test the effectiveness of 
the controls 
2. 
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Standards of Field Work 
The first standard of field work is: 
The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if 
any, are to be properly supervised. 
A privacy audit presents no new implications for this stan¬ 
dard . 
The second standard of field work is: 
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the ex¬ 
isting internal control as a basis for reliance thereon 
and for the determination of the resultant extent of 
the tests to which auditing procedures are to be re¬ 
stricted. 
A major portion of the work in a privacy audit revolves 
around this standard. Except as noted below, the informa¬ 
tion in SAS 1 on the auditor's study and evaluation of inter¬ 
nal control as supplemented by SAS 3 and as superceded by 
12 
SAS 9 holds true for a privacy audit. Revision of the 
scope, purpose and some of the basic concepts in SAS 1 is re¬ 
quired. 
The purpose of the review of internal control required 
in a privacy audit is twofold. First, the review will deter¬ 
mine for the auditor how much reliance can be placed on the 
organization's internal control to insure compliance with the 
privacy policy of the organization. This is a review of the 
overall functioning of the controls. Second, the review will 
serve as a basis for determining the nature, extent, and tim¬ 
ing of audit tests to be applied in the examination of the 
effectiveness of the privacy policy. 
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This differs from the review of internal control per¬ 
formed in conjunction with an examination of financial state¬ 
ments. In that case the review of internal control is per¬ 
formed solely as a prelude to the application of auditing 
procedures to determine the fairness and accuracy of the fi¬ 
nancial statements. In a privacy audit the review is a pre¬ 
lude to the use of auditing procedures but is also a review 
of the functioning of the controls themselves. 
Given the two purposes of the review the auditor could 
make two statements concerning the privacy procedures of an 
organization. The auditor could state that the controls out¬ 
lined by the organization in its privacy policy are in ef¬ 
fect and if effective could carry out the privacy policy. 
The auditor after application of auditing procedures, the 
nature, timing and extent of which were determined by the 
initial review, could make a statement concerning the effec¬ 
tiveness of the controls. 
The scope of the auditor's review depends on the pre¬ 
sentation made by management. Management is responsible for 
reporting on the organization's privacy policy and the con¬ 
trols implemented to enact that policy. The auditor is re¬ 
sponsible for reviewing those controls. 
Since SAS 1 restricts the review of internal control to 
13 
accounting control as defined in SAS 1, it is useful to 
suggest here a definition for privacy control to provide a 
reference to the auditor on the controls which are reviewed 
in a privacy audit. 
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Privacy control comprises the plan of organization and 
all the methods, measures and records that are concerned 
with the safeguarding of the privacy of the individuals 
about whom the organization maintains individually identifi¬ 
able personal information. The term includes the policies, 
procedures, and practices established or encouraged by 
management as well as the plan of organization and other 
measures intended to carry them out. 
The characteristics of a satisfactory system of pri¬ 
vacy control have been specified in chapter V. It was noted 
in that chapter that the nature of the controls implemented 
are relatively standard across organizations while the speci¬ 
fic implementation practices vary depending on the applica¬ 
bility of the various laws, regulations and requirements. 
The section of chapter V on the implications of the stan¬ 
dards will serve as a framework for review of the privacy 
control by the auditor. The information in chapter V along 
with the presentation below supplements for the auditor the 
concepts and procedures in SAS 1. 
The following are examples of the review that the au¬ 
ditor might make with regards to each standard. The sugges¬ 
tions are in the form of questions to which the auditor 
would seek answers. 
Openness—Is there public notice of the existence of 
the data bank? Have individuals been notified? Do controls 
exist to limit the use of the data to those uses specified 
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in the notices? Are there procedures for responding to in¬ 
quiries from those wishing to know whether information is 
maintained about them? 
Individual access—Do procedures exist for providing 
copies of records to individuals? Do controls exist to in¬ 
sure that all data in a record is contained in these copies? 
Are these copies understandable? 
Individual participation—Do procedures exist to pro¬ 
vide individuals an opportunity to register complaints con¬ 
cerning integrity of the data in their records? Does the 
organization have arbitration procedures? Are there proce¬ 
dures to insure that records are corrected or amended? What 
provisions have been made to insure that amendments are in¬ 
cluded whenever records are accessed? 
Collection limitation—Does the organization have a 
policy of limiting data collection? What controls exist to 
insure that no extra data is collected or entered in the 
records? Have sources of data been notified of additional 
sources which might be used? Does the organization period¬ 
ically review this collection limitation policy? 
Use limitation—Are there controls to limit the inter¬ 
nal uses of information? Are these controls consistent with 
notices given to individuals concerning the internal uses of 
data? 
Disclosure limitation—Are there controls to limit the 
external disclosure of information? Are these controls 
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consistent with notices given to individuals concerning the 
external disclosure of data? Are there procedures to limit 
disclosures to organizations which have established an effec¬ 
tive privacy protection program which is consistent with the 
confidentiality expectations of the individual and the 
sending organization? 
Information management—Has an individual been ap¬ 
pointed as privacy monitor? What controls exist to insure 
that the sources and past users of personal data are noti¬ 
fied of corrections made to that data? Are there controls 
on the accuracy of the data? Are there procedures to purge 
dated data? Are the organization's personnel knowledgeable 
with regards the established privacy policies? Has the or¬ 
ganization established separation of duties in critical 
areas? 
Accountability—Does the organization maintain a log 
of data sources and uses? 
A final comment on this standard involves the CPA's 
use of the internal audit function in conducting the review 
of internal control. SAS 9, which supercedes SAS 1 on this 
subject, suggests that the CPA make use of the internal au¬ 
dit function if the objectivity of the internal function can 
be determined. The independence or objectivity of the inter¬ 
nal audit function could be questioned since it has been sug¬ 
gested above that internal auditors be involved in the design 
and implementation of privacy controls. A recent study. 
170 
however, has shown that the internal auditor's independence 
need not be sacrificed by participation in such projects. 
Organizations and CPAs should review this report to avoid 
those situations which might lead to a loss of internal au¬ 
dit independence. The report states that design phase au¬ 
diting will not impair independence under four conditions: ^ 
1. The internal auditor should not be perceived as a de¬ 
signer or participant but rather as a consultant or mat¬ 
ters of controls 
2. The internal audit must have EDP technical competence 
to be self-reliant 
3. There is adequate review of work by internal audit mana¬ 
gers 
4. There is top management support of internal audit acti¬ 
vities 
The third standard of field work is 
Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained 
through inspection, observation, inquiries, and confir¬ 
mations to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion re¬ 
garding the financial statements under examination. 
In conducting a privacy audit it is necessary that the au¬ 
ditor obtain sufficient competent and relevant evidence to 
m 
afford a reasonable basis for the auditor's opinions, judg¬ 
ments, conclusions, and recommendations concerning the pri¬ 
vacy practices of the organization. The review of privacy 
control conducted to satisfy the second standard of field 
work serves as a basis for determining the nature, timing 
and extent of tests to be performed in the gathering of evi¬ 
dence. It is this gathering of evidence which serves as the 
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basis for the auditor's opinion concerning the effectiveness 
of the privacy procedures of the organization. 
In financial audits evidential matter supports the fi¬ 
nancial statements. It is the underlying accounting data 
and corroborating information. In a privacy audit evidential 
matter supports the statements of the organization concerning 
the privacy policy and practices. It consists of the records 
containing personal information, special records maintained 
in accordance with generally accepted privacy principles and 
corroborating information. 
The following is a description of some evidential mat¬ 
ter which could be obtained during a privacy audit and sug¬ 
gested methods of confirmation. This presentation describes 
evidence and confirmation methods for each of the privacy 
standards. The presentation conforms to the presentation in 
chapter V on the techniques for implementing the standards. 
The auditor would only gather and confirm evidence to sup¬ 
port the contentions made by the organization regarding its 
privacy policy and practices. 
Openness—Copies of the actual notices made to the 
public or to individuals would serve as the evidential mat¬ 
ter. The effectiveness of the procedures could be confirmed 
by surveying the public that the organization was attempting 
to reach or the specific individuals that should have been 
notified. 
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Individual access—Copies of records in the format 
which would be sent to individuals would serve as evidence. 
The auditor would have to exercise judgment to determine 
that the copies are understandable. The auditor could con¬ 
firm that complete records are sent to individuals by test¬ 
ing the software used to access and make copies of the re¬ 
cords . 
Individual participation—Letters or other documenta¬ 
tion of correspondence between the organization and the indi¬ 
vidual regarding requested corrections to records would be 
evidence. Confirmation would require that the auditor ex¬ 
tract the records from the files to determine that correc¬ 
tions or amendments are indeed in the records. The auditor 
could also test the software to determine the effectiveness 
of the record update process. 
Collection limitation—Evidence of the effectiveness 
of this standard would include forms used for data collection 
and any notices contained thereon, a review of record formats 
m 
and software restrictions on data types and sources. Con¬ 
firmation of this standard would require comparing a sample 
of records with the source documents to verify that only au¬ 
thorized data from authorized sources is stored. The auditor 
could also test the software to determine the effectiveness 
of the processing controls on data types and sources. 
It was noted in chapter V that implementation of this 
standard presents the particular problem of controlling the 
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use of data from unauthorized sources. The auditor would 
need to verify that some separation of duties existed where¬ 
by one person is responsible for preparing source documents 
and entering codes and another person certifies those source 
codes prior to data entry. This type procedure would be 
necessary to exercise control over the collection and stor¬ 
age of data from unauthorized sources. 
Use limitation—Confirmed evidence of the effectiveness 
of this standard would be the inability of the auditor to 
gain access to the computer system or to unauthorized per¬ 
sonal data on that system. For example, the auditor could 
attempt to gain access to data while using the access code of 
an individual in the organization. 
Other evidence for this standard would be a review of 
the notices given to individuals concerning the internal uses 
of personal data. Confirmation that actual uses were consis¬ 
tent with those notices would require a comparison of the 
notices and the authentication/authorization procedures and 
tables used by the organization to verify that uses are con¬ 
sistent with policy and public notices. 
Disclosure limitation—Confirmed evidence of effective¬ 
ness would be the inability of the auditor to gain access to 
data for use by unauthorized organizations. Evidence to as¬ 
sist the auditor would be reports of the results of privacy 
audits of other organizations. Confirmation would be a re¬ 
view of the disclosure authorization table to verify that 
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only those organizations which comply with the minimum pri¬ 
vacy procedures are included in the table. Further confir¬ 
mation would be that only those organizations in the table 
can get personal data. 
Other evidence for this standard would be a review of 
the notices given to individuals concerning the external uses 
of personal data. Confirmation would be a comparison of the 
notices with organizations in the authorization table to 
verify that organizations which are sent data are known to 
the individual. 
Information management—The important aspect of this 
standard for purposes of collecting and verifying evidential 
matter is the propagation of error corrections by the organi¬ 
zation. Confirmed evidence of the effectiveness of this 
standard would require that the auditor attempt various re¬ 
cord corrections and verify that the corrected records were 
sent to the sources of the corrected data or past users of 
the data. 
Testing of the past effectiveness of this standard 
would require a file of source documents which generated the 
changes. These source documents would be traced to the re¬ 
cords to verify corrections made and a review of the records 
maintained by the sources and users of the data to confirm 
their receipt of the changes. The auditor might instead 
verify the existence and completeness of any log of the dis¬ 
patches of such corrections. 
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Another aspect of this standard is the security system 
installed as part of the mechanism necessary to assure that 
the data is current and accurate. The auditor could test 
the integrity of the data by sampling the files and obtain¬ 
ing verification of the information from the person about 
whom the data is maintained. This procedure would be much 
the same as that conducted by auditors now to verify the re¬ 
liability of accounting data such as accounts receivable. 
Accountability—Evidence of the implementation of this 
standard would be the transaction logs created by the organi¬ 
zation. The minimum content of these logs has been suggested 
in chapter V. The auditor would need to confirm that any 
addition of data to a personal record file would automatic¬ 
ally create a log of the source of the data. The auditor 
would also need to confirm that any internal or external 
uses of data would result in an automatic creation of a log 
of that use. Tests of the existing software would provide 
confirmation of the present functioning of the logging sys¬ 
tem. 
In audits of financial statements an auditor is guided 
by the principle of materiality. On the sufficiency of evi¬ 
dential matter, for example, SAS 1 states: 
The amount and kinds of evidential matter required to 
support an informed opinion are matters for the auditor 
to determine in the exercise of his professional judg¬ 
ment after a careful study of the circumstances in the 
particular case. In making such decisions, he should 
consider the nature of the item under consideration; 
176 
the materiality of possible errors and irregulari¬ 
ties; . . ,15 
Since materiality is an economic concept, the auditor will 
have some difficulty applying this to the collection of evi¬ 
dential matter and to the report of findings in a privacy 
audit. The Cohen Commission, in discussing the auditor's 
response to detected illegal or questionable acts, states: 
This responsibility rests on the premise that conven¬ 
tional concepts of materiality, based principally on 
quantitative considerations, are inapplicable to known 
illegal or questionable acts. The auditor should not 
take it on himself to determine that some violations of 
the law on propriety are more or less serious than 
other.^ 
The Commission goes on to suggest a possible solution 
to this problem. They state: 
However, the inapplicability of the materiality concept 
to the auditor's decision as to whether to act does 
not imply that his actions should always be the same. 
The auditor must obtain consideration appropriate to 
the circumstances of every illegal or questionable act. 
This involves at least three factors ... he must per¬ 
form sufficient additional or alternative audit proce¬ 
dures to assure himself of the extent and consequences 
of the irregularity. The second factor is a comparison 
of the act with the standard of corporate conduct 
against which the auditor is conducting his examina¬ 
tion. . . . Finally, . . . obtain an appropriate dispo¬ 
sition . . . require disclosure of the violation . . . 
it should be disclosed in the auditor's report.^ 
A solution to this problem of materiality in privacy 
audits is suggested here. As noted in chapter V, an organi¬ 
zation might be guided in its implementation by the sensiti¬ 
vity of the data. The cost and sophistication of privacy 
controls might then be a function of the sensitivity of the 
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data. On the idea that an organization's accountability de¬ 
pends on the circumstances, Rosenfeld states: 
Persons who are accountable to others are judged with 
an ideal standard—by behavior or results that would be 
ideal in the circumstances. No one is expected to act 
ideally in a given set of circumstances, of course, 
but may be judged by how far short of the ideal he falls. 
The key to standards is the circumstance.18 
This suggests a procedure whereby the organization as¬ 
signs sensitivity ratings to the items of personal informa¬ 
tion for which they are accountable. Bing^ has suggested a 
sensitivity classification system which might be useful for 
this purpose. The organization could then as part of its 
privacy report describe the sensitivity rating and corre¬ 
sponding protection procedures for the items of personal in¬ 
formation which are maintained by the organization. The 
auditor could use these sensitivity ratings as measures of 
materiality in the same way that the auditor now uses eco¬ 
nomic value as measure of materiality when auditing finan¬ 
cial statements. Highly sensitive data would require more 
sophisticated controls, and more extreme audit testing proce¬ 
dures than would less sensitive data. Since the organization 
is responsible for formulating the sensitivity ratings, the 
auditor is freed from the responsibility of determining ma¬ 
teriality. However, since the monetary measurement of ma¬ 
teriality used in financial audits is a standard, the sen¬ 
sitivity rating system would need to be standardized. Also, 
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the auditor would need to verify that this sensitivity rat¬ 
ing was applied correctly by the organization. 
This procedure presents the auditor with a basis for 
determining the sufficiency of evidential matter and for de¬ 
termining the extent of audit procedures necessary. It also 
presents the auditor with a basis for determining what to re¬ 
port concerning the study of the privacy controls conducted. 
If the level of control for the data in each sensitivity rat¬ 
ing is as stated by the organization, then a favorable report 
is issued. 
The organization may also wish to assign quantified 
performance standards to the various sensitivity groups. For 
example, the organization might state that the most sensitive 
data will be maintained at 99% accuracy. The auditor could 
then confirm, by sampling, that the data in that sensitivity 
grup was accurate to that degree with a certain level of 
confidence. 
Standards of Reporting 
The first standard of reporting is: 
The report shall state whether the financial statements 
are presented in accordance with generally accepted ac¬ 
counting principles. 
The representation of management of interest in a privacy 
audit is the privacy policy statement. The audit report 
should state whether the privacy policy has been formulated 
and enacted in accordance with generally accepted privacy 
principles. The privacy policy statement would enumerate 
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the practices which the company was required to enact and 
those which the organization had voluntarily adopted. The 
auditor would be stating that given those practices that the 
policy statement and enacting procedures were prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted privacy principles. 
For example, the organization may have chosen to vo¬ 
luntarily adopt the recommendations of the Privacy Protec¬ 
tion Study Commission concerning the safeguaring of privacy 
of personnel records. The organization would formulate a 
policy and enacting procedures for that purpose. The au¬ 
ditor would state that given the decision to comply with 
those recommendations, that the policies and policy state¬ 
ments are prepared and the procedures are enacted in accor¬ 
dance with generally accepted privacy principles. 
The second standard of reporting is: 
The report shall state whether such principles have been 
consistently observed in the current period in relation 
to the preceding period. 
For a privacy audit the purpose of this standard is to re¬ 
quire that the auditor note changes made in privacy policy 
and practices since the last privacy report. The auditor 
would not judge the implications of such changes since that 
is a judgment to be made by the reader of such reports. The 
major benefit of privacy reports is the information concern¬ 
ing what is actually being done by an organization. By high¬ 
lighting changes made from one period to the next, the use 
of these reports is facilitated. 
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The third standard of reporting is: 
Informative disclosures in the financial statements are 
to be regarded as reasonably accurate unless otherwise 
stated in the report. 
For a privacy audit an auditor is to assume that the disclo¬ 
sures in the organization's privacy report are adequate. It 
is not the auditor's responsibility to judge the completeness 
of the organization's representation. 
The fourth standard of reporting is: 
The report shall either contain an expression of opinion 
regarding the financial statements, taken as a whole, or 
an assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot be ex¬ 
pressed. When an overall opinion cannot be expressed, 
the reasons therefor should be stated. In all cases 
where an auditor's name is associated with financial 
statements, the report should contain a clear-cut indica¬ 
tion of the character of the auditor's examination, if 
any, and the degree of resonsibility he is taking. 
Just as there is a standard auditor's report issued in con¬ 
nection with a basic financial audit, there should be a 
standard auditor's report issued in connection with a privacy 
audit. The suggested form of such a report is as follows: 
We reviewed the organization's privacy policy statement, 
described in the report by management, and reviewed and 
tested the related controls and internal audit proce¬ 
dures. We received assurance from the organization's 
legal counsel that the organization has implemented all 
mandatory privacy practices. Counsel has also assured 
us that the optional practices implemented are appropri¬ 
ate for this organization. 
We have found that the procedures reported by management 
do exist and if effective would implement the organiza¬ 
tion's privacy policy. We have tested the controls and 
internal audit procedures and found that they do effec¬ 
tively implement the organization's privacy policy. 
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We are stating that the privacy policy is accurately re¬ 
ported and is effective. We are not giving an opinion 
that privacy is adequately protected by this organiza¬ 
tion as that is not our function. 
The first paragraph of the auditor's report defines 
the scope of the auditor's examination. It states that the 
policy statement is the representation of management and its 
legal counsel. The auditor assumes that this representation 
is accurate unless evidence is found to the contrary. The 
auditor does not guarantee the privacy of individuals about 
whom information is maintained only that the controls are 
as stated and are effective. The second paragraph expresses 
the auditor's opinion on the results of the investigation. 
The third paragraph clarifies again the responsibilities as¬ 
sumed by the auditor. This paragraph is directed at the 
general public and is intended to reduce the possibility of 
misinterpretation of the auditor's statement. 
SAS 2, which supercedes parts of SAS 1 with regards 
to the fourth standard of reporting, enumerates several cir¬ 
cumstances resulting in a departure from the auditor's 
standard report. The following is a description of condi¬ 
tions which would lead to departure from the standard au¬ 
ditor's report on privacy. 
If the auditor is unable to obtain the assurance of 
the organization's legal counsel that the privacy policy of 
the organization is appropriate, the auditor should disclaim 
an opinion. It is not the function of the auditor to 
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determine what laws and regulations are appropriate for the 
organization. Not receiving the counsel's assurance signi¬ 
ficantly expands the scope of the privacy audit into an 
area in which the auditor is not qualified. 
If the auditor finds that the representation of manage¬ 
ment is either missing or inadequate, the auditor would dis¬ 
claim an opinion. The auditor should remember that it is 
the representation of management which is being audited. 
The organization's statement should present a sufficient ba¬ 
sis for an opinion. 
The organization is required to prepare its privacy 
policy statement in accordance with generally accepted pri¬ 
vacy principles. As mentioned above, the policy statement 
should specify the laws, regulations and voluntary proce¬ 
dures for which the organization has decided to be respon¬ 
sible. The organization should then list the eight privacy 
standards and the procedures which are enacted to implement 
each standard. Finally, the organization would specify the 
specific techniques which are used to implement each stan¬ 
dard. This framework was suggested for two reasons. 
First, it gives the organization guidance in formulat¬ 
ing and enacting its privacy policy. Policy formulation is 
guided by the intent of the privacy standards as they are 
derived from the objectives of privacy (minimize intrusive¬ 
ness, maximize fairness, create legitimate enforceable ex¬ 
pectations of confidentiality). Policy enactment is guided 
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by the practices normally used to implement the standards. 
These enactment techniques were specified in chapter V. 
The second reason for using the generally accepted 
privacy principles framework is to guide the auditor in con¬ 
ducting the privacy audit. The auditor, in reviewing the 
organization's policy statement, can judge, should the 
statement itself be adequate, the adequacy and appropriate¬ 
ness of the procedures. By reviewing the procedures used to 
implement the standards the auditor can determine if they 
follow from the objectives of privacy. By reviewing the 
practices and techniques used to implement the standards the 
auditor can determine if the techniques have the potential 
for being effective in implementing the standards. 
It follows, therefore, that without an adequate organi¬ 
zational privacy policy statement the auditor cannot issue 
any opinion and must depart from use of the auditor's stan¬ 
dard report. If the policy statement is inadequate, either 
not prepared in accordance with generally accepted privacy 
principles or for some other reason insufficient to form the 
basis of the audit, the auditor should disclaim an opinion. 
Should the representation of management be adequate 
to serve as the basis of an audit, the auditor would issue 
either an adverse or an unqualified opinion. If the controls 
implemented by management are adequate and effective, an un¬ 
qualified opinion would be issued. If the controls are in¬ 
adequate or are not appropriate for the privacy standard in 
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question, an adverse opinion would be given. If the con¬ 
trols are adequate and appropriate but are found to be in¬ 
effective, an adverse opinion would be given. 
A financial audit can result in a qualified opinion. 
The auditor may find that the financial statements are 
fairly presented with some exception or exceptions. The au¬ 
ditor would not give a qualified opinion for a privacy audit. 
A privacy program cannot be effective or appropriate "on the 
whole" with some exceptions. The privacy controls are 
either effective or appropriate or they are not. If all 
controls are appropriate and effective, the opinion is un¬ 
qualified. If some control or controls are not appropriate 
or effective the auditor gives an adverse opinion stating 
which controls are not appropriate or effective. 
Summary 
This section has presented standards for the conduct 
of a privacy audit. The framework for this presentation 
was the present generally accepted auditing standards. This 
was done to avoid duplication. Many of the concepts, proce¬ 
dures and general information contained in the statements 
on auditing standards is applicable to a privacy audit. 
This section has suggested areas in which the standards 
needed to be supplemented or altered for a privacy audit. 
These standards have met the five audit model goals in 
the following ways: 
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1. The basis of the audit is the representation of manage¬ 
ment contained in the privacy policy statement and the 
assurance of the organization's legal counsel. The po¬ 
licy statement is presented in accordance with generally 
accepted privacy principles. This procedure has mini¬ 
mized the limitations of the auditor in interpreting 
privacy laws and regulations. It has also maximized the 
competence of the auditor by requiring that the auditor 
review a statement by the organization and perform cer¬ 
tain tests of effectiveness 
2. The statement of the organization about which the auditor 
gains assurance from legal counsel serves as the criteria 
for evaluation. The basis of the counsel's assurance 
are the privacy laws and regulations which by their na¬ 
ture are generally accepted 
3. Supplements to the standards of field work suggested me¬ 
thods for gathering evidence which would be quantifiable 
and verifiable 
4. It has already been shown that the privacy techniques 
by their nature record information about their own 
functioning and are in themselves a system of controls. 
The standards of reporting were supplemented to suggest 
that if these conditions did not exist that the auditor 
could not make an unqualified opinion 
5. An auditor's privacy report was suggested 
Audit Techniques 
The purpose of this section is to suggest audit tools 
and techniques which the auditor might employ in obtaining 
and confirming evidence in the conduct of a privacy audit. 
Mair, Wood and Davis (Mair) suggest that there is a distinc¬ 
tion between audit tools and techniques. They state 
A technique is an action that the auditor may perform, 
whereas a tool is something tangible that he can use. 
They later state that a tool "assists in implementation of 
an audit technique."22 This section first suggests audit ii 22 
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techniques and then outlines the use of some of the current 
audit tools. 
It is not the intention of this researcher to suggest 
an optimum set of tools and techniques. A 'more useful ap¬ 
proach is to outline methods for choosing audit techniques 
and to present a "menu" of audit tools. The term menu is 
used since it connotes a list of items from which the auditor 
can choose depending on the situation at that time. No op¬ 
timum set of tools and techniques is provided here for three 
reasons. First, as Mair has noted, the choice of tools de¬ 
pends on the technique employed. Second, the techniques em¬ 
ployed will depend on the privacy implementation procedures 
adopted in each organization. Since there is variation in 
privacy implementation, there will be variation in audit 
techniques and tools precluding the formulation of an opti¬ 
mal set. Cash, Bailey and Whinston (Cash) have noted that 
there is no set combination of tools and techniques which 
can be employed in all situations. Concerning computer au¬ 
dit techniques they state 
We have not pursued the issue of optimal combinations in 
this paper as there is no unique solution to this issue. 
Our purpose is to review this literature and provide 
insights into the techniques. Each auditor may then use 
these results in developing the audit program suited to 
the situation.22 
Finally, the choice of audit techniques will depend on the 
initial review of the privacy system of control. This is 
explained further below. 
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Since the scope of this research project is limited to 
computerized record-keeping systems, the audit tools and 
techniques presented will be those applicable to a computer 
environment. This does not limit the presentation to compu¬ 
terized audit tools and techniques. There are manual proce¬ 
dures which can be effectively utilized in a computer envi¬ 
ronment. Also, some of the controls used to implement pri¬ 
vacy are manual in nature and, as noted by Mair, 
Normally, the examination of manual procedures must be 
performed manually . . . 24 
A review of the literature shows that there are many 
different classification schemes used by various authors as 
frameworks for discussing audit tools and techniques. These 
schemes are based on the classification given the controls 
being audited and the responsibilities of the auditor. For 
example, Mair describes controls and audit tools and tech¬ 
niques in terms of "the three major aspects of electronic 
data processing: applications, systems development, and the 
25 
information processing facility (IPF)." Mair goes on to 
describe two possible ways of verifying application controls 
He states 
There are two purposes for utilizing the various tech¬ 
niques described: (1) to verify the manual and/or compu 
ter processing operations and (2) to verify the results 
of processing.26 
A similar framework is used by the Institute of Inter¬ 
nal Auditors in the Systems Auditability and Control (SAC) 
reports. The SAC framework is described as follows: 
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The typical data processing function includes three ele¬ 
ments: computer application systems, . . . computer 
service center operations, . . . application systems 
development . . . 
The SAC reports use this framework to describe control and 
audit practices actually in use in the organizations which 
were surveyed during the SAC study. 
2 8 
Sardinas describes the three phases of software 
security and auditability as preprocessing, processing and 
postprocessing. These phases include procedures which are 
performed before a computer program executives, while the 
program is executing and after a program has completed execu¬ 
tion. 
All of the above classification schemes are very simi¬ 
lar. They all are both classification schemes for control 
and for the audit practices used to review and evaluate 
those controls. These schemes can be summarized as follows: 
I. Application System Development (Mair, SAC) 
preprocessing (Sardinas) 
II. Computer Service Center Operation (Mair, SAC) 
preprocessing (Sardinas) 
III. Applications (Mair, SAC) 
phases of processing (Mair) 
processing (Sardinas) 
results of processing (Mair) 
postprocessing (Sardinas) 
These schemes are useful as references to control and audit 
practices. They are not used in this research as a frame¬ 
work because they do not conform to the privacy model de¬ 
veloped above. For a presentation of audit tools and 
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techniques to be meaningful the framework must conform to 
the framework of the controls established. Since privacy 
controls are established and reported by the organization us¬ 
ing the GAPP framework, the audit practices must be pre¬ 
sented in the same framework. Since it is the above sum¬ 
marized schemes with which most people are familiar, they 
will be cross-referenced to the GAPP framework wherever pos¬ 
sible . 
Mautz and Sharaf take a different approach to classify¬ 
ing audit techniques. They first determine the nature of the 
assertion to be tested, suggest the audit evidence applicable 
to testing the assertion and then suggest audit techniques 
which can be utilized by the auditor in the particular aitua- 
29 
tion. For example, the assertion of the existence of non¬ 
physical things (accounts receivable) could be tested by the 
statement of an independent third party using the confirma¬ 
tion audit technique. This is a most useful classification 
scheme for this research project for two reasons. 
First, it lends itself to the GAPP framework. For 
example, an assertion of the information management privacy 
standard is that personal information is accurate. Evidence 
for this assertion could be the statement by an independent 
third party (the person about whom the information is main¬ 
tained) . This evidence could be obtained using the confir¬ 
mation audit technique. 
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Second, the Mautz and Sharaf scheme suggests that the 
nature of the assertion determines the quality of evidence 
which can be gathered to test the assertion. It is shown 
below that this is important to the auditor as the privacy 
audit program is designed. 
Having outlined the intent, scope and framework for 
the audit technique presentation, this section includes 
three subsections. First is a discussion of a process or 
program the auditor might use in conducting the audit. Se¬ 
cond is a discussion of some audit tools and techniques. 
Third is a presentation of some "new" audit approaches. 
Audit Program 
An auditor's review of internal control is a sequen¬ 
tial process generally involving a preliminary review, the 
gathering of detailed information, the performance of audit 
tests, and the evaluation of findings. This is a cumulative 
process in which an evaluation of the results of each step 
is an input to the designing and conducting of the next se¬ 
quential step. 
SAS 3, for example, prescribes a preliminary review 
which involves conducting inquiries, observing client per¬ 
sonnel, and reviewing documentation. The results of this 
step are used to determine the extent of additional control 
review. An evaluation of the results of the detailed review 
are used to determine the extent of reliance to be placed on 
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the controls and the extent of substantive tests to be per¬ 
formed. This detailed review involves tests of compliance 
to "provide reasonable assurance that accounting control pro- 
30 
cedures are being applied as described." The auditor con¬ 
cludes the review with an evaluation of the system of con¬ 
trol . 
There are other examples in the literature of these au¬ 
dit steps. Mair states: 
Seven specific steps should be found in every compliance 
audit examination (audits to verify compliance with con¬ 
trols) : 
- Define objectives 
- Gather basic information 
- Gather detailed information 
- Evaluate control 
- Design audit tests 
- Perform tests 
- Evaluate findings31 
The SAC reports found that 
Most of the internal auditors interviewed followed some 
variation of a three-phase approach, which includes: 
- Initial review and evaluation of the area to be audited 
and audit plan preparation 
- Detailed review and evaluation of processing logic and 
controls 
- Tests to verify compliance with established controls, 
and verification of selected data records.^2 
Mautz and Sharaf recommend steps which conform to their au¬ 
dit technique classification scheme presented above. They 
state: 
The procedure of judgment formation may be divided into 
the following steps: 
1. Recognition of the proposition to be proved 
2. Evaluation of the proposition as one requiring evi¬ 
dence of a high or moderate degree of probability 
Collection of evidence within the given limits of 
time and cost 
3. 
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4. Evaluation of the evidence obtained as valid or not 
valid 
5. Formulation of judgment as to the proposition at is¬ 
sue^ 
Arthur Andersen & Co. (AA) presents an approach to the 
review and evaluation of internal control which has many 
points in common with the privacy audit standards presented 
. . 34 
above m this chapter. The AA approach is also a stepwise 
process as the others above. AA also, however, incorporates 
a more explicit consideration of control and audit objec¬ 
tives . 
The AA guide breaks economic events into cycles with 
the accompanying transactions, systems, procedures, inter¬ 
faces and data bases being identified. This cycle approach 
is easily extended to the non-economic events which involve 
personal information since the basis for grouping events in¬ 
to cycles is the job accomplished by the events. The audit 
team identifies the broad and specific internal control ob¬ 
jectives for each cycle which can be be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the controls. It is noted here that these 
objectives are roughly equivalent to the privacy objectives 
and standard developed in chapter IV. 
The audit team then identifies the control techniques 
which are employed to achieve the control objectives. This 
gives the team a basis for determining the degree to which 
the basic objectives are being achieved. This approach fo¬ 
cuses on the controls in place rather than what might be but 
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is not. Again this corresponds to the privacy audit stan¬ 
dards developed above. In a privacy audit the CPA reviews 
the controls and techniques employed by the organization. 
Without makinq a decision concerning the privacy controls 
which might be in place, the auditor determines the existence 
of and effectiveness of the controls which the organization 
has stated that it has implemented. 
The next step in the AA process is an overview of the 
entity's internal control environment which will serve as a 
basis for a subsequent evaluation of the specific control 
techniques employed. The privacy auditing standards above 
suggested a similar approach. The auditor first reviews 
the privacy controls to determine if they could be effective 
in implementing the organization's privacy policy. This is 
a prelude to a more detailed evaluation of the controls. AA 
calls this process a "transaction flow review." During this 
process AA notes that the auditor should identify each tech¬ 
nique with a specific control objective. The GAPP framework 
facilitates this process since the implementation techniques 
for each standard are specified by the organization. 
The AA process concludes with an evaluation of the 
control techniques and compliance testing to determine whe¬ 
ther the techniques provide reasonable assurance that the 
control objectives are achieved and that the controls are in 
place as described. 
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This brief survey of the literature on the review and 
evaluation of internal control shows that authoritative 
guides approach the internal control review as a cumulative 
step process with the results of each step forming the basis 
for the next step. The AA approach adds to this process an 
explicit consideration of control objectives and an evalua¬ 
tion of the control techniques which implenent those objec¬ 
tives . 
The auditor receives little guidance from this litera¬ 
ture on how to review the results of each step and to use 
these results to design and conduct the next step in the 
-J5 
process. For example, SAS 1 and SAS 3 suggest that the 
discovery during the preliminary review of weaknesses in the 
controls considered material in nature should determine the 
extent of additional review and tests of compliance. Also, 
Mautz and Sharaf state 
. . . more compelling evidence is required for material 
assertion than for assertions that are not material.36 
The nature, timing and extent of tests conducted by the au¬ 
ditor are dependent on this concept of materiality. This 
concept, although not clearly defined, is familiar to the 
auditor and is used in conducting financial audits. The au¬ 
ditor may have difficulty applying this concept in a privacy 
audit. 
These audit steps surveyed above also require that the 
auditor make an overall evaluation of the system of control. 
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This is also a difficult process for the auditor. Mair 
states 
• • • typical auditing literature indicates simply that 
the 'auditor evaluates the controls' without elaborating 
much further. As a matter of fact, the auditor custom¬ 
arily studies the detailed information that was gathered 
and then intuitively leaps to a conclusion. Such in¬ 
tuition is largely dependent upon the skills and experi¬ 
ence of the auditor. The quality of the decision is 
quite suspect when the application system is sophisti¬ 
cated or unique. ^ 
The intuitive nature of this evaluation process may or 
may not present the auditor with a difficult task in the con¬ 
duct of a financial audit. However, in the conduct of a pri¬ 
vacy audit, an auditor cannot at first be expected to possess 
the skills and experience necessary to make judgments con¬ 
cerning the effectiveness of the privacy control system. 
The following conclusions are drawn from this brief 
survey of the literature concerning the review and evalua¬ 
tion of internal control: the review is a cumulative step 
process requiring an evaluation based on materiality at each 
step; the auditor is required to make an overall evaluation 
at the conclusion of the review which is usually made in¬ 
tuitively and is also based on the concept of materiality; 
the auditor may not at first have the skill and experience 
necessary to make these evaluations in the conduct of a pri¬ 
vacy audit. 
It was noted above in chapter III that the auditor was 
qualified to conduct a privacy audit. It is not this re¬ 
searcher's intention to contradict that by stating here that 
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auditor may not have the skill or experience necessary for a 
privacy audit. However, since the intuitive evaluation ne¬ 
cessary in a review of internal control is normally based on 
the use of the concept of materiality, it is necessary to 
suggest an alternative to this concept for a privacy audit. 
This section suggests a framework for making the required 
evaluation decisions which replaces the materiality concept 
with that of data sensitivity and formalizes the review pro¬ 
cess to decrease the auditor's reliance on intuition. The 
resulting framework will suggest techniques to the auditor 
for use at each stage in the review process. 
The audit program suggested here consists of five 
steps which are similar to those steps discussed above. The 
first step is an initial review of the privacy controls im¬ 
plemented by the organization. The results of the review is 
a preliminary evaluation of the privacy controls. This step 
forms the basis of the auditor's first required statement in 
the audit report. The auditor would state that the controls 
are in place as represented by the organization. 
The second step in the program is a detailed review of 
the system of privacy control. This step results in a mea¬ 
sure of the potential loss to which the personal information 
of each record system is exposed. This loss is calculated 
from a combination of the sensitivity of the information, 
the probability of exposure and the importance of the 
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controls in preventing that exposure. This loss potential 
or "criticality" measure is used by the auditor to design 
the audit tests of compliance. 
The third step in the program is the design of the au¬ 
dit tests. The results of this step is a measure of extent 
of testing required to determine the effectivness of the 
controls. The fourth step is the actual performance of the 
tests and the fifth step is an evaluation of the system of 
control. The following is a detailed description of each of 
these steps. The process is conducted by the auditor for 
each system of personal records and for each privacy stan¬ 
dard in effect for that system. 
Initial Review 
This part of the program involves five steps and the 
formulation of a conclusion. First, the auditor identifies 
the objectives of the standard under consideration. For ex¬ 
ample, the use limitation standard is defined as the limiting 
of the internal use of information. The auditor would review 
the organization's internal privacy policy and public privacy 
representation to determine what limits the organization 
wishes to place on the internal use of information. This is 
simply a review of documentation. 
Second, the auditor identifies the controls which have 
been implemented to enact the standard. For example, con¬ 
sidering again the use limitation standard, the auditor 
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would review the relevant documentation to determine what 
access controls have been implemented. The philosophy of 
the AA guide referenced above is important at this stage of 
the audit program. The auditor is not responsible for de¬ 
termining what controls could have been implemented but is 
responsible for reviewing the organization's implementation 
plan to determine what has been implemented. The AA guide 
states 
Arthur Andersen's approach recognizes this by focusing 
on the controls that are in place rather than what might 
be but are not.38 
The checklist/questionnaire procedure often employed by au¬ 
ditors would not be used here. It is only necessary that 
the auditor identify those controls which are implemented for 
each standard. 
The third step in this initial review is an identifica- 
3 9 
tion of potential causes of exposures. Mair describes the 
relationship between controls, exposures and causes of expo¬ 
sure. An exposure is the effect of a cause of exposure. A 
control acts to reduce the cause of the exposure. At this 
stage in the initial review the auditor reviews the objec¬ 
tives of the standard and identifies any causes of exposure 
which could act against that objective and result in failure 
of the standard (could result in exposure). For example, 
causes of exposure which could act on the standard of use 
limitation are unlimited access to on-line data files, im¬ 
properly distributed report output or perhaps failure of the 
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hardware/software used to implement the authentication/ 
authorization procedures. Mair summarizes many other poten- 
40 
tial causes of exposure. The auditor may find it useful 
to summarize the causes of exposure and the controls on 
those exposures as in figure 5. The auditor would indicate 
where the control acts to reduce the cause of the exposure. 
Hoffman describes these causes of exposures as 
"threats" and proposes that one can enumerate the potential 
threats (t) to form a set of threats (T) which act on a set 
of objects (0) composed of individual objects (o). Hoffman 
id discussing potential intrusion activities or threats on 
security objects. This concept is also useful, however, if 
thought of as causes of exposure (threats) and objectives of 
standards (objects). The results of the auditor's review 
would then be summarized as in figure 6. Using this dia¬ 
gram allows the auditor to represent those causes which ex¬ 
pose more than one objective and those objectives subject to 
more than one cause. 
In summary, Hoffman states: 
The object-threat relations form a bipartite graph (fi¬ 
gure 6) in which edge <t.o.> exists if and only if t. 
is a viable means of gaining access to object o.. it 
should be noted that the relation of threats to-’objects 
is not one to one; a threat may compromise any number 
of objects and an object may be vulnerable to more than 
one threat.41 
The fourth step in the initial review is to identify 
the exposures which could result from the causes just 
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Figure 6. The Threat-Object Relation 
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identified. Mair suggests nine exposures to which an organi¬ 
zation is susceptible. He states 
The following list of exposures includes some of the re¬ 
verse effects that a business organization might en¬ 
counter : 
- erroneous record keeping 
- unacceptable accounting 
- business interruption 
- erroneous management decisions 
- fraud and embezzlement 
- statutory sanctions 
- excessive costs/deficient revenues 
- loss or destruction of assets 
- competitive advantage^ 
This is a list which applies to a general computer audit but 
which is a useful guide to the auditor in summarizing the 
privacy exposures to which an organization is subject. This 
information can be summarized by the auditor in table form 
as in figure 7, which is an augmented figure 5. The auditor 
would indicate wherever a cause could lead to that particu¬ 
lar exposure. 
Following further the Hoffman framework introduced 
above may also be useful to the auditor. Figure 8 presents 
sets T and O included in figure 6 and adds a set of security 
measures M. These security measures are the controls imple¬ 
mented by the organization. In summary, Hoffman states 
The set of security measures transforms the bipartitate 
graph of [figure 6] into the tripartite graph of [fi¬ 
gure 8]. In a 'protected' system, all edges are of the 
form <t^m:j_> and <m^Oj>. Any edge of the form <t^Oj> 
identifies an unprotected object. It should be noted 
that a single security technique may counter more than 
one threat and/or protect more than one object. . .43 
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Figure 8. The Basic Security System 
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The use of both of these figures is helpful to the au¬ 
ditor in the following ways. Using figure 7 gives the au¬ 
ditor a ready reference regarding exposures and the controls 
which have reduced the possibility of exposures by reducing 
the causes of the exposure. By reviewing the table the au¬ 
ditor can determine that there is a control for each cause 
of exposure. Using figure 8 gives the auditor a ready visual 
reference regarding the extent to which a given standard is 
implemented. If the auditor's diagram has no edges of the 
form <tj_Oj>/ that standard can be assumed to be implemented 
since all potential causes of exposure have been reduced by 
one or more controls leading to no unprotected or unimple¬ 
mented objective. 
The final step in the initial review is to determine 
if the privacy controls are implemented and if effective 
would enact the privacy policy of the organization. The au¬ 
ditor would review any tables made like that in figure 7, 
find that all causes of exposure are covered by a control, 
and conclude that the privacy of the records in the particu¬ 
lar system of interest are protected as represented by the 
organization. The auditor could also assemble the diagrams 
made like that in figure 8, find that all standards are im¬ 
plemented, and conclude that the records in the particular 
system of interest are protected as represented by the or¬ 
ganization. 
206 
Two clarifications need to be made at this point. 
First, there will be controls which act on many or all 
causes of exposure. In the matrix diagram (figure 7) a 
control may be checked in many or all columns indicating 
that the control acts on more than one cause. In the set 
diagram (figure 8) there may be a security measure 
which acts on many threats. AA points out that conclusions 
on these type controls are difficult to reach. They state 
Because pervasive-type internal control techniques are 
general in nature, no conclusions should be drawn from 
them regarding whether specific cycle control objectives 
have been achieved. Such conclusions can be reached 
only after the specific techniques used to achieve a 
specific cycle control objective had been identified 
and appropriate compliance tests of such techniques have 
been performed.44 
The auditor, in reaching a conclusion on this initial review, 
should carefully evaluate the diagram to determine that 
there are controls acting on each specific cause for expo¬ 
sure which has been identified. 
The second clarification concerning the conclusions 
reached after the initial review is that the auditor may not 
be able to state that all standards are implemented nor that 
the privacy of records in a particular system are protected 
as represented by the organization. The auditor would first 
state this conclusion in the audit report. In a financial 
audit the auditor could continue the audit process at this 
point while not relying on the system of control. Since in 
a privacy audit the controls are the primary subject of 
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consideration, the auditor would have to decide whether to 
continue the audit. It would require judgment on the au¬ 
ditor's part. The auditor would refer to the discussion of 
the fourth standard of reporting above in this chapter. If 
the controls were completely lacking or inappropriate, the 
auditor might wish to stop at this point and issue an ad¬ 
verse opinion. 
Should the auditor decide to continue, the detailed re¬ 
view stage of the audit would be the next step. 
Detailed Review 
This part of the program involves four steps and the 
calculation of a loss potential for each system or privacy 
standard of interest. This part of the program uses record 
systems as a focal point. After determining the sensitivity 
of the personal information and other characteristics of 
each system, the auditor assigns probabilities of exposure 
and weights the importance of the controls in reducing the 
causes of those exposures. The auditor would calculate a 
numerical or linguistic loss potential for each system. 
The SAC study found similar measures being used by internal 
auditors.^ 
The first characteristic of the record system is the 
sensitivity of the personal data in the system. This is a 
surrogate for the "value" of the information and replaces 
the materiality concept normally used in auditing. This may 
208 
have already been calculated by the organization and used as 
a guide in implementing the privacy controls. (This we sug¬ 
gested in chapter V.) If the organization has not assigned 
any sensitivity ratings, the auditor may have to do so to 
permit a determination of the value of the system and for 
determining the extent of audit tests necessary. Mautz and 
Sharaf explain this point further. They state 
Because cost and time are so important in the perform¬ 
ance of an engagement, transactions, events, and even 
irregularities of little or no materiality cannot be 
given the attention which must be reserved for material 
transactions, events, and irregularities.4^ 
Material weaknesses become, for a privacy audit, weaknesses 
in a system of records which is sensitive in nature. The 
auditor should concentrate on testing controls which are act 
ing on causes of exposure which could result in the exposure 
of sensitive personal information. 
A m7 
Bing has suggested that three grading groups are 
sufficient. He suggests the following groups: 
1. Normal aspects: General personal information such as 
name, date of birth 
2. Personal aspects: intimate, detailed or specific infor¬ 
mation such as religion, rent payments, and work ab¬ 
sences 
3. Disparaging or defamatory aspects such as cause of disso 
lution of previous marriage or information on default of 
payments 
The rating assigned to a system would partly depend on the 
characteristics of the system which are determined in the 
next stage of the detailed review. The characteristics 
would determine whether one rating (that of the most 
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sensitive data in the system) should be assigned or whether 
data of different sensitivity ratings is controlled separ¬ 
ately (stored on different mediums, accessed by different me¬ 
thods) requiring the assignment of different ratings to 
different sets of data. 
The next step in the detailed review is to determine 
the other characteristics of each system being considered. 
The characteristics of the system will determine the prob¬ 
ability of exposures and the importance (weights) attached 
to the controls which reduce the causes of the exposures. 
These characteristics presented here, which an auditor might 
consider, are certainly not complete. The implications of 
these characteristics are only briefly presented. More de¬ 
tails on the implications can be obtained in the references 
provided. 
Many of the characteristics of interest here are those 
that result from the use of advanced computer technology. 
As systems become more sophisticated it becomes increasingly 
difficult to verify the existence of controls since many of 
these controls are incorporated into the hardware and soft¬ 
ware of the system. As computer installations make more use 
of software packages such as data base management systems 
(DBMS) and operating systems, controls become more concen¬ 
trated in these packages and therefore become more critical. 
These packages also raise the possibility of an auditor 
sacrificing independence as these packages are used to 
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extract data for verification. Also, as systems move away 
from batch-oriented processing modes to on-line, real-time 
modes with highly integrated files, it becomes more diffi¬ 
cult to control the accuracy of the data and to verify in¬ 
terim results of processing. Other characteristics of in¬ 
terest here are the quality, quantity and scope of internal 
auditing in the organization and the interrelationship of 
the controls on the system development process, the applica¬ 
tion systems and the information processing facility. 
As computerized record-keeping systems have evolved 
many of the controls which had been manual in nature have 
been incorporated into the hardware/software of the system. 
Controls on the accuracy of the data and on access to the 
data, for example, have become part of the system. When the 
auditor attempts to verify the effectiveness of these con¬ 
trols there are two major choices of techniques with vari¬ 
ous combinations of the two. The auditor can verify the 
results of the processing, the files. This can be accom¬ 
plished by the use of confirmations or comparisons with 
other independently, externally maintained files or by per¬ 
forming reasonableness or other edit tests on the resulting 
data. This process is performed to secure evidence that 
the processing results are accurate and complete. This pro¬ 
cedure only provides an inference that the essential con¬ 
trols are functioning. 
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The auditor may also verify the actual controls by 
testing the processing directly. This testing will provide 
evidence of the present and continued reliability of the 
controls. 
The SAC reports found incidences of various combina- 
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tions of these techniques. The three identified were: 
1. Verify the results of processing and infer that controls 
are functioning 
2. Verify application program controls and complement this 
with verification of the results of processing 
3. Data verification (results) processing complemented by 
selective functional testing 
The auditor must be aware of the extent of the use of soft¬ 
ware/hardware controls and consider the difficulty of verifi¬ 
cation and the "invisible" nature of these controls when de¬ 
termining the importance of the controls. This problem is 
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extensively discussed in Mair and the SAC reports. 
The use by the organization of software packages will 
impact on the controls instituted and the auditor's verifica¬ 
tion of these controls. For example, control over the access 
to data may have been incorporated into the operating system, 
the DBMS or both. The integrity of these controls becomes 
important since these may be the only methods of limiting 
access to data files. 
The very nature of a DBMS makes them causes for parti¬ 
cular auditor concern. The consolidation of files and the 
reduced redundancy of data in the files precludes 
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post-processing editing in many cases and raises the impor¬ 
tance of controls over access and updating. Since one of 
the objectives of a DBMS is to increase the integrity of the 
data, erroneous input is often prevented from causing a file 
update. However, this feature requires the controls over 
reinput of corrected transactions be strengthened to pro¬ 
tect against loss of transactions. Adams^ discusses these 
and other issues at some length. 
Another issue on the use of DBMS in an organization is 
that of auditor independence. When accessing data files to 
perform some post-processing verification tests, the au¬ 
ditor is in most cases utilizing the data accessing routines 
of the DBMS and the operating system. If the auditor cannot 
verify the integrity of these routines, then the auditor is 
not necessarily independent of the organization in conduct¬ 
ing the audit. The organization could have modified these 
routines giving the auditor no assurance that the data ob¬ 
tained is that which was requested. 
Many organizations are evolving from a batch-mode of 
processing to on-line and real-time modes of processing. 
Mair^ points out many audit problems which result from this 
evolution. For example, some on-line systems only give an 
illusion of timeliness since actual update of files occurs 
on a batch basis. Controls on the submission of transac¬ 
tions for processing becomes important to insure accuracy 
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of files. Real-time inquiry and update systems require more 
extensive and sophisticated access controls than do batch 
systems. 
Also, as organizations evolve away from the use of 
batch systems, there are fewer ponts at which the organiza¬ 
tion and the auditor can verify interim results of process¬ 
ing. Controls internal to the software/hardware become more 
critical since there is no external review at the interim 
stages. The auditor in attempting to verify controls in 
such systems must resort to more sophisticated auditing 
tools to verify controls or must be satisfied with verifying 
the results of processing. 
The quality, quantity and scope of internal auditing 
in the organization becomes more important as the system be¬ 
comes more sophisticated. If the internal auditor is per¬ 
ceived as qualified and independent, the CPAs may be able to 
adjust the scope of their study. A study conducted by Rit- 
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tenburg and Davis found CPAs very willing to adjust the 
scope of their audits if they were satisfied with the work 
of the internal audit staff. Rittenburg and Davis also 
found that the activities which had the most impact on the 
scope of the CPA study were those which involved ongoing re¬ 
view of processing controls. Should the CPA be satisfied 
with the internal auditor's monitoring of processing con¬ 
trols, verifying these controls might become less important 
to the CPA. 
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The final consideration discussed here is the relation¬ 
ship of the controls over the system development process, the 
information processing facility, and the applications sys¬ 
tems. The controls over the information processing facility 
directly affect the application system controls. These con¬ 
trols complement the application system controls. If the 
auditor finds that these controls are lacking, it is diffi¬ 
cult to assume that the application controls can be effec¬ 
tive. Also, the control over the system development process 
and the participation of the auditor in systems development 
help insure that application controls are tested before the 
systems are modified. If controls over the system develop¬ 
ment process do not exist and the internal auditor does not 
participate in the design process by suggesting controls, 
then the auditor would not be able to predict the ongoing ef¬ 
fectiveness of application controls. 
These system characteristics have been presented be¬ 
cause they must be considered by the auditor in estimating 
the probability of exposures and in evaluating the impor¬ 
tance of controls in preventing these exposures. These con¬ 
siderations will be incorporated into the estimated loss po¬ 
tential and again be explicitly considered in the design of 
the audit tests. 
The loss potential is a modification of risk analysis 
which is performed to evaluate the effectiveness of security 
measures employed in a computer environment. These risk 
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analyses are also performed to estimate the value of poten¬ 
tial losses. This estimate becomes the benefit portion of a 
cost/benefit analysis performed concerning the possible in¬ 
stallation of various security measures. This researcher 
suggests that the auditor estimate a loss potential, which 
is analogous to risk analysis, during the detailed review 
stage of the privacy audit. This loss potential estimate 
will be used to determine the extent of audit tests needed. 
In a review of the literature this researcher found 
references to identifying the potential losses resulting 
from exposures. For example, the AA guide states 
If an objective [control objective] is not achieved, or 
only partially achieved, specific risks are stated and 
considered. 
The guide goes on later to state 
Thus, a significant factor in the Arthur Andersen & Co. 
approach to the study and evaluation of internal ac¬ 
counting controls is the emphasis placed on considering 
the explicit risks associated with nonachieved or under¬ 
achieved internal control objectives.53 
On this same subject, Mair states 
. . . the magnitude of the application exposures must be 
estimated. This involves appraising the maximum plaus¬ 
ible consequences in dollars that could result from a 
particular exposure. That amount may then be multiplied 
by the likelihood of its occurrence. 
Mair goes on later to state 
Selection of the processing steps and controls to be 
tested is based primarily upon the factor of 'exposure.' 
The auditor selects the features within the application 
to be tested based upon 
- the relationships determined to exist between controls 
and causes 
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- the volume and value of the items being controlled 
- the worst likely error rate to be expected without de¬ 
tection if the controls weren't there.54 
This researcher suggests the calculation of a loss po¬ 
tential. This, as Mair suggests, is calculated by multiply¬ 
ing the value of the items being controlled by the likeli¬ 
hood of the occurrence of an exposure. The value of concern 
in a privacy audit is the sensitivity of the personal re¬ 
cords. The likelihood of occurrence of the exposure is the 
probability of the exposure, given the characteristics of 
the system and the controls in place. The loss potential 
is defined as follows: 
1 ? LP = S x ~ V P.W. 
i=l 1 1 
where: 
LP = loss potential 
S = Sensitivity of the personal records in the system 
S = (1,2,3) and 1 = normal aspects 
2 = personal aspects 
3 = disparaging or defamatory as¬ 
pects 
P. = probability of exposure i 
1 P= (0,1,2,3,4) and 0 = virtually impossible 
1 = not likely 
2 = possible 
3 = very likely 
4 = certain to occur 
n = number of exposures being considered 
W. 
l 
importance of controls 
W = (1,2,3,4,5) and 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
over exposure P^ 
unimportant 
not very important 
important 
very important 
critical 
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Note that for one exposure combines the probability of 
the exposure with the degree of dependence on the controls 
in reducing the probability of the occurrences of that ex¬ 
posure. If there is only one very critical control operat¬ 
ing on an exposure, then the probability of occurrence is 
more likely than if there were several controls. The prob¬ 
ability of occurrence is adjusted for the nature of that 
control. Assignment of probabilities and weights of impor¬ 
tance is discussed below. 
It should also be noted that the auditor can sum ex¬ 
posures P^W^ over one standard to get a privacy standard 
loss potential or over all exposures to get a system privacy 
loss potential. 
The explicit use of the weight of importance of con¬ 
trols is not normal in risk analysis. For example, Martin 
states 
Vulnerability to a certain event may be defined as the 
cost that an organization would incur if that event took 
place. . . . exposure to a stated event may be defined 
as the vulnerability to that* event multiplied by the 
probability of its occurrence. . .55 
Martin's probability of occurrence is a scale 0-7 of likeli¬ 
hood of occurrence in a period of time from not likely (0) 
to likely 10 times per day (7). 
The National Bureau of Standards (NBS) describes risk 
analysis as follows: 
The first step in risk analysis is to estimate the po¬ 
tential losses to which the ADP (Automatic Data Process¬ 
ing) facility is exposed. . . . place a dollar value on 
218 
the loss estimate. . . . the second step of the risk 
analysis is to evaluate the threats to the ADP facility 
. . . develop estimates of the probability of occurrence 
of each threat type. . . . the third step in the risk 
analysis is to combine the estimate of the value of the 
potential loss and probability of loss to develop an es¬ 
timate of loss expectancy.^6 
Neither Martin nor the NBS guide explicitly consider 
the critical nature of controls in developing an exposure or 
loss expectancy. A person conducting a risk analysis could, 
however, implicitly consider the existence of the controls 
when estimating the probability of occurrence of the threats 
or exposures but would not necessarily consider the impor¬ 
tance of the controls. 
The weight of importance of the controls is expli¬ 
citly included in the privacy loss potential calculation to 
assist the auditor in determining the areas in which audit 
effort should be concentrated. During the initial review 
the auditor would have identified the exposures that could 
act against the objectives of the privacy standards and 
would also have identified the controls which act to reduce 
the probability of the exposures. These control and expo¬ 
sure relationships would have been diagrammed as in figure 8 
and put into a matrix as in figure7. The auditor could by 
visual inspection determine what controls need to be tested. 
However as the number of exposures, controls and systems in¬ 
creases and there exist several controls acting concurrently 
in many exposures it becomes more difficult to concentrate 
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the audit effort for maximum efficiency. The AA guide makes 
this point when they state: 
An entity may employ hundreds of internal control tech¬ 
niques. . . . only those that obviously are used and 
that appear to provide the greatest degree of assurance 
that the objectives are achieved need to be considered 
by the study team. S’7 
The SAC reports describe a technique used within some 
organizations to direct audit effort to those application 
systems with the most audit need. They state: 
The technique identifies quantifiable characteristics 
of a computer application system that are significant 
from a risk analysis viewpoint. The characteristics 
are weighted and combined to obtain a system score. 
Several computer application systems may be scored in 
this way and the potential benefits obtainable from 
auditing the systems may be compared. 
The privacy loss potential analysis reduces the amount of 
intuition needed to determine the extent of audit testing 
necessary for the various standards or systems. The results 
of this analysis will assist the auditor in determining the 
extent of audit testing required and in determining the 
areas that require that testing. 
In assigning the probability of exposure an auditor 
would consider the characteristics of the system identified 
earlier in this detailed review stage. For example, the 
probability of errors going undetected is higher in a DBMS 
system where the reduction of data redundancy also reduces 
the possibility for cross-checks for reasonableness. Also, 
for example, there is a greater probability of unauthorized 
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use and updates of data in application systems if controls 
over access to the information processing center are lax or 
nonexistent. 
The auditor would also consider the controls which are 
identified to be in place to reduce the probability of the 
exposure. Reference to the visual aids like figure 7 and 
figure 8 would be useful for this purpose. If there are no 
controls on an exposure, then the exposure is very likely to 
occur. 
The auditor may also wish to consider the nature of 
the exposure itself. The auditor may consider whether the 
exposure is one that a person in the organization may wish 
to intentionally cause to occur. For example, gaining ac¬ 
cess to personal data for monetary gain is perhaps more 
likely to occur than avoiding sending correction notices to 
sources and users of the personal data since there is nothing 
to be gained by doing so. Considering whether exposures 
could be intentional or unintentional and the motives for in¬ 
tentional exposures could affect the probability of an ex¬ 
posure . 
In assigning weights of importance to the controls 
over exposures the auditor would again consider the charac¬ 
teristics of the system and the possible intent of the or¬ 
ganization employees. The auditor would also consider the 
number of controls which operate on an exposure. If there 
is only one control which acts to reduce the probability of 
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an exposure, then that control is much more critical than if 
there are several controls identified as acting on an expo¬ 
sure regardless of the apparent quality of that control. The 
auditor may seem to be reconsidering much of the information 
which went into estimating the probability of the exposures. 
For the most part this is true. However, as mentioned 
above, the intent is to significantly increase the probability 
of those exposures which become more likely to occur as the 
characteristics of the system, the motivations of the em¬ 
ployees and, most importantly, the critical nature of the con¬ 
trol are considered. 
The final point discussed concerning the detailed review 
is an alternative to the loss potential calculation. Hoff¬ 
man suggests a linguistic variable approach to measuring the 
security of a system which, while sacrificing the apparent 
precision of a numeric approach, may give a higher level of 
confidence that the final "fuzzy" rating is more realistic. 
This linguistic variable approach follows from the tripar¬ 
tite graph of figure 8 and is described by Hoffman as fol- 
1 59 
lows: 
B is a set of barriers, a mapping of T x 0 x M, the 
threats, security objects, and security measures, to a set of 
ordered tuples b = <t^,oj,mk>, the security points in the sys¬ 
tem. 
Each element in the barrier set B is a composite variable 
r\j . 
B with three components. Each component has a name (t^,oj /Hi^) 
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and a linguistic value (P , the threat possibility, L , the 
X/ X/ 
% 
object loss value and R , the security measure resistance) 
which is a linguistic variable which assumes values which 
are words rather than numbers. The composite linguistic 
'Xj 
variable B is diagrammed in figure 9. 
The subscripts for the linguistic variables are the 
same as the barrier B to emphasize that these components are 
evaluated in the context of the specific barrier. The au¬ 
ditor could devise the barrier set B, assign linguistic 
values to the probability of an exposure £ and to the object 
C\j (\j 
loss value (sensitivity) L for each barrier B and from these 
results determine the extent of testing necessary to deter¬ 
mine a linguistic value for variable the security measure 
resistance. The auditor would conclude that a complete sys¬ 
tem exists if there is a set <t.,o.,m. > for all <t.,o.> sets. 
l 3 k D D 
The auditor would conclude that this system is effective if 
all R took values of effective given P and L values. 
Having completed the detailed review and having either 
calculated a loss potential or described a barrier set B, 
the auditor next designs the audit tests shown to be required 
by the results of the detailed review. 
Audit Test Design 
At this stage of the privacy audit the auditor decides 
the nature and extent of the audit tests to be performed. 
The auditor also decides the areas for performing tests. 
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The auditor could decide that the loss potential is suffi¬ 
cient criteria for design of audit tests. A high loss poten 
tial in a system or on a control or standard indicates that 
extensive testing is required. A low loss potential indi¬ 
cates that less testing is required. SAS 1 notes this in¬ 
verse relationship. It states: 
The second standard of field work recognizes that the 
extent of tests required to constitute sufficient evi¬ 
dential matter under the third standard vary inversely 
with the auditor's reliance on internal control.^0 
This researcher suggests, however, that the quality of evi¬ 
dence required and the costs of performing the tests are ad¬ 
ditional criteria which may be employed in choosing the 
tests. 
Mautz and Sharaf suggest that as propositions being 
tested increase in materiality the stronger the evidence 
must be. They state: 
The persuasiveness of audit evidence increases, approach 
ing compulsion as different types of evidence combine to 
support any given proposition. . . . The more material 
the proposition under consideration, the stronger must 
be the evidence upon which judgment rests, varying from 
a merely persuasive preponderance for immaterial propo¬ 
sitions to compelling or near compelling evidence for 
material propositions. 
Mautz and Sharaf note, however, that the strength of the 
evidence varies with the nature of the assertion being 
tested because the nature of the assertion determines to a 
great extent the types of audit evidence possible. They di- 
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vide the nature of assertions into four groups. Group I 
asserts the existence of physical things and can be tested 
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empirically by physical examination and counts. The evi¬ 
dence gathered for this group is compelling. Group II as¬ 
serts some mathematical computation, and can be tested ra¬ 
tionally by recomputation. The evidence gathered for this 
group is also compelling. Group III asserts the existence 
of physical things not present and can be tested authorita¬ 
tively by confirmation with third parties or by reviewing 
authoritative documentation. The evidence gathered for this 
group is merely persuasive. 
The fourth, group asserts the existence of nonphysical 
things, the nonexistence of physical and nonphysical things, 
qualitative judgments and value judgment quantities. These 
assertions are tested in many different ways and the evi¬ 
dence gathered is merely persuasive. 
In a privacy audit the majority of the evidence pos¬ 
sible is merely persuasive. For example, evidence on the 
accuracy of personal records is gathered by confirmation, 
which is merely persuasive. Much of the evidence can be 
gathered using a combination of authoritarianism and ration¬ 
alism. For example, the limiting of the access and use of 
personal data can be tested by reviewing documentation, by 
interviewing personnel and by reviewing access logs created 
by the computer. This evidence is authoritarian. This evi¬ 
dence can be complemented by testing the access controls to 
determine their effectiveness. This evidence is rational. 
Mautz and Sharaf state, as quoted above, that the 
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persuasiveness of audit evidence increases as different types 
of evidence combine to support a proposition. This is the 
philosophical side of the arguments presented above that au¬ 
dit tests should be a combination of tests of processing re¬ 
sults and tests of controls. 
The auditor should, then, determine the strength of 
evidence necessary, given the magnitude of the loss potential. 
If the loss potential is high and the nature of the proposi¬ 
tion being tested cannot lead to compelling evidence, then 
different types of tests will be required to increase the 
persuasiveness of the evidence. The auditor should not make 
a conclusion on the effectiveness of a significant control 
unless the evidence is strong. 
The second criteria which might be considered in de¬ 
signing audit tests is the cost of the tests to be performed. 
As the quantity of tests increases to increase the persua¬ 
siveness of the evidence, the cost of the audit increases. 
Also as the sophistication of the audit techniques increases, 
the initial costs of acquiring the expertise required to per¬ 
form the techniques increases. This expertise is acquired by 
increased training or by hiring of consultants. Also some 
tests will require more time. Time may be needed to design 
the tests or time may be needed to write specialized software 
for the tests. Client or audit firm computer time may also 
be required. Should the overall cost of the audit be a 
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consideration, then the costs of the audit tests should be 
used in designing the audit program. 
Three criteria which might be used in deciding the ex¬ 
tent of audit testing have now been identified. These cri¬ 
teria are loss potential (LP), quality of evidence (Q), and 
cost of audit tests (C). The LP might loosely be termed the 
audit "criticality" and the Q and C combined, the audit ef¬ 
fort. The SAC reports identified different methods of com- 
6 3 
bining these factors to decide on an audit plan. First, 
audit need might be defined as criticality multiplied by ef¬ 
fort. Second, audit need might be defined as criticality 
without considering effort. Third, audit cost-benefit might 
be defined as criticality divided by effort. Relating this 
to the criteria developed above, these three formulations are 
derived: 
Audit need = LP x Q x C; or 
Audit need = LP; 
Audit cost - benefit = LP + (Q x C). 
The auditor conducting the privacy audit would need to con¬ 
sider the environment and objectives which exist for the au¬ 
dit in question before deciding the use of the criteria above 
in designing the audit tests. 
Perform Audit Tests 
After considering the criteria developed in the section 
above, the auditor would design the tests necessary to 
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evaluate the effectiveness of the privacy standard for each 
system of personal records. The tools which might be used 
to evaluate the proposition of each standard will be out¬ 
lined in the next major section below (Audit Tools). The 
final step in the privacy audit process is an evaluation of 
the results of the tests. 
Evaluation of the Privacy System of Control 
After performing the audit tests, the auditor must make 
judgments as to the degree of effectiveness of the techniques 
implemented by the organization to enact the privacy stan¬ 
dards. Although the auditor might intuitively reach conclu¬ 
sions on the effectiveness of the system of control, this 
section offers three more quantitative evaluation methods. 
The first method requires the calculation of a privacy 
rating (PR) which is a variation on Hoffman's security rat- 
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ing (SR). The privacy rating can be calculated for each 
privacy standard for each system. The privacy rating is de¬ 
fined as follows: 
1 n 
PR (s,r) = - T G. I. 
p n if;1 1 k 
where: 
PR (s,r) = privacy rating of system s by rater r. Sub- 
P script p notes that all ratings are partial 
system ratings. Each privacy standard is 
rated separately 
n = number of controls being considered 
= "goodness" of control i; CUG<_1 G. 
l 
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I. = importance of control i. Also equals p.w., 
probability of exposure i and weight of1 1 
importance of control i over exposure i. 
n 
Note: 0<I. for l<i<n and 7 I.=n 
i=i 1 
The constraint that I^=n insures that perfectly 
private systems have a rating of 1 for all standards and a 
system totally deficient of privacy safeguards would have a 
rating of 0 for all standards. 
The goodness rating is the subjective evaluation of the 
auditor based on the results of the audit tests. Note that 
the auditor would consider this goodness a degree of effec¬ 
tiveness since G is between 0 and 1. If a test shows a con¬ 
trol to be effective half the time, then G might equal 0, 
since that result would be totally unacceptable. If a con¬ 
trol is found to be effective 99% of the time, then G might 
equal .8 or .9, for example. 
The importance rating I would have to be transformed 
each time that a new PR is calculated. The auditor would de¬ 
cide which controls are to be evaluated, multiply the rele¬ 
vant P and W ratings and scale the results such that for a 
given PR calculation, £ I^=n. 
The PR measure could be used to evaluate each standard 
within a system. The auditor may choose to use the absolute 
results and assume that scores of .9 or better for all stan¬ 
dards are sufficient for an unqualified opinion in the au¬ 
ditor's privacy report. 
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The auditor should use this measure carefully. Each 
component of the result as well as the result itself should 
be evaluated since as Hoffman notes: 
. . . that equation rejects to some extent the theory 
that 'a chain is no stronger than its weakest link.' 
This is the reason that only partial system ratings are sug¬ 
gested here. It cannot be assumed that one effective stan¬ 
dard cancels out an ineffective standard to result in an ef¬ 
fective privacy program. It would not be correct, for ex¬ 
ample, to assume that an effective collection limitation 
standard compensates for an ineffective use limitation stan¬ 
dard resulting in an effective privacy protection program. 
A second evaluation method involves extending the use 
of the barrier set B diagrammed in figure 9. After having 
defined the relevant composite linguistic variables B the 
auditor would perform audit tests to determine a linguistic 
value for the variables. R, the security measure resistance. 
Having filled in the values for all variables &, the auditor 
f\j 
can-*then review each barrier B and the barrier set B. The 
results of this review is a "fuzzy" rating for each barrier 
or a combination of barriers making up a sub-set of B for a 
privacy standard. 
The third method for evaluation is to compare the re¬ 
sults of the tests to some predetermined standard or maximum. 
The PR measure could be compared with a maximum possible PR 
measure. PR would be calculated twice. One calculation 
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would be performed as above. The second would be calculated 
with G values being the highest that could be given at the 
conclusion of the audit tests. Then 
PR actual 
PR maximum 
= privacy protection index 
and index = 1.00 to .90 excellent 
.49 to 0 very poor 
The auditor could with experience in conducting privacy au¬ 
dits develop more realistic maximum figures for G and rely 
less on absolute values for PR and more on the privacy pro¬ 
tection index. 
Audit Tools 
This section presents some audit tools which could be 
used to test the effectiveness of the controls implemented 
to enact the privacy standards in an organization. The pre¬ 
sentation for each standard briefly reviews the causes of 
exposures and the controls used to reduce the probability of 
those exposures. These were outlined in figure 7. The pre¬ 
sentation for each standard then goes on to suggest tools 
which could be used by the auditor to test the effectiveness 
of the controls in reducing the probability of the causes of 
the exposures. It should be noted that all of these tools 
are now used by auditors in conducting EDP audits. No at¬ 
tempt has been made to present an exhaustive list of the 
tools which could be used in each case. Also, since some 
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tools are used many times, they will be briefly described 
only when they are introduced. 
This presentation does not include the more common or 
more pervasive type controls. For example, training, qua¬ 
lified personnel, general systems development controls and 
general controls over the information processing center are 
ignored. Only those controls which can be directly related 
to the privacy standard causes of exposure are presented 
here. Also, these controls are not intended to be a defini¬ 
tive, complete list. There are many variations of privacy 
protection implementation possible which preclude presenting 
a definitive list of controls in this research. 
The controls and the audit methods suggested to not 
attempt to address the issue of efficiency. Whether one im¬ 
plementation is more efficient than another is not of concern 
in this presentation. 
Openness 
There are four causes of exposures possible for this 
standard. First, the public notice of existence of the data 
bank is either not published or the notice does not reach a 
substantial portion of the potential candidates for inclusion 
in the data bank. The organization might control for this 
situation by creating a suspense file or an annual budget re¬ 
quirement that reminds the organization to renew its public 
notices. During this annual renewal process the organization 
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might review the characteristics of the target audience and 
compare this to the audience of the media being used. 
The auditor could test these controls by physically 
examining the notices and by reviewing the documentation re¬ 
quiring the periodic review and the documentation that re¬ 
sults from this review. If the auditor wishes to complement 
this review, a confirmation process might be undertaken to 
determine the extent to which the notices actually reached 
the target audience. Using generalized or custom-designed 
audit software the auditor could sample the file of personal 
records and prepare confirmations to be sent to the indivi¬ 
duals who have records in the organization's files in an at¬ 
tempt to confirm that the individual knows of the existence 
and of the uses of the data bank. 
The use of audit software, especially generalized au¬ 
dit software (GAS), is quite common among auditors. It is 
recommended for use several times during this presentation 
and is explained in general here. GAS is used to examine 
files, verify application processing and controls, correct 
file conditions and to process inquiries. Functions which 
can be specified, usually by choosing parameters, are access 
ing files, arithmetic operations, logical operations, record 
handling operations, updating of files, file comparisons, 
output functions and statistical functions. As internal 
storage structures have become more complex and as the use 
of DBMS has increased the effectiveness of GAS has decreased 
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GAS packages are often unable to access the data directly 
which either prevents their use altogether, forcing the au¬ 
ditor to use the much more expensive method of custom- 
designed software or requires that the auditor have the 
client create an interface between the GAS and the client's 
data. This last alternative raises the question of auditor 
independence which was addressed above. 
The results of the auditor's confirmation process, 
testing the extent of public notice success, should be inter¬ 
preted carefully. The auditor needs to exercise judgment in 
what the results of the confirmation process mean with re¬ 
gards the effectiveness of the organization in reaching its 
target audience, those people who are likely candidates for 
inclusion in the data banks. 
This second cause of exposures for this standard is 
the failure to notify individuals who actually have records 
about them in the data bank. Notices would include informa¬ 
tion that such a record does exist and the uses of that re¬ 
cord. The causes are that pre-printed input and output forms 
are not used nor are notices printed on periodic correspon¬ 
dence with the individuals, such as statements. Control for 
this cause of exposures could be the standardization of 
forms, the segregation of the duties of preparing documents 
and forms from the duties of using the forms for input or 
of sending the documents to the individual. Automatic print¬ 
ing of notices on correspondence might also be employed with 
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the responsibility for verifying that documents have notices 
again being segregated from the responsibility for printing 
notices. 
The auditor can test these controls by reviewing or¬ 
ganization charts and job descriptions for appropriate se¬ 
gregation of duties. The auditor might also review documen¬ 
tation on procedures, observe operations, conduct inquiries, 
and review source document files to see if they are the ap¬ 
propriate pre-printed forms. Finally, the auditor might 
conduct a confirmation with individuals about whom records 
are stored to verify that they were originally and periodic¬ 
ally informed of the existence, contents and uses of the 
data bank. 
The use of documentation review, observation, and in¬ 
quiry is suggested often in this section on audit tools. 
When such tools are suggested it is intended that they sup¬ 
plement other tools since by themselves they do not produce 
very persuasive evidence. For example, the use of confirma¬ 
tions combined with the review, observation and inquiries 
will give more conclusive evidence than any single tool that 
no secret personal record systems exist. 
The third cause of exposure is the lack of the capa¬ 
bility of accurately informing individuals in a timely manner 
upon request that a record about them either does or does not 
exist in the data bank. The primary control that an 
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organization can use is a mechanized procedure in the compu¬ 
ter system itself. 
The auditor can easily establish that this capability 
exists by requesting that this process be demonstrated and 
then observing the operation. The auditor may wish to test 
that this process does not fail to find the requested record 
if it is in the system. The auditor can either test the 
process itself or the results of the process. 
To test the process itself the auditor would need to 
capture actual requests (inputs) and the results of those 
requests and, using these, attempt to duplicate the process 
using GAS. If the results are the same then the process is 
confirmed. This technique is called parallel simulation and 
is an automated version of what has been termed "auditing 
around the computer." 
Another method of verifying the processing would be 
the creation of "dummy" personal records in the data bank. 
The auditor would make up dummy requests for those records 
and have them processed along with "live" requests for real 
records. Since the auditor knows that these dummy records 
exist, all requests should result in a positive response. 
For completeness the auditor should actually submit dummy 
requests for records known not to exist. The dummy records 
are known as integrated test facilities (ITF) and the dummy 
requests are known as test data. The combination of the two 
will verify the phases of processing. 
237 
To verify the results of this process the auditor 
could take the output from the normal request process and 
verify, using GAS, that the records either do or do not ex¬ 
ist. 
The final causes of exposures is the public and indi¬ 
vidual notices containing incomplete or inaccurate informa¬ 
tion. The organization controls for this by insuring that 
its privacy implementation corresponds to these notices. The 
auditor must make qualitative judgments regarding this cause 
of exposure. The auditor could test the control on this by 
reviewing all privacy policy and procedures and determining 
if the practices actually correspond to the information in 
the notices. 
Individual access 
There are two causes of exposures for this standard. 
First, the copy of the record provided to the individual is 
not easily understood. The organization can control for this 
by providing conversion tables in the computer system so that 
any codes are translated to explanatory phrases and by pro¬ 
viding for formatted print-outs or print-outs on pre-printed 
forms. The auditor can examine this output and determine 
its readability. 
The second cause of exposure is the printout of incom¬ 
plete copies of records. (The problem of not finding the 
record at all is discussed under the openness standard.) 
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The controls implemented by the organization depend to a 
great extent on the internal storage formats. Regardless of 
the internal storage structures, however, the accessing 
software is the main method of control. The organization 
would want to be sure, for example, that data access rou¬ 
tines do not erroneously end before successfully completing 
a traversal of a set of chained records. The organization 
might, for example, include a hash total of the contents of 
an individual's record in the master record. As details 
such as amendments are added, the hash total is updated. 
When a record is accessed the hash total of the record re¬ 
trieved must equal the hash total stored in the record. 
To test the effectiveness of these controls the au¬ 
ditor again has the choice of verifying the results of pro¬ 
cessing or verifying the processing controls themselves. 
To verify the processing controls the auditor could per 
form parallel simulation. If the internal data structures 
are complex, GAS may not be effective and special-purpose au 
dit software would have to be designed. The ITF and test 
data combination could also be used here. 
Another method of verifying processing controls is the 
snapshot method which is also called tracing and tagging. 
To use this method the auditor identifies in some way (a 
special code) those inputs that are of interest. In this 
case it would be requests for copies of records. As the 
processing of the input progresses information concerning 
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the condition of the input, the stage of processing and the 
contents of certain memory locations is output for review. 
The auditor would review the output to determine if the ac¬ 
cessing routine ended before the entire record had been ac¬ 
cessed. This method could be used in conjunction with ITF 
and test data to determine what processes were used to pro¬ 
cess the test data. 
To verify the results of processing the auditor could 
select some output records and, using GAS, verify that the 
accessing routines find all of each record requested. 
Individual participation 
The main cause of exposures for this standard is the 
failure to input record corrections and amendments to re¬ 
cords. The organization can use pre-numbered correction and 
amendment forms. The organization then devises an internally 
maintained suspense file system which periodically prints no¬ 
tices of missing form numbers. There could also be a proce¬ 
dure of putting a code on the record which has a correction 
or amendment forthcoming. If the input is not processed in 
a certain length of time, a notice is printed that there is 
an input missing. These two procedures could be performed 
simultaneously by segregated functions thus adding another 
control. 
The auditor could test many of these controls by re¬ 
viewing documentation on procedures, by reviewing organiza¬ 
tion charts and job descriptions, by inquiry and by 
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observation of operations. The auditor could also manually 
trace the process of record correction to verify that changes 
are processed. 
The auditor could verify the integrity of the programs 
used to update records through the use of test data and ITF. 
Snapshot, tracing and tagging could also be used to insure 
that inputs actually update the records. This would be 
especially important when amendments, which are not part of 
the records, are added to the file. 
To test the results of processing the auditor could 
read from the file, using GAS or some other audit software, 
copies of records which should have been updated or amended. 
The auditor can then compare the copies of the records to 
the source documents to verify the results of the update. 
Collection limitation 
The first cause of exposures for this standard is the 
lack of a policy of limited data collection and the failure 
to periodically review that policy. The organization can 
control for this cause of exposure by establishing a suspense 
which requires that the policy be reviewed by a certain date. 
The auditor can review documentation and conduct inquiries 
to see that this policy does exist and is reviewed. It 
should be noted that the auditor is not responsible for re¬ 
viewing the content of this policy. As with all privacy 
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practices the auditor is merely responsible for determining 
that what the organization has stated is as they say. 
The second cause of exposures for this standard is 
the entrance of unauthorized data into the system. To con¬ 
trol for this the organization can segregate the functions 
which prepare input forms from the functions which actually 
input the data. The forms for input could be pre-printed 
to reduce attempts to input unauthorized data. Provision 
could be made for cross-referencing source documents to in¬ 
ternal records. This feature would allow periodic compari¬ 
son of records and documents to verify that only the infor¬ 
mation on the documents is contained in the records. The 
nature of the record storage and retrieval system also of¬ 
fers controls to the organization. For example, fixed for¬ 
mat records can only contain that data for which the records 
were originally designed. Also, with DBMSs the DMD or DSMD 
can be designed to accept only authorized data types. 
To test these controls the auditor can review documen- 
tation and organization charts and job descriptions. These 
could also be compared to data authorization tables to 
verify that the accessing and updating of data permitted by 
these tables agrees with the documentation. 
The sampling of the files using GAS would serve as a 
test of the results of processing. The copies of the records 
produced by the GAS would be reviewed for unauthorized data. 
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The source document cross reference control would assist in 
» 
this test. 
The controls themselves could be tested using test 
data and ITF. The auditor would attempt to enter unautho¬ 
rized data into the system. The auditor could also use pa¬ 
rallel simulation. Using actual inputs and a simulation 
program, the auditor could verify that the simulation and 
the actual system reject the same unauthorized data. 
The tagging, tracing and snapshot methods could be 
used with live data or with test data to verify that error 
routines were called in when unauthorized data is input. 
The mapping technique could also be used with live or 
test data. This technique allows an auditor to know what 
logic modules in a program are used and how many times they 
are used. The auditor could verify, for example, that error 
routines are used the same number of times that unauthorized 
data is input. 
The third cause of exposures for this standard is the 
entrance of data into the files from unauthorized sources. 
The organization could control this cause by requiring that 
a source indicator code be a part of all inputs. As the in¬ 
puts are processed by the system a check with the source/ 
data authorization table would be made to ensure that only 
data from authorized sources in input to the system. To con 
trol the integrity of the function placing these codes on 
the source documents the organization could segregate the 
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functions preparing the documents from the functions respon¬ 
sible for input. The organization could also require an en¬ 
dorsement from a different function be placed in the source 
document. Finally, the organization may wish to rotate 
these duties or the personnel responsible for them. 
To test these controls an auditor can review documenta¬ 
tion, review organization charts and job descriptions and 
conduct inquiries. The auditor might also review the source/ 
data authorization table and the user authorization table to 
verify that these agree with the policies, procedures, and 
documentation which has been reviewed. 
It is possible that data entry personnel, who have be¬ 
come familiar ‘with their jobs, could reinput transactions 
which were rejected for unauthorized source codes by replac¬ 
ing the code with one that would be accepted. The auditor 
could test for this condition by performing an analysis of 
job accounting, log tapes or error suspense files. These 
files or tapes are created by many systems to monitor the 
actions of the system, provide for back-up and ensure that 
errors are corrected and re-input. The auditor would attempt 
to match the rejected inputs with subsequent successful in¬ 
puts in which only the source code was changed. 
An alternative to using these files for this review 
would be embedded audit data collection which is sometimes 
called concurrent processing. This technique has been also 
suggested using the name System Control Audit Review File 
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(SCARF) and Systems Management Facilities (SMF). This tech¬ 
nique collects data concerning certain transactions which 
can be subsequently reviewed by the auditor. This technique 
has been termed transaction selection when used with batch 
6 6 
systems. The auditor could set the parameters for this 
technique to store all information concerning transactions 
which were rejected for unauthorized source code. The au¬ 
ditor could then review the files to determine if the source 
code was overridden and the transaction successfully pro¬ 
cessed. The software for this technique is "embedded" in 
the application system software. This requires that the au¬ 
ditor be involved in the system design process and suggest 
the characteristics of the embedded logic. This technique 
requires, therefore, the cooperation of the internal and in¬ 
dependent auditors. It is conceivable that the embedded lo¬ 
gic be bypassed by the subsequent modification of the appli¬ 
cation system or be disabled by modification of the parame¬ 
ters. 
To verify that the embedded logic is being used at the 
time of the audit the auditor could tag "live" transactions 
and trace them or produce snapshots during the processing. 
The auditor could also combine this with mapping to be sure 
that the embedded logic is accessed for all tagged transac¬ 
tions. A combination of test data and mapping could also be 
used in this case. These techniques could also be used to 
verify that source authorization logic and the source/data 
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authorization table are called on each time a transaction is 
processed. This would verify that in all cases inputs are 
checked for unauthorized sources. 
As for other standards above, the auditor could use 
test data and ITF or parallel simulation to verify the ef¬ 
fectiveness of the controls. 
Use limitation 
The cause of exposures for this standard is unauthor¬ 
ized use of personal information. The controls which can be 
utilized for this standard include authentication/authoriza¬ 
tion routines, authorization/use tables or DMD and DSMD re¬ 
strictions for DBMSs, output distribution plans and proce- 
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dures, segregation of duties and job rotation. Mair de¬ 
scribes a technique of using "bait records" which could also 
be used by the organization. To use this technique the or¬ 
ganization creates dummy records to "bait" personnel into 
unauthorized use of personal data. The internal auditors 
could periodically review the record and the uses of it to 
determine if the record has had incidences of unauthorized 
access and use. 
The auditor would test these controls in much the same 
manner as above for collection limitation. The emphasis for 
the tests for use limitation is on testing the use controls 
rather than the source controls but the principles are the 
same. 
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Disclosures limitation 
The cause of exposures for this standard is the unau¬ 
thorized external disclosure of personal information. The 
controls implemented by the organization and audit tests of 
compliance are as above for use limitation. The one addi¬ 
tional review required of the auditor is a comparison of the 
authorization table and the reports of privacy audits of- 
third parties to verify that the organization releases per¬ 
sonal data only to other organizations which comply with 
certain privacy requirements. 
Information management 
There are four causes of exposure for this standard. 
First, the organization has not appointed a privacy monitor. 
Personnel procedures could be used to control for this 
cause. Requiring that a position or number of positions in 
the organization have as part of their job description the 
duties of privacy monitor and that these positions have a 
high priority for hiring could serve as a control for this 
cause. The auditor can review job descriptions, review hir¬ 
ing practices, conduct inquiries and observe operations to 
determine compliance with these controls. 
The second cause of exposure is failure to notify past 
users of data and the sources of that data of corrections 
made to the data. This process has been termed propagation 
of corrections. The organization can control for this 
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exposure by having notices automatically produced by the com¬ 
puter when erroneous data is corrected. The function pre¬ 
paring correction source documents could maintain a suspense 
file of corrections until the output notices have been re¬ 
ceived. Since it is likely that there will be a need to 
distinguish error corrections from normal data updates, it 
might be advisable to segregate these duties into two dif¬ 
ferent functions. This would preclude circumventing the 
automatic notice procedures by submitting error corrections 
as normal updates. 
The auditor could review documentation, observe opera¬ 
tions, conduct inquiries and review organization charts and 
job descriptions to verify the segregation of duties and sus¬ 
pense file aspect of these controls. 
The auditor using test data or by tagging live data 
could verify that notices automatically result from error 
correction by reviewing job accounting or other logs or files 
created by embedded audit data collection. 
The combination of tracing and mapping of live or test 
data input would be used to verify that the logic modules 
which make the notices are used when error corrections are 
input. 
Parallel simulation could be used to compare actual 
notices produced with those produced by the auditor's simula¬ 
tion software. 
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Finally, the auditor might extract a sample of error 
correction source documents and compare these to logs of er¬ 
ror correction notices to verify that the sampled documents 
all resulted in error notifications. 
The third cause of exposure is the existence of erro¬ 
neous or dated data in the personal records. Controls to 
protect the accuracy are the same general controls used to 
keep all data, personal and otherwise, accurate. To ensure 
that data is current the organization can make provisions 
for putting dates in the records along with the data and 
then periodically purging from the files that data which is 
no longer current. The assigning of dates can be performed 
automatically as data is entered. The purging routine can 
be carried out continuously or be periodically scheduled. 
The auditor can test for the automatic assignment of 
dates using test data, embedded audit data collection, 
mapping, or any number of the tests discussed above. The 
auditor can review job accounting logs, processing schedules 
and other documents to verify that the purging process is 
carried out. The results of the purging process could be 
verified by reviewing samples of the files to determine that 
only current information is present. Also, the files could 
be scanned looking for data which is being maintained beyond 
established retention dates. 
To test for the accuracy of data the auditor can use 
many of the tools which would normally be used for 
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verification. Error prevention, detection and correction 
controls could be tested for effectiveness. The auditor 
could also confirm the accuracy of the data with the indi¬ 
vidual about whom the data is stored. The process would in¬ 
volve use of GAS or other audit software to produce confir¬ 
mations to be sent to the individuals. 
The final causes of exposures for this standard is the 
nonexistence or ineffectiveness of general controls over the 
information processing facility and the systems development 
process. The controls and the audit techniques and tools 
could be those normally associated with these activities. 
Accountability 
The main cause of exposure for this standard is the 
failure to record or copy the sources and uses of personal 
information. The organization can exercise control over this 
cause by implementing automatic mechanized procedures for re¬ 
cording the information anytime that data is input or ac¬ 
cessed. The controls discussed above for collection, use 
and disclosure limitation are important here also because 
some of those controls attempt to prevent circumvention of 
the authorization processes. If the circumvention of these 
controls is effective then the sources and uses which are re¬ 
corded will be accurate. 
All of the tools necessary to test for the effective¬ 
ness have been discussed above. The auditor would need to 
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have verified the effectiveness of the use, disclosure and 
collection limitation controls to verify that when sources 
and uses are logged that they are accurate. Then the au¬ 
ditor would test the actual input and accesses to verify 
that these cause the creation of the use and source informa¬ 
tion. 
Audit tools summary 
This section has presented an overview of some sources 
of exposures, controls and audit tools for each of the eight 
privacy standards. None of this has been necessarily defi¬ 
nitive nor complete. The variations in implementations be¬ 
tween different organizations and the differences in or¬ 
ganization characteristics precludes a definitive list of 
causes of exposures for each standard. Some of the causes 
of exposure presented here may not apply to some organiza¬ 
tions while there may be some additional causes which exist 
in others. The controls used vary with the causes of expo¬ 
sure and can also be different for the same exposure because 
the particular organizational environment must be considered 
before choosing controls. 
The audit tools presented above have merely been sug¬ 
gestive of how commonly used audit tools can be applied to a 
privacy audit. Where the objectives of the tests were simi¬ 
lar for two or more standards the tests were only suggested 
in one place. In a few places there were many more tests 
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which could have been suggested. The description of the 
techniques was abbreviated since these are all described in 
6 8 
other sources. Some of these techniques have limitations. 
However, these were ignored since there are no limitations 
which are peculiar to their use in a privacy audit. 
New Techniques 
Cash presents four "new" auditing techniques which "are 
potentially important in their own right and can increase the 
effectiveness of existing methods." None of the tools pre¬ 
sented in the section above were capable of completely 
evaluating the effectiveness of controls because of the pre¬ 
ponderance of evidence necessary, the inherent limitations 
of the techniques or because of the particular environment 
which exists in the client firm. Cash suggests that these 
new techniques are attempts to overcome the shortcomings 
of the traditional audit techniques. 
This section presents an overview of these four new 
techniques. The purpose is to briefly present these tech¬ 
niques and suggest the implications of their use in a privacy 
audit. 
Software standardization 
In the discussion of technological considerations 
above the problem of audit software interface with DBMS and 
other uses of complex internal data structures was intro¬ 
duced. This interface problem may cause the auditor to 
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either sacrifice independence by having the client facili¬ 
tate the interface or to spend additional time and money de¬ 
veloping specialized software for each audit engagement. A 
solution to this problem might be the standardization of 
compilers, object code and source code. Cash states: 
The justification usually presented with these ap¬ 
proaches is that with standardized software, uniform 
examination and.evaluation procedures could be 
adopted. 
If feasible, this procedure would greatly assist the auditor 
in conducting privacy audits. However, standardization at¬ 
tempts have proven to be difficult given the particularly 
desirable features of the myriad of software alternatives. 
One standardized set of languages with all the desirable 
features would probably be too complex to be of any use. 
Systems design involvement 
Some of the audit tools suggested above require the 
participation of the auditor in the systems design process. 
The SCARF technique, for example, requires that the auditor 
specify the characteristics of the audit logic modules while 
the application system is being designed. Also, the fami¬ 
liarity with the entire system that the auditor would gain 
while participating in the design process would facilitate 
auditing the system after it was made operational. 
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Formal systems assertions 
This approach to auditing includes involvement of the 
auditor in the system design function and the introduction 
of a standard system development technique that allows for¬ 
mal assertions about the resultant system. The logical 
justification for this approach is similar to that which 
has the auditor's dependence on internal control determine 
the extent of additional testing. If the auditor can prove 
that the process used to generate application systems is re¬ 
liable then there is a higher degree of confidence that the 
resultant output system is reliable.. 
This approach offers features which facilitate the 
standardization and system design involvement techniques dis 
cussed above. The formal system assertions approach offers 
the auditor a standard set of controls and general design 
methodology with which to participate in the system design 
process. Also, this approach offers a standardized system 
design methodology which is an alternative to the software 
standards which are perceived as not viable. The specifica¬ 
tions of this approach, which are outlined below, are ob- 
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tained from a paper by Cash, Bailey and Whinston (Cash). 
The system design methodology for formal systems asser 
tions establishes four phases in the design process. Each 
phase must be proven equivalent to the ones linked to it. 
The methodology thereby asserts software system reliability 
as a result of the formalism introduced into the system 
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development cycle. Cash notes that formal system asser¬ 
tions will allow a more thorough investigation of the 
client's internal control system by reducing the time ne¬ 
cessary to verify computer program code. 
The four phases in the design process are described as 
follows: 
1. Theoretical model (TM) is a formal specification 
that addresses an abstracted version of the system. This 
phase is initiated by the presentation of user requirements 
to the systems analyst followed by a presentation by the au¬ 
ditor of system control specifications in terms of user re¬ 
quirements . 
2. Implementation specification (IS) consists of 
qualifications to the theoretical model that reflect the en¬ 
vironment in which the model is to be implemented. This 
phase involves, first, the derivation of an implementation 
specification which supports modularization of the theoreti¬ 
cal model and facilitates its implementation via a program- 
•• 
ming language. The second aspect of this phase is a formal 
proof of equivalence with the theoretical model. 
3. Source language specification (SL) is the algorith¬ 
mic representation of the implementation specifications in 
some programming language. This step is performed in a 
language which supports structured programming since program 
modules are amenable to proofs of correctness. The results 
of this phase are proved to correspond to the IS and there¬ 
fore to the TM. 
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4. Machine language representation (ML) is a transla¬ 
tion process from the source language specification. The ML 
is demonstrated to be consistent with the higher level spe¬ 
cification of the SL by certifying the correctness and the 
authenticity of the translator and resultant code. 
The Internal Control Model (TICOM) 
TICOM is a technique which facilitates the review and 
evaluation of internal controls from a total systems per¬ 
spective. This technique views the manual and automated com¬ 
ponents of the total system of control in an equal fashion. 
This technique also specifically recognizes the interaction 
of the several control perspectives. The general and spe¬ 
cific application controls, the information processing 
facility controls and the controls on the system development 
process all come together to make up the total system of in¬ 
ternal control. TICOM assists the auditor in recognizing 
these overlapping controls and in recognizing where they do 
not overlap. The potential impact that these controls can 
have on one another in preventing and failing to prevent 
causes of exposure was discussed above. 
The TICOM methodology can be applied to an existing 
system. However, the application of the formal systems as¬ 
sertion methodology is a precondition for the maximum benefit 
of TICOM. 
The general characteristics of TICOM are as follows: 
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1. Provides an encoding mechanism for internal control 
systems that views automated and manual procedures 
equally which provides a total system perspective 
for review and evaluation 
2. Uses recent EDP technological advances to facilitate 
review and evaluation of the system for more tho¬ 
rough investigation 
3. Facilitates positional analysis 
4. Eliminates 'slanted' questions on a questionnaire 
5. Allows simulation of accounting subsystems to check 
for 'lagged' (also termed 'compensatory') control 
procedures, and subsystem overlap that might condone 
fraudulent activity 
6. Facilitates viewing internal control systems at dif¬ 
ferent levels of detail which allows the auditor to 
specify the level of detail needed to perform the 
review and evaluation.73 
Although desired for accounting control, this model 
lends itself to assisting in the conduct of a privacy audit. 
The model addresses all of the issues related to the review 
and evaluation of privacy controls. This model specifically 
addresses the problem, discussed above, of the formulation 
of an opinion as to the overall effectiveness of a control 
system. The number of controls that comprise a control sys¬ 
tem could potentially cause the auditor problems in forming 
an overall evaluation. As this model views internal control 
as a total system, this problem is alleviated. 
The specifications of this approach, which are pre¬ 
sented below, are obtained from two papers by Cash, Bailey 
74 
and Whinston. 
Figure 10 is a schematic of the TICOM system. Initial¬ 
ization, Elicitation of System Description, the conversion of 
that description into the Internal Control Description 
Language (ICDL), and the submission of the ICDL to the 
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Figure 10. TICOM Schematic 
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Internal Control Description Language Analyzer (ICDLA) are 
all steps preceding the loading of the data into the Inter¬ 
nal Control Description Data Base (ICDDB). The ICDDB is a 
stored description of the manual and automated internal con¬ 
trol system. The ICDDB is a network data base structure, 
which is the data base structure proposed by the CODASYL 
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committee. Through the use of the query processor the au¬ 
ditor can objectively analyze the internal control system in 
a much more efficient manner than is presently possible. 
The essential elements of the TICOM development steps 
are as follows: 
1. Initialization is the setting up of the static and 
literal information in the internal control system. This in¬ 
formation consists of the name, title, functional and physi¬ 
cal location, and identification index for all employees of 
the client organization. 
2. Elicitation of System Description is the process 
of evoking a description of the internal control system using 
free-form or questionnaires. The questionnaires are pre¬ 
printed with the ICDL primitives and have questions such as 
"Is a form generated?" and "To whom are the parts of the 
form distributed?" The answers to the questions are fill-ins 
to skeleton ICDL primitive statements which result in com¬ 
plete ICDL statements. 
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The free-form method requires that the auditor develop 
a mental image of the internal control system and transpose 
that image into ICDL statements. 
3. Generation of Internal Control Description Language 
is a process of converting the questionnaire and free-form 
results into machine-readable form. 
4. Internal Control Description Language Analyzer de¬ 
termines the consistency and completeness of the ICDL state¬ 
ments, prints diagnostics and performs a generalized loading 
function. 
It should be noted that this system also includes the 
description and analysis of the software and hardware aspects 
of the internal control system. 
The ICDDB's network data structure supports the query 
access to date. The query language suggested by Cash is a 
GPLAN/QS which is a non-procedural language using common 
English statements of the form: 
<COMMAND><RETRIEVAL CLAUSE>CONDITIONAL CLAUSE> 
The TICOM model is only conceptual at this time. If 
and when implemented this system offers a powerful and easy 
to use tool to the auditor to assist in the review and 
evaluation of internal control systems. When combined with 
the formal system assertion methodology, the use of the TICOM 
system would allow the auditor to perform more objective and 
complete reviews of internal control and to be more prepared 
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to make judgments on the overall effectiveness of the total 
system of control. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented a model for a privacy audit. 
The goals of the model were established, the function of the 
auditor outlined, and the audit techniques suggested. 
The goals of the model were met in the following man¬ 
ner. The auditor's assumed competence is maximized by de¬ 
signing the audit function to be similar to the present re¬ 
view and evaluation of internal control and by suggesting 
tools and techniques which are already widely used. The au¬ 
ditor's limitations were minimized by requiring substantial 
input by the organization and the organization's legal coun¬ 
sel and by suggesting an alternative to the materiality cri¬ 
teria often utilized by the auditor. The privacy laws, the 
privacy committee recommendations and the GAPP framework 
satisfy the requirement for the establishment of generally 
accepted operational criteria. 
Methods were suggested whereby the auditor could col¬ 
lect verifiable, quantifiable evidence with which to make 
assertions concerning the privacy system. It was pointed out 
above that the privacy standards require the recording of 
information and installation of controls. These were dis¬ 
cussed at length in the audit technique section. Finally, 
an auditor's report of findings was suggested. 
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The auditor's function in conducting a privacy audit 
is much the same as that in conducting a financial audit. 
The auditor begins the examination with the representation 
of the organization, then reviews the system of control, 
performs tests, and finally issues a report of findings. 
Standards for the privacy audit function were suggested. 
The final section of this chapter suggested the appli¬ 
cation in a privacy audit of presently existing audit tools 
and techniques. Some "new" techniques which hold great pro¬ 
mise for assisting an auditor in conducting reviews and 
evaluations of internal control were also reviewed. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter presents a summary of the research pro¬ 
ject, discusses its limitations and proposes some actions 
for the future. 
Summary 
This research project began: with a discussion of the 
problem of privacy as it exists today. The protection of 
individuals' right to privacy is a widely discussed yet 
sometimes misunderstood topic. Privacy is a popular subject 
today for several reasons. First, there is a growing re¬ 
cognition that great financial and psychological harm can 
be done to an individual whose right to privacy has been 
violated. Second, individuals have voiced concern about 
erosion of their privacy, particularly that caused by the 
ever-increasing use of computers for record-keeping. Third, 
discussions on transborder data flow, a problem partially 
attributed to privacy are being carried out on an interna¬ 
tional basis. 
The problem of privacy is often confused with secrecy 
and computer security. Secrecy is the absence of information 
about individuals in the possession of others while privacy 
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is the control of that information by the individual. Com¬ 
puter security is a system of control implemented by an or¬ 
ganization to protect its information assets against uses 
which are not in accordance with the organization's policies 
Privacy is the right of an individual to participate in de¬ 
cisions made with .regard to that personal information which 
is in the hands of others. To participate in these deci¬ 
sions an individual needs to know what information is main¬ 
tained by others and how it is used. 
There are at this time a few laws in existence in this 
country which have attempted to give to individuals mechan¬ 
isms for participating in the decisions made with regard to 
personal information maintained by others. The Privacy Act 
of 1974 specifies certain requirements for record-keeping 
functions in the Federal Government. There are other fe¬ 
deral laws which set similar requirements for specific parts 
of the private sector. 
The Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, 
issued in July of 1977, will serve as the basis for any fur¬ 
ther implementation of privacy in the public and private 
sector. The Commission's report suggests a privacy implemen 
tation plan that involves legal requirements, voluntary com¬ 
pliance, the right to remedy violations of privacy in the 
courts and a permanent privacy commission to participate in 
the formulation of privacy legislation and to monitor the 
implementation of The Privacy Act of 1974. The Commission 
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was guided in formulating its implementation plan by three 
principles. These are: first, that incentives for systemic 
reform should be created; second, that existing regulatory 
and enforcement mechanisms should be used as much as pos¬ 
sible; and third, that unnecessary cost be avoided. 
This researcher has suggested that the Commission's 
plan is incomplete because the implementation principles did 
not address all of the privacy issue. Three additional im¬ 
plementation principles were added. These are: first, that 
consideration be given to the movement for an international 
privacy policy; second, that the impact of technology on 
compliance be considered; and third, that information be 
provided to the general public concerning the privacy proce¬ 
dures of record-keeping organizations. 
The resulting privacy implementation model suggested 
in chapter III includes an audit by certified public accou- 
tants (CPAs) of the privacy safeguards implemented by 
record-keeping organizations. This audit would be supple¬ 
mentary to the plan of the Privacy Commission. The legal re¬ 
quirements, voluntary compliance, recourse in the courts, the 
proposed privacy commission and the audit would be comple¬ 
mentary functions. 
Since the CPA is required now to review and evaluate 
internal control during the financial audit, the privacy au¬ 
dit, which is also a review and evaluation of internal con¬ 
trol, should be conducted as a part of the financial audit 
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to minimize the cost of the privacy audit. The resulting 
report of the auditor would be used by individuals, other or¬ 
ganizations, and the proposed privacy commission to evaluate 
the privacy procedures of record-keeping organizations. 
Having an independent function publicly report on the 
privacy procedures implemented by organizations balances 
the needs of individuals and other interested parties to know 
about and control the information maintained about them with 
the needs of organizations to use personal information to 
manage their affairs. The public independent report is a 
strong incentive for organizations to conform to a certain 
norm of privacy practices. The courts act as a safety valve 
in this plan. When violations do occur, an individual's 
last resort is recourse in the courts. Finally, the pro¬ 
posed privacy commission serves as a national focal point 
for monitoring privacy practices, privacy violations and 
technology advances. By accumulating and evaluating this in¬ 
formation, the commission can suggest privacy practices and 
implementation plans in the future. 
The arguments for an audit of privacy safegurds are 
summarized as follows. First, changes in the laws and the 
responsiveness of the courts to those laws occur much more 
slowly than changes in computer technology. An audit is a 
compliance monitoring mechanism which can more easily keep 
pace with changes in technology. By verifying compliance 
with privacy laws and privacy commission recommendations. 
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the audit mechanism can provide a more timely check on the 
use of technology in violation of the right to privacy. 
Second, the audit is a preemptive mechanism which attempts 
to prevent privacy violations. This is more desirable, given 
the effects of privacy violations, than use of the courts 
which, although a necessary component of the privacy pro¬ 
tection plan, can only correct privacy violations after they 
have been found to have occurred. Third, the use of the 
audit mechanism may be a way for the United States to parti¬ 
cipate in international transborder data flow agreements. 
The present privacy plan of courts and a commission does not 
appear to be acceptable to other countries. 
It was suggested that the logical candidate for con¬ 
ducting the privacy audit is the CPA. That the CPA should 
conduct the privacy audit has not been suggested prior to 
this research. This reseracher only found a few places in 
the literature which mentioned a privacy audit and none made 
any suggestion of who might conduct the audit. This is so 
because the concern about privacy rights is only a recent de¬ 
velopment. 
There are certainly alternatives to the CPA for this 
job. The creation of a new government agency or private pro¬ 
fession was dismissed by this researcher because of the cost 
and time necessary for development. The Privacy Protection 
Study Commission raised the issue of the constitutionality 
of any government monitoring of privacy safeguards in the 
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private sector. This would preclude the use of the General 
Accounting Office or other existing or any newly created 
government agency for privacy audits. The use of internal 
auditors was dismissed by this researcher because that pro¬ 
fession presently lacks the appearance of independence 
which would be necessary to give credibility to the audit 
report. 
To facilitate the audit and to give guidance to the 
auditor an audit model was devised. The model consists of 
audit standards, a framework, and suggested audit techniques 
to assist the auditor in conducting the audit. 
The standards suggested are extensions of the present 
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. The framework of 
Generally Accepted Privacy Principles (GAPP) was devised to 
assist organizations in implementing privacy practices and 
to assist the auditor in reviewing and evaluating those prac¬ 
tices. The GAPP framework assists the organizations be¬ 
cause it gives some order to the many privacy procedures and 
relates all procedures to a set of privacy goals. This al¬ 
lows the organization to implement privacy with some idea 
of the intent of the various practices. This framework as¬ 
sists the auditor because it is similar in structure to the 
present Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
which are used for a financial audit. The main difference 
between the GAPP and the GAAP frameworks is that the GAPP 
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is only a classification scheme for the various privacy 
practices. 
The audit model concludes with a suggested audit pro¬ 
gram which is very similar to that conducted by an auditor 
in reviewing and evaluating internal control. The auditor 
reviews the representation of management to determine what 
the organization has planned to do to protect privacy. The 
auditor then evaluates this plan for effectiveness using the 
same tools presently used in a financial audit. Some new 
audit tools, which might be of assistance to the auditor in 
conducting privacy audits, were also introduced. 
Recommendations for the Future 
This study has been exploratory in nature which makes 
it quite limited. The privacy and audit models are based on 
the assumptions of this researcher. Statistical tests are 
impractical at this stage. The resulting models are there¬ 
fore based on insights rather than on any conclusive proofs. 
The next stage in the research into a solution of the 
privacy problem should be a validation of the assumptions on 
which the privacy model is based. It should be determined 
if an independent report concerning the privacy practices of 
organizations in this country will satisfy other nations who 
would like to see an omnibus privacy law and a regulatory 
agency. A study of the costs of conducting the privacy audit 
should be undertaken to determine if the incremental costs 
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are less using this model than they would be if some other 
independent agency conducted the audit. In conducting such 
a study the researcher should be careful to record incremen¬ 
tal costs above the costs of what the auditor should be do¬ 
ing and not necessarily above those things that the auditor 
is doing. In studying the costs it should also be deter¬ 
mined who is to pay for the audit. Those who benefit from 
the audit should be those who incur the cost. The third as¬ 
sumption that was made was that a public report of the pri¬ 
vacy practices of an organization would be an effective mo¬ 
tivation for an organization to practice a certain norm of 
privacy protection. A study should be conducted to validate 
this assumption. It should be determined if this public re¬ 
port will overcome the possibility that technology will make 
the violation of privacy rights quite attractive to record¬ 
keeping organisations. 
Research is also necessary to validate the audit model. 
A study should be conducted to determine if the audit model 
and the GAPP framework is helpful to the organization and 
the auditor. After this model is implemented it will be 
necessary to accumulate information on the relative effec¬ 
tiveness of the various control techniques and audit tools. 
The proposed privacy commission might be a good focal point 
for accumulating this information. This would allow a con¬ 
tinuous revision of these controls and audit techniques to 
get a "best set" for use by organizations and auditors. 
275 
One audit tool that was introduced was the Internal 
Control Model (TICOM). This tool is only conceptual at this 
time. Research needs to be done in further developing this 
tool. The TICOM technique appears to hold great promise for 
assisting the auditor in conducting a review and evaluation 
of internal control. A specific application of interest for 
this research is the use of this tool in reviewing and eval¬ 
uating privacy practices. 
Should the privacy and audit models be validated and 
found to be a desirable complement to the privacy implementa¬ 
tion plan of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, addi¬ 
tional actions would be necessary. The American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants would need to publish a set of 
audit standards for use in a privacy audit. These would 
provide guidance to the auditor in conducting the audit and 
would provide the readers of the privacy reports with a stan¬ 
dard report with which to comparatively evaluate the prac¬ 
tices of organizations. It is also possible that a legisla¬ 
tive requirement for such audits would be desirable. Sug¬ 
gesting that organizations will voluntarily submit to privacy 
audits may not be realistic. 
Conclusions 
This research has introduced a plan for the implementa¬ 
tion of privacy which attempts to satisfy the perceived needs 
of all parties concerned with the privacy problem. A 
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framework for making this plan feasible has also been sug¬ 
gested. There is additional developmental research required 
before the plan can be implemented. The results of this 
study are, however, a sound basis for conducting such de¬ 
velopment. It is hoped that this study can be the basis for 
an efficient, effective privacy protection program. 
Research into the area of privacy is just beginning. 
The problem of protecting privacy is quite complex. There 
may not be a privacy implementation mechanism which satis¬ 
factorily meets the needs of all competing interests. This 
research suggests one solution. As research continues on the 
subject, alternative solutions may be suggested. It may be 
years before a .solution is found. This research has been an 
attempt to establish the groundwork for the future research. 
The conclusion reached above that the CPA is the logi¬ 
cal candidate for conducting the privacy audit may be found 
to be less than satisfactory to some. There are several 
reasons for this. First, that the CPA is the lowest cost al- 
ternative may not be true. In the short-run, the cost of 
training for CPAs should be less than costs for the alterna¬ 
tive functions. In the long-run this may not be the case. 
Also, there may be costs, both monetary and non-monetary, 
other than training, which should be considered. 
Second, the CPA is shown above to be eminently quali¬ 
fied for this task because the privacy audit is presented as 
very similar to tasks already performed by the CPA. This 
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may not be the case. The CPA review of privacy controls is 
an end in itself while the CPA review of internal control in 
financial audits is one phase in the review of financial 
statements. The CPA can review these statements without re¬ 
liance on the controls should that be necessary. In a pri¬ 
vacy audit there is no alternative to the controls them¬ 
selves. This is a situation quite different for the auditor. 
Third, the CPA is again presented as qualified for this 
task because there are no new audit tools required. The au¬ 
dit program outlined above did not present any audit tools 
not already found in use by auditors. The application of 
these tools in a privacy audit would, however, be different. 
For example, the sampling of receivable files with audit 
software for the purpose of obtaining confirmations and 
thereby establishing the accuracy of the stated amount of 
receivables is not the same as doing that confirmation for 
personal record files to determine if the information is ac¬ 
curate. The auditor is familiar with the results of receiv¬ 
able confirmations and is not necessarily familiar with the 
results of personal record confirmations. The auditor can 
reach a conclusion concerning asset overstatements after re¬ 
viewing confirmation results because the auditor is an ac¬ 
countant. The auditor may not be able to reach a conclusion 
on the overall accuracy of personal records. 
Fourth, the CPA was chosen for this task because of the 
perceived independence of the profession. It may be that the 
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internal auditor will eventually be perceived as independent 
when reporting to an audit committee. Should the general 
public perceive this independence, the internal auditor may 
be a better choice for the task of conducting a privacy au¬ 
dit. The internal auditor uses all of the tools suggested 
for a privacy audit. Also, the internal auditor is involved 
on an ongoing basis with the organization. This permits an 
intimate knowledge of the privacy requirements for a company 
and also permits the more effective use of the audit tools 
which require constant system design involvement. 
Finally, the CPA was chosen for this task because of 
what was thought to be a considerable overlap of financial 
audit and privacy audit tasks. This was required by the goal 
of minimizing cost. Should the internal auditor be given the 
task, the minimization of cost could be realized. More im¬ 
portant, however, is the issue of overlap. It is true that 
many controls implemented for financial records are the same 
as those implemented for personal records. It is also true 
r 
that all of the tools required of the auditor for a privacy 
audit are used for financial audits. However, some of the 
controls for privacy are not those used for financial re¬ 
cords. There may be a difference in the importance of the 
controls. It may not be obvious to the auditor that some 
controls used for financial records are more or less impor¬ 
tant with regard to privacy. Also, the application of the 
audit tools differs. It is not determined at this time the 
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amount of overlap between these two tasks. The desirability 
of having the CPA conduct privacy audits hinges on this 
point. The suggestion that an audit be conducted and the 
presentation of an audit program remain as significant con¬ 
tributions of this research regardless of the outcome of that 
debate. 
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